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ABSTRACT 
This research examines the treatment of terror detainees during pre­charge 
detention in Pakistan and the UK. Pakistan is the principal focus and the UK acts as a 
comparator thereto. Suspected terrorists are more vulnerable to maltreatment during pre­
charge detention. Their vulnerability increases more in a country like Pakistan where 
more than 60,000 people have died in various terrorist attacks. Arguably, there is no case­
study on the topic in Pakistan and the UK has not been used as a comparator. This 
scholarship, therefore, attempts to fill the gap by evaluating the treatment of terror 
detainees during pre­charge detention in Pakistan by using relevant human rights law and 
principles as a yardstick and the UK as a comparator to the main case.    
This scholarship uses liberal critique research methodology assessing pre­charge 
terror detention in the following six themes: the period of pre­charge terror detention; 
police interrogation and questioning; internal police review mechanisms; police records; 
the rights of a terror suspect to contact the outside world; and the detention conditions. 
The relevant anti­terror legislation of the two countries will be used to find the law on the 
topic. The related provisions in the UDHR, ICCPR and UNCAT will also be used to find 
out how we ought to treat terror detainees in a criminal justice system.  
The results show that the UK fulfils most of its human rights obligations, while 
Pakistan does not. The UK provides a maximum period of 14 days for pre­charge 
detention, while Pakistan has 90 days. A terror suspect can be interrogated for up to two 
hours at a time in the UK, while police interrogation sessions in Pakistan are unlimited. 
The UK includes internal police review mechanism as a check on the special powers of 
the police, while there is no such arrangement in Pakistan. The countries also differ in 
their police records, the rights of a terror suspect to contact the outside world and the 
detention conditions. Consequently, Pakistan can arguably learn from the UK’s 
experience on the topic. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
1.0 Background 
In 1998, Osama Bin Laden issued the following statement demanding war on the 
United States and its allies: “Kill the Americans...in any country in which it is possible...in 
order for their armies to move out of all the lands of Islam... We also call on Muslims...to 
launch the raid on Satan’s US troops...so that they may learn a lesson.”1 On September 
11, 2001 (‘9/11’) his group, Al­Qaida, attacked the twin towers of the World Trade Centre 
in New York and the Pentagon in Washington. Soon after, the United States claimed the 
right of self­defence against Al­Qaida and its associates before the United Nations 
Security Council.2 In October 2001, the United States attacked the Taliban regime in 
Afghanistan, which allegedly harboured Al­Qaida. The United States termed these attacks 
on Al­Qaida the ‘War on Terror’. 
Following its invasion of Afghanistan, the US military imprisoned hundreds of 
suspects at its Guantanamo Bay Naval Base in Cuba.3 The US administration pronounced 
these detainees as “unlawful combatants”.4 They were, therefore, denied the protections 
guaranteed by the US Constitution and by international humanitarian laws.5 The US 
government also refused to treat them in accordance with the liberty and security of 
person rights in international human rights laws, which have universal applicability—
                                                          
1Baxi, U. (2005) ‘The “War on Terror” and the “War of Terror”: Nomadic Multitudes, Aggressive 
Incumbents, and the “New” International Law’, Osgoode Hall Law Journal, p. 14. 
2 Rehman, J. (2003) International Human Rights Law, London, New York: Pearson Education Limited 
pp. 911­914; see also, Beard, J. (2001) ‘America’s New War on Terror: The Case for Self­Defence Under 
International Law’, Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy, Vol 25, pp. 559 – 560. 
3 Malinowski, T. (2008) ‘Restoring Moral Authority: Ending Torture, Secret Detention, and the Prison at 
Guantanamo Bay’, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 618, p. 149. 
4 Ibid; see also, Macken, C (2011) Counter­terrorism and the Detention of Suspected Terrorists: 
Preventive Detention and international Human Rights Law, New York: Routledge, pp. 1­4 
5 Ibid.  
Page 11 of 272 
 
across the globe and to every one of us. Instead, the administration authorised its own 
rules for the treatment of these detainees.6 It sanctioned certain interrogation techniques 
possibly amounting to ill­treatment against the detainees held there, including 
waterboarding, truth serums, hooding, forced shaving of hair, deprivation of light and 
auditory stimuli, removal of clothing and all comfort items, etc.7  
The US­led ‘War on Terror’ soon spread to other regions and countries. Iraq was 
attacked in 2003, alleging that Saddam Hussain, the then Iraqi leader, possessed weapons 
of mass destruction and that it was highly likely for the weapons to be used against the 
US if Al­Qaida had acquired them.8 In 2004, 10 bombs exploded in four trains in Madrid 
killing 191 people and injuring more than 1800.9 Similarly, the ‘War on Terror’ arrived 
in the UK in 2005 when a series of coordinated terrorist bombs exploded during the 
morning rush hour, hitting London’s public transport system.10 This attack killed 52 and 
it injured another 700. It caused severe disruption and affected the nation’s 
telecommunication systems.11 Al­Qaida was behind these attacks.12 Several terrorist 
attacks have since been launched in the UK, including those in Manchester and London 
in 2017. Since 2005, many terror suspects in the UK have been arrested and prosecuted 
while hundreds are still under terrorist investigation.13 Has the UK resorted to harming 
these detainees? What human rights protections are in place to safeguard terror detainees 
from possible police abuses and maltreatment during pre­charge detention in the country? 
                                                          
6 Nowak, M. (2006) ‘What Practices Constitute Torture? US and UN Standards’, Human Rights 
Quarterly, Vol. 28, No. 4, pp. 812 – 813. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Encyclopaedia Britannica, Iraq War 2003 available at https://www.britannica.com/event/Iraq­War last 
accessed 24 October 2017 
9 Ibid, Madrid Train Bombings of 2004, available at https://www.britannica.com/event/Madrid­train­
bombings­of­2004 last accessed 24 October 2017 
10Memon, N., et al. (2008) “Detecting Hidden Hierarchy in Terrorist Networks: Some Case Studies” 
Intelligence and Security Informatics Lecture Notes in Computer Science 5075.at pp.484–485. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Spillet, R. (14 September 2017) “One terror suspect is arrested EVERY DAY in Britain with dozens 
being held after the London and Manchester attacks”, Daily Mail available at 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article­4883290/Almost­400­terror­arrests­Britain­
year.html#ixzz4wSojYUJj last accessed 24 October 2017 
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Can the UK’s treatment of terror detainees be used as a model from which to learn? Or 
should the UK do more to protect the treatment of terror detainees when fighting 
terrorism? 
The ‘War on Terror’ has also caused havoc in Pakistan. More than 60,000 people 
have died in the country since 2003.14 One of the country’s ex­Prime Ministers, Benazir 
Bhutto, has also fallen prey to the war.15 Owing to this threat, Pakistan has launched many 
military operations within its territory to fight against terrorism.16 The country has also 
made a ‘National Action Plan’ to combat terrorism.17 Pakistan has enacted new anti­terror 
laws and also amended its existing Anti­Terrorism Act 1997 more than 20 times to 
contain the threat.18 These laws allow for capital punishments, such as death penalty, life 
imprisonment and indefinite detention. More than 30,000 terrorists/insurgents have been 
killed during these operations and hundreds have been executed.19 Similarly, thousands 
have been arrested on suspicion of terrorism and are still pending trial.20 
Pakistan has concurrently adopted the ‘war model’ of the US and the ‘crime’ or 
‘justice’ model of the UK in its fight against terrorism. The treatment of terror detainees 
under the ‘war model’ is a question for international humanitarian law. This thesis will 
                                                          
14 South Asia Terrorism Portal (22 October 2017) Pakistan, available at 
http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/database/casualties.htm last accessed 30 October 2017 
15 “Assassination” (2007) Benazir Bhutto, available at 
http://www.benazirbhutto.com/assassinatination.html, last accessed 30 October 2017 
16 Buncombe, A. (16 June 2014) “Pakistan Steps­up Military Operation to Oust Taliban Militants from 
North Waziristan”, available at http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/pakistan­military­steps­
up­operation­to­oust­taliban­militants­9539611.html last accessed 30 October 2017; See also, Yousaf, K. 
(21 August 2017) “Rajgal Cleansed of Terrorists as Military Concludes Operation Khyber – IV”, Tribune 
International, available at https://tribune.com.pk/story/1487260/army­announces­completion­operation­
khyber­4/ last accessed 30 October 2017; See also, Plett, B. (23 May 2009) “Pakistan Army Vows Swat 
Victory”, BBC New, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/8065320.stm last accessed 
30 October 2017 
17 The Nation (12 January 2015) “ The National Action Plan”, available at http://nation.com.pk/12­Jan­
2015/the­national­action­plan last accessed 30 October 2017 
18 The Protection of Pakistan Act 2014; See also, Bokhari, S.W. (2013) “Pakistan’s Challenges in Anti­
terror Legislation”, Centre for Research and Security Studies. 
19 South Asia Terrorism Portal (22 October 2017) Pakistan, available at 
http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/database/casualties.htm ; see also, Cornell Centre on the 
Death Penalty Worldwide ( 30 October 2017) Pakistan, available at 
http://www.deathpenaltyworldwide.org/country­search­post.cfm?country=Pakistan  
20 Bokhari, S.W. (2013) “Pakistan’s Challenges in Anti­terror Legislation”, Centre for Research and 
Security Studies. 
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investigate how suspected terrorists are treated under the ‘crime’ or ‘justice’ model in 
Pakistan. Although it may not be mandatory for the ‘war model’, the ‘crime’ or ‘justice’ 
model demands fair treatment of terror suspects. Does the war model influence the justice 
model in Pakistan and the country resort to the abuse and maltreatment of terror suspects? 
Or, are Pakistan’s anti­terror laws and actions regulating the treatment of terror suspects 
under the justice model in compliance to the human rights laws and norms. 
The principal focus of this research is Pakistan. It will assess the treatment of 
terror suspects during pre­charge detention in Pakistan in light of the human rights law 
and principles and it will also compare and contrast the same with the UK’s experience 
in this regard. 
Part I of this chapter explains the ‘what’ question of this thesis; that is, what is the 
treatment of terror detainees during pre­charge detention in the research settings of 
Pakistan and the UK. This part explains the meaning of the phrase ‘treatment of terror 
detainees’. The scholarship embarks upon the legal nature of pre­charge detention which 
makes terror detainees more vulnerable to be mistreated during the period. It also defines 
and differentiates pre­charge detention from other forms of detention. It then formulates 
six categories/themes to elaborate and grasp the meaning of the phrase ‘treatment of terror 
detainees’ during pre­charge detention. It also puts forward the main argument of the 
thesis. This argument will serve as a thread running throughout the thesis. Parts II and III 
of this chapter focus on the ‘why’ and ‘how’ questions, respectively. Part II puts forward 
the aims and objectives while Part III describes the methods employed to accomplish 
these objectives. Finally, Part IV of this chapter gives an overview of the thesis structure.  
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PART I 
1.1.0 WHAT? The Main Focus of this Research 
This research project relates to the ‘Treatment of Terror Detainees’. It is important 
to understand here the meaning and scope of the phrase ‘Treatment of Terror Detainees’. 
Dickson has well mapped out its scope, which this research will rely on: 
When judging [what treatment of a terror suspect] is justified in human rights 
terms, we need to be clear about the exact form of detention we have in mind. We 
also need to know what the features of the particular form of detention are – not 
just how long it may last, but also what conditions the detainees will be kept in; 
what kind of questioning they will face; what kind of evidence will be admissible 
resulting from that questioning; what right of access to lawyers and visitors such 
detainees will have; and what opportunities they will be given to have the legality 
of their detention reviewed.21  
 
This excerpt implicitly includes the meaning of the phrase ‘treatment of terror detainees’. 
It focuses on several categories: a particular type of detention, police interrogation and 
review, police records, rights of a detainee to access the outside world and conditions of 
detention in which a detainee is kept. Walker is seemingly in agreement with this quote.22  
He has analysed and assessed various forms of detention, its features and duration, police 
interrogation and its review and access of a terror detainee to police record, rights of the 
detainee to access the outside world, and the conditions in which a terror suspect is kept 
with reference to the specific provisions of the anti­terror law in the UK.23 
Similarly, Londras has also used the above categories/themes to analyse and 
assess the ‘preventive detention’ in light of the human rights standards and its impact on 
the domestic courts’ decision.24 Posner, while advocating strict anti­terror laws to cope 
with the threat from modern terrorism, has also used these categories.25 In his book, 
                                                          
21 Dickson, B. (2009) “The Detention of Suspected Terrorists in Northern Ireland and Great Britain”, 
University of Richmond Law Review 43, pp.929­930. 
22 Walker, C. (2009) Blackstone’s Guide to the Anti-Terrorism Legislation at pp.145–155. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Londras de, F. (2011) Detention in the ‘War on Terror’: Can Human Rights Fight Back? Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
25 Posner, R. (2006) Not a Suicide Pact: The Constitution in a Time of National Emergency, Oxford 
University Press: Oxford and New York 
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Posner has allocated a separate chapter to detention and interrogation and in places has 
shed light on the rest of the categories, such as incommunicado detention, detention 
conditions, and so on. Sunstein has used these categories while declaring that 
‘precautionary principles’26 are ill founded to rely on for the prevention of terrorism.27 
Macken has also used these categories to differentiate between ‘preventive’ and ‘pre­
charge’ detention and has suggested that preventive detention is being replaced by pre­
charge detention in terrorism cases.28  
This research relies on the meaning of the ‘treatment of terror detainees’ covering 
the main six categories, themes, or the Dickson’s principles, as follows: the period of pre­
charge detention; police interrogation and questioning; internal police review 
mechanisms; police records; rights of a terror suspect to contact the outside world; and 
detention conditions. This thesis makes a case­study of the six categories or themes during 
the period of pre­charge detention in Pakistan to assess the treatment of terror detainees 
in the country in light of the relevant human rights laws and norms and uses UK as a 
comparator to the main case – Pakistan.  
It is also important to define and differentiate pre­charge detention from other 
forms of detention to refine our focus of the main case­study on the topic. The term 
‘detention’ is very broad and it can be given in various situations under the anti­terrorism 
regime. Therefore, it is important to understand and differentiate between all forms of 
detention and limit ourselves to only one particular type to narrow down our focus. There 
are five types of detention.29 The first is called ‘indefinite detention’, which is defined as 
confiscating the terror suspect’s liberty for an indefinite period. Because the detainee is 
                                                          
26 Sunstein, C. (2005) Laws of Fear: Beyond the Precautionary Principle, Cambridge: University Press. P. 
4 “The Precautionary Principle takes many forms. But in all of them, the animating idea is that regulators 
should take steps to protect against potential harms, even if casual chains are unclear and even if we do 
not know that those harms will come to fruition.”  
27 Ibid. 
28 Macken, C. (2011) Counter­terrorism and the Detention of Suspected Terrorists: Preventive Detention 
and International Human Rights Law, New York: Routledge 
29 Dickson, B. (2009) “The Detention of Suspected Terrorists in Northern Ireland and Great Britain”, 
University of Richmond Law Review, 43 
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neither charged nor released soon after arrest, it is also called ‘internment’ or ‘detention 
without trial’.30 It is also referred to as ‘administrative detention’ because the detention 
order is issued by the executive and not by the judiciary.31 However, it is most commonly 
known as ‘preventive detention’, which is used as measure of precaution to prevent the 
occurrence of any terrorist attack.32 The second form is pre­trial detention, which refers 
to detention pending trial but after the framing of charge.33 It is also termed as ‘post­
charge detention’. The third form is detention at seaports or airports. The fourth form of 
detention refers to cases of ‘stop and search’, which can happen anywhere in a country.34  
The last form is called ‘pre­charge’ detention, which is defined as where the 
suspect is detained soon after arrest for a fixed term to obtain evidence, information, 
statement or confession before a charge is framed.35 The purpose of the detention is either 
to charge or set the detainee free on insufficient evidence. It is also called ‘investigative 
detention’. This research will focus on the treatment of terror detainees during pre­charge 
detention particularly in Pakistan. Consequently, all other forms of detention are outside 
the purview of the research, except, when necessary, some contextual references may also 
be made to these other forms of detention from time to time. Similarly, arrest (i.e. how a 
terror suspect is arrested, how much force is allowed to make such arrest, and what are 
the arrest powers and legal requirements, etc.) also lies outside the scope of this research. 
 
 
 
                                                          
30 Ibid. 
31 Macken, C. (2011) Counter­terrorism and the Detention of Suspected Terrorists: Preventive Detention 
and International Human Rights Law, New York: Routledge, pp. 5 ­8 
32 Ibid. 
33 Awan, I. (2011) “The Erosion of Civil Liberties: Pre­charge Detention and Counter­terror Laws”, The 
Police Journal, p. 281; see also Dickson, B. (2009) “The Detention of Suspected Terrorists in Northern 
Ireland and Great Britain”, University of Richmond Law Review. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Dickson, B. (2009) “The Detention of Suspected Terrorists in Northern Ireland and Great Britain”, 
University of Richmond Law Review, 43 
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1.1.1 The Legal Nature of Pre-charge Detention 
Why is pre­charge detention selected as the subject of this scholarship? This 
question provokes us to understand the legal nature of pre­charge detention and the 
reasons why terror detainees are particularly vulnerable to be mistreated during that 
period.   
Stigall defines pre­charge detention as “detention of a suspect for the purpose of 
obtaining evidence for use at a subsequent criminal prosecution.”36 According to Macken: 
The purpose of pre-charge detention is to give policing and investigative 
authorities time to gather sufficient evidence for use in a criminal proceeding 
against the detainee. Pre-charge detention operates to “freeze time” to facilitate 
the investigation of a specific and concrete criminal offence the detainee is 
reasonably suspected to be involved in.37  
 
Walker defines pre­charge detention in terrorism cases as  
The detention allowed subsequent to arrest…to afford the police the widest 
opportunities for investigations and so departs considerably from [detention in 
ordinary criminal law]. The detention period may then be extended for further 
judicially-authorised periods.38   
 
Meanwhile, according to Liberty, “Pre­charge detention refers to the period of time that 
an individual can be held and questioned by police before being charged with an 
offence.”39 In addition, Awan argues that  
Pre-charge detention requires suspects to be held only for the purpose of 
gathering evidence in respect of criminal offences.  This means that they cannot 
simply be detained for public safety reasons.  Once the police have exhausted their 
questioning of a suspect, the person must either be released or charged.40 
 
                                                          
36 Stigall, D.E. (2009) Counter­terrorism and the Comparative Law of Investigative Detention, Amherst: 
Cambria Press, p. 6 
37 Macken, C. (2011) Counter­terrorism and the Detention of Suspected Terrorists: Preventive Detention 
and International Human Rights Law, New York: Routledge, pp. 138 ­ 139 
38 Walker, C. (2009) Blackstone’s Guide to the Anti­Terrorism Legislation, 2nd Edition, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, p. 137 
39 Liberty, “Extended pre­charge detention”, available at https://www.liberty­human­rights.org.uk/human­
rights/countering­terrorism/extended­pre­charge­detention last accessed on 27 July 2017 
40 Awan, I. (2011) “The Erosion of Civil Liberties: Pre­charge Detention and Counter­terror Laws”, The 
Police Journal, p. 281 
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The legal nature of the pre­charge terror detention is evident from the above 
definitions. Pre­charge detention demands to confiscate the liberty of a person, who is 
reasonably suspected of terrorism, for a specified period of time for getting more 
information or evidence, recording their confessions or statements for the two main 
outcomes: formally charge or set them free. There is no third outcome in pre­charge 
detention.  
Pre­charge terror detention is a waiting period in which police have to determine 
that the reasonable suspicion upon which the person is arrested and detained is ‘concrete’ 
or the arrest was made on a ‘mere’ suspicion based on a rough guess or indication and 
was therefore wrong. A reasonable suspicion ‘presupposes the existence of facts or 
information which would satisfy an objective observer that the person concerned may 
have committed the offence’.41 So, if the reasonable suspicion corroborates well with the 
facts of the offence committed, it turns into a concrete suspicion and the person is 
formally charged with the offence, however, if the suspicion is a mere guess or a rough 
indication the detainee is set free. 
The legal nature of pre­charge terror detention is straightforward providing only 
two outcomes (charge or set free the detainee) and if there turns out to be any third 
outcome then it will be reasonable to investigate it. The third outcome is ‘mistreatment’ 
of terror detainees during the period especially in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. There 
are various reasons why terror suspects are more vulnerable to be mistreated during that 
period. Firstly, if the reasonable suspicion of the investigative authorities does not change 
into a concrete suspicion and the detention is found out to be ‘unlawful’ the authorities 
are obliged to pay reparation or the officer who has made the arrest should face any 
disciplinary actions.42 To avoid paying off any reparation or facing any disciplinary 
                                                          
41 Hoffman, D., and Rowe, J. (2003) Human Rights in the UK: An Introduction to the Human Rights Act 
1998, 4th edition, Pearson: Harlow, England. p. 192 
42 Tushnet, M. (2010) “Defending Korematsu? Reflection on Civil Liberties in Wartime”, Georgetown 
University Law Centre. See also, Walker, C. (2009) Blackstone’s Guide to the Anti­Terrorism Legislation 
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actions police would normally do anything to charge the detainee rather than letting 
him/her go free. For example, terror suspects in Pakistan are falsely charged with another 
offence if after arrest the reasonable suspicion of the investigative authorities does not 
change into a concrete suspicion.43   
Another important reason why terror detainees are more vulnerable during pre­
charge detention is the nature of the offence of terrorism. Terrorism is a national as well 
as a transnational security concern.44 Richard Posner, Michael Ignatieff and Oren Gross 
would support torture to coerce terror suspects to confess.45 In this case individual liberty 
is often sacrificed for greater good.46  
In addition, terror suspects are more vulnerable during pre­charge detention 
because there is no ‘political check’ to safeguard them during that period.47 Security laws 
are often invoked against minorities as precautionary measurement to prevent the 
occurrence of future terrorist attacks.48 The cost of security is put in the box of the 
minorities, where they have hardly any representation in legislature to raise voice against 
any of the mistreatment they are going through.49 Consequently, law enforcement 
agencies get the courage to carry out the maltreatment of terror detainees during pre­
charge detention. 
                                                          
2nd edition, New York: Oxford University Press. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
1966, Article 9. Available at http://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx 
43 Khan, M. (2017) “Detention in Pakistan: The Means to an End or the End Itself?” available at 
http://rsilpak.org/detention­pakistan­means­end­end/ last accessed 26 May 2018 
44 Londras de, F. (2011) Detention in the ‘War on Terror’: Can Human Rights Fight Back? Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press 
45 Gross, O. (2003) “Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crisis Always be Constitutional”, 
The Yale Law Journal, vol. 112:1011; Posner, R. (2006) Not a Suicide Pact: The Constitution in a Time 
of National Emergency, Oxford University Press: Oxford and New York. Ignatieff, M. (2005) The Lesser 
Evil: Political Ethics in an Age of Terror, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.  
46 Walker, C. (2009) Blackstone’s Guide to the Anti­Terrorism Legislation 2nd edition, New York: 
Oxford University Press. 
47 Sunstein, C. (2005) Laws of Fear: Beyond the Precautionary Principle, Cambridge: University Press 
pp. 204 – 226. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Ibid. 
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Furthermore, the presumption of innocence, a universally accepted principle of 
human rights that a person is innocent unless proven guilty,50 seems faded when it comes 
to combat terrorism, especially post­9/11 and the treatment of terror suspects in the 
aftermath.51 Terror suspects are arrested, detained, produced before special courts 
escorted by heavy security, including police dogs, and accompanied by media reporters 
in such a frightened and prejudiced way where “all screaming out: ‘these defendants are 
guilty, they must be guilty because this is a terrorist trial’.”52 Terror detainees are, 
therefore, more vulnerable to maltreatment during the period of pre­charge detention 
because they are generally denied their universally accepted principle of human rights—
the presumption of innocence. 
Lastly, and most importantly, why terror detainees are more prone to maltreatment 
during police custody is the urge to get more information related to the offence for 
successful prosecution and also to disrupt further terrorist attacks. To get more 
information for prosecution and prevention of terrorism the detainee is tortured and they 
are produced before the court when their torture marks have disappeared.53 They are often 
kept in incommunicado detention used as a tool to compel them and thus get out of them 
further information.54 Perhaps this is why the Human Rights Committee believes that 
suspects are vulnerable to be mistreated during police custody55 and in case the suspect 
is a terrorist that would further aggravate his/her vulnerability. 
In summary, this research aims to evaluate Pakistan’s treatment of terror detainees 
during pre­charge detention—including the period of pre­charge detention, police 
                                                          
50 Steiner, H. J. et al. (2007) International Human Rights in Context, 3rd edition, New York: Oxford 
University Press, pp. 432–435. 
51 Luban, D. (2005) Eight Fallacies about Liberty and Security in the ‘War on Terror’ edited by Wilson, 
R.A. New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 252 – 253.  
52 Robertson, G. (2005) Fair Trials for Terrorists in the ‘War on Terror’ edited by Wilson, R.A. New 
York: Cambridge University Press. P. 173   
53 Khan, M. (2017) “Detention in Pakistan: The Means to an End or the End Itself?” available at 
http://rsilpak.org/detention­pakistan­means­end­end/ last accessed 26 May 2018 
54 Posner, R. (2006) Not a Suicide Pact: The Constitution in a Time of National Emergency, Oxford 
University Press: Oxford and New York. 
55 The Human Rights Committee (1992), General Comment No. 21, 44th session at para. 3 
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interrogation and questioning, internal police review mechanisms, police records, the 
rights of a terror suspect to contact the outside world, and detention conditions—in light 
of the human rights laws in the research setting of Pakistan and the UK, although Pakistan 
will be the primary focus and the UK will act as a comparator. These categories/themes 
are further elaborated upon in the following subsections. 
 
1.1.2 The Period of Pre-charge Detention 
What is the total period of pre­charge detention in terrorism cases in Pakistan and 
the UK? One can easily invoke the express provision in the anti­terror laws of Pakistan 
and the UK and can answer that it is 90­days and 14­days in total, respectively.56 
However, what ought to be the period of pre­charge in the two countries seems to be a 
particularly difficult question to answer. The main reason for this is that there are no 
express provisions in any regional or international human rights instruments that clearly 
stipulate the maximum period of pre­charge detention. Therefore, the situation is blurred 
which necessitates to assess the period of pre­charge terror detention in the two countries 
in light of the human rights laws and norms. Followers of the conservative approaches to 
security what might be loosely described as Bruce Ackerman, Mark Tushnet, Richard 
Posner, and Oren Gross, would probably support lengthy pre­charge detention to enable 
law enforcement agencies to successfully carry out their investigation in the prosecution 
of terror suspects.57 Meanwhile, followers of the liberal approaches to security—such as 
David Luban, Claire Macken, Clive Walker, Fernando Teson, David Cole, Jeremy 
                                                          
56 Anti­Terrorism Act 1997, Section 21E, available at http://pakistanlawyer.com/2016/07/23/anti­
terrorism­act­1997/ ;see also, The Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, section 57 available at 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2012/9/section/57/enacted  
57 Ackerman, B. (2004) “The Emergency Constitution”, Yale Law School, Faculty Scholarship Series, 
Paper 121; see also, Tushnet, M. (2010) “Defending Korematsu?: Reflection on Civil Liberties in 
Wartime”, Georgetown University Law Centre; Gross, O. (2003) “Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to 
Violent Crisis Always be Constitutional”, The Yale Law Journal, vol. 112:1011; Posner, R. (2006) Not a 
Suicide Pact: The Constitution in a Time of National Emergency, Oxford University Press: Oxford and 
New York. 
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Waldron, Lucia Zedner, Fiona de Londras—see a lengthy period of pre­charge detention 
as an unnecessary incursion on the rights of the accused.58 Therefore, this research will 
critique the ‘total’ period of pre­charge detention in Pakistan and the UK in light of the 
human rights law. The critique will also cover the period that a terror suspect is required 
to spend in police custody ‘at a time’ and her/his prompt production before a court soon 
after arrest. Any gaps between the law and practice will also be assessed. The laws and 
practices of the UK’s treatment of terror suspects during pre­charge detention will serve 
as a comparator to the main case­study, which is Pakistan.  
 
1.1.3 Police Interrogation and Questioning 
This scholarship will also cover the duration of each police interrogation session 
without a break. There is a split between ‘securicrats’ and ‘liberals’ on the duration and 
mode of police interrogations. Lengthy police interrogation sessions are preferred by the 
conservative approaches to security. Coercive techniques are regarded as useful in 
extracting evidence and more information about terrorism for preventive purposes. 
Owing to this utilitarian aspect of coercive police interrogations, torture is openly 
supported by ‘securicrats’ such as Richard Posner and Michael Ignatieff.59 In contrast, 
the followers of the liberal approaches to security—such as David Luban, Lucia Zedner, 
                                                          
58 Luban, D. (2005) Eight Fallacies about Liberty and Security in Human Rights in the ‘War on Terror’ 
edited by Wilson, R.A. New York: Cambridge University Press. See also: Waldron, J. (2003) “Security 
and Liberty: The Image of Balance”, The Journal of Political Philosophy, vol. 11, No. 2; Cole, D. (2007) 
“The Poverty of Posner’s Pragmatism: Balancing Away Liberty After 9/11”, 59 Stan. L. Rev. 1735­1751; 
Zedner, L. (2003) “Too Much Security”, International Journal of the Sociology of Law, 31; Teson, F.R. 
(2005) Liberal Security in Human Rights in the ‘War on Terror’ edited by Wilson, R.A. New York: 
Cambridge University Press; Macken, C. (2011) Counter­terrorism and the Detention of Suspected 
Terrorists: Preventive Detention and international Human Rights Law, New York: Routledge; Teson, F.R. 
(2005) Liberal Security in Human Rights in the ‘War on Terror’ edited by Wilson, R.A. New York: 
Cambridge University Press; Londras de, F. (2011) Detention in the ‘War on Terror’: Can Human Rights 
Fight Back? Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Walker, C. (2009) Blackstone’s Guide to the Anti­
Terrorism Legislation 2nd edition, New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
59 Posner, R. A. (2006) Not a Suicide Pact: The Constitution in a Time of National Emergency, Oxford 
University Press: Oxford and New York. See also, Ignatieff, M. (2005) The Lesser Evil: Political Ethics 
in an Age of Terror, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.   
Page 23 of 272 
 
Clive Walker, Jeremy Waldron, David Cole, Fiona de Londras, Claire Macken—are not 
ready to interfere significantly with civil liberties that have been achieved through a long 
struggle. Torture to ‘liberals’ is totally prohibited and there can never be any place or time 
where its perpetration should be allowed. Because a terror detainee is more vulnerable to 
the abuse of law enforcement agencies as far as the legal nature of pre­charge terror 
detention is concerned, this research will also focus on the length of each police 
interrogation session without break. In particular, it will ask what is the duration of a 
police interrogation session in Pakistan? And, what ought it be? How many hours a day 
should a terror suspect be interrogated? Is and ought there be any break time between the 
two interrogation sessions? What questions should be asked from the suspect? And, do 
the police electronically record the interviews? Any gaps between the law and practice 
will also be assessed. Consequently, the evaluation of police interrogation sessions of the 
main case­study will form a key part of this study. Certain similarities and differences 
will also be charted between the main case of Pakistan and its comparator—the UK. Once 
the charge is framed, any subsequent interrogation (i.e. post­charge interrogation) will 
not form part of this research project.  
 
1.1.4 Internal Police Review Mechanisms 
There are five different ways of reviewing laws. The most common is when a court 
reviews the law and enforcement thereof to determine whether a terror suspect has been 
treated in accordance with the law. The second type of review is conducted by a 
parliamentary committee to rule out any possibility that the law in question would result 
in the violation of human rights. The third type of review mechanism is called an 
‘independent review’, which assesses any law in question through an independent legal 
expert to find out whether the application of the law is against the letter or spirit of the 
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human rights obligations.60 In addition, there are also independent commissions, which 
hear complaints against police.61  The last is an internal police review mechanism, which 
differs from the four previous review mechanisms. Internal police review mechanisms 
support the existence of an office within the police department to review the actions of 
those police offices and officers responsible for the custody and investigation of the 
treatment of terror suspects.62 The main purpose of the internal police review mechanism 
is to safeguard a terror suspect from the abuse of the investigating law enforcement 
agencies, and to furnish the court with an accurate and impartial account of all the 
activities carried out during pre­charge detention.63 The review record plays an important 
in the outcomes of pre­charge terror detention – promptly charge or immediately release.  
This research will critique the laws and practices pertaining to the internal police 
review mechanisms during the entire period of pre­charge detention in Pakistan. The main 
case­study will also be compared and contrasted to its representative comparator—the 
UK—for an in­depth understanding of the importance of police review mechanisms for 
Pakistan.  
 
1.1.5 Police Records 
This research will examine the purpose of maintaining a police record and it will 
describe its relationship to the treatment of terror detainees. Police records are significant 
for courts to rely on and they are the basis of the court’s judgements.64 Therefore, an 
inaccurate police record has an adverse impact on the defence of a terror suspect. This 
research will critique the law and practice related to the maintenance and availability of 
                                                          
60 Blackbourn, J. (2014) “Evaluating the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation” Parliamentary 
Affairs 67, The University of New South Wales, Australia. 
61 Independent Police Complaints Commission, available at http://www.ipcc.gov.uk/page/our­values­0  
62 Walker, C. (2009) Blackstone’s Guide to the Anti­Terrorism Legislation, 2nd Edition, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Ibid. 
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police records in Pakistan in the light of domestic and international human rights law, and 
in comparison, to the UK. 
   
1.1.6 Rights of a Terror Suspect to Contact the Outside World 
Human rights laws clearly recognise the right of a terror suspect to contact the 
outside world. The list of the persons included in the outside world is quite exhaustive 
but the most important categories of persons to reach out to from detention are the family 
and friends of the terror detainee, the lawyer of his or her choice, medical officers, 
interpreters, religious and political leaders, and embassy staff if the detainee is from 
another country.  
Once again, there is a tension here between ‘securicrats’ and ‘liberals’ on a terror 
suspect’s right to contact the outside world. Followers of the conservative approaches to 
security—such as Richard Posner, Bruce Ackerman, Mark Tushnet, Oren Gross and so 
on—would discourage this right and they would support keeping a terror detainee in 
incommunicado detention indefinitely. Conversely, followers of the liberal approaches to 
security—such as David Luban, Clive Walker, Claire Macken, Fiona de Londras, Jeremy 
Waldron and so on—would object to this. They would regard this as a significant 
violation of human rights especially when the detainees are prevented from contacting a 
solicitor or legal counsel. Thus, this research will critique the law and action of the 
Pakistan governing the rights of a terror suspect to contact the outside world in light of 
the human rights law. Consequently, an in­depth study of the rights of terror suspects to 
contact the outside world in Pakistan will be carried out which will use human rights laws 
and norms as yardstick to tell how these rights ought to be and what lessons could be 
learnt from the UK on the theme. 
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1.1.7 Detention Conditions 
This research will also critique the conditions in which terror detainees are kept during 
the pre­charge detention. Tough detention conditions are recommended by followers of 
the conservative approaches to security while liberals think that detention conditions 
should be humane. However, this research does not take consideration of any of the 
conditions of convicted criminals in jail. It will only focus on the detention conditions of 
a terror suspect when he or she is in police custody; that is, throughout the period of the 
pre­charge detention period. Again, the principal focus is Pakistan to learn not only from 
the human rights laws and norms on the this but also to learn from the UK’s experience.   
These six categories/themes will be used throughout this research project to fully 
appreciate the stances of the conservative and liberal approaches to security on the 
treatment of terror detainees in Pakistan and the UK. This will help us to understand 
which security paradigm is reflected in the overall treatment of terror detainees in the two 
countries, particularly in Pakistan. A rigorous case­study of these six categories will be 
carried out in Pakistan and in light of the relevant human rights laws and norms to find 
out what is the law in Pakistan on the treatment of terror suspect and how it ought to be. 
The treatment will also be compared and contrasted with the UK’s example. 
  
1.1.7 The Main Argument of the Thesis 
The law and its operation in practice needs to be rigorously evaluated from time 
to time by legal scholars, especially in countries such as Pakistan where there is no 
mechanism for an independent law review, to determine if they are fit for purpose because 
societies change with the passage of time and so should their laws. In Pakistan, more than 
60,000 people have died due to terrorism.65 Pakistan follows a predominantly 
                                                          
65 South Asia Terrorism Portal (22 October 2017) Pakistan, available at 
http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/database/casualties.htm last accessed 30 October 2017 
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conservative approach to security to combat this terrorist threat. However, this can result 
in the violation of some of the detainees’ human rights to make them confess or to bring 
a successful prosecution. Despite this approach, Pakistan’s conviction rate is less than 
10%.66 Although there may be many reasons behind the low conviction rates of terrorists 
in Pakistan, the treatment of terror detainees during pre­charge detention has not been 
evaluated so far. Therefore, an in­depth assessment of Pakistan’s laws and practices 
governing the treatment of terror suspects during pre­charge detention in lights of the 
human rights law and Pakistan’s comparison, in this regard, with the UK is required. 
Pakistan is the main focus of this evaluation and UK will be used as a comparator.  
Before the main argument of this thesis is put forward, it is important to 
differentiate among the fights against terrorism. There is a clear distinction between the 
war, executive and crime paradigms of terrorism.67 In the war paradigm, it is the military 
who deal with terrorists.68 In the executive paradigm, it is mainly the executive who 
confiscates the liberty of a terror suspect for an indefinite period without being challenged 
in court.69 In the case of the crime or justice paradigm, it is neither the military nor the 
executive but the administration of justice system (i.e. the judiciary) who play an 
important role in bringing those who are responsible for terrorist attacks to justice in 
accordance with the public law in force in a country.70 The war and executive paradigms 
of terrorism might suit a particular conservative approach to security because they 
                                                          
66 Shah, S. (12 March 2016) “Poor Prosecution Plays Havoc With Judicial System”, The News 
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actively fight against terrorism while the crime or justice paradigm of terrorism will suit 
a liberal approach to security because the crime paradigm pursues terrorism passively. 
This research is not going to substantiate which fight is better in combating terrorism. 
The purpose of shedding light on the three responses to terrorism is to understand that 
there are certain boundaries and parameters in which to respond to terrorism in each 
distinct fight and to set a scene for launching the main argument of the thesis.  
The main argument of this thesis is that in the absence of a case­study on the 
treatment of terror detainees during pre­charge detention in Pakistan, the country is unable 
to differentiate among the three fights against terrorism. Pakistan follows a predominantly 
conservative approach to security on the treatment of terror suspects during pre­charge 
detention by reflecting the war or executive model in its legal response to terrorism. 
Treatment during pre­charge detention is the subject of the crime or justice model, which 
requires the adoption of a liberal approach to security to pursue terrorism (as stated in the 
preceding paragraph). The justice model of terrorism pre­conceives the observance of 
certain important human rights laws and norms when dealing with the detention of terror 
suspects arrested on charge. Meanwhile, the war paradigm of terrorism might require the 
adoption of a conservative approach to security to fight against terrorism but does not 
require the justice model.  
The justice model is also different from the executive paradigm of terrorism, 
which can detain a terror suspect without charge for an indefinite period for preventive 
purposes. Consequently, in the absence of a context­based case­study on the treatment of 
terror suspects during pre­charge detention in Pakistan, the country is unable to clearly 
differentiate, in its laws and its practice, the justice model from the executive or war 
model when fighting against terrorism. It seems as if Pakistan merges all the three fights 
into one. A justice model requires the adoption of a liberal approach to security to fight 
successfully against terrorism which is not the case in Pakistan because for the same 
Page 29 of 272 
 
model the country has adopted a predominant conservative approach to security that is 
more suitable for the executive or war model of terrorism. It is, therefore, very important 
to critique the justice model of terrorism, particularly the treatment of terror detainees 
during pre­charge detention, in Pakistan.  
One can counter­argue this point—Pakistan’s following of a dominant approach 
to security in its justice model is a right course of action and is proportionate to the threat 
from terrorism to the country and its people because more than 60,000 people have died 
in terrorist attacks since 2003. Especially in the case of Pakistan, it is not the liberal 
security approaches but the conservative ones that can most effectively fight against 
terrorism and which can also protect human rights. Consequently, this research project 
will also evaluate the counterargument to show why it does not hold ground when it 
comes to the treatment of terror suspects during pre­charge terror detention under the 
crime or justice model. The counterargument will appear in Chapter Five.   
In hindsight, the way forward for Pakistan will be to learn from the human rights 
and norms and the UK’s experience when treating terror detainees during pre­charge 
detention. This will help Pakistan differentiate its legal response from its war or executive 
response to terrorism. These two countries can also learn from each other’s experience in 
their struggle against terrorism. This case­study, which is human rights law driven, offers 
more to learn from, not only for Pakistan but also for other countries, including the UK. 
It can help to improve the justice model by reflecting more liberal attitudes in their 
respective laws and practices when dealing with terror detainees during pre­charge 
detention.  
One can also counter­argue this point—why can Pakistan not learn from the 
experience of the United States or any other country following dominant approaches to 
security. A strong rebuttable to this will be presented in Chapter Two by referring to 
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certain common historical, legal and political facts that are shared by Pakistan and the 
UK, which acting as a main case and comparator, respectively.  
 
PART II 
1.2.0 WHY? The Research Purposes 
The aim of this thesis is to carry out a detailed case­study of the pre­charge terror 
detention and the treatment of terror suspects therein for Pakistan. This will critique the 
powers of pre­charge detention in Pakistan in light of the relevant human rights laws and 
principles. The UK’s powers of pre­charge terror detention and its treatment of detainees 
will serve as a comparator to borrow some lessons for the main case­study in Pakistan. 
This in­depth study in Pakistan will not only safeguard terror detainees from police abuses 
but it will also help to identify specific legal provisions to be amended. Consequently, 
this thesis will contribute a case­study on the treatment of terror suspects in Pakistan in 
the realm of human rights laws and terrorism.  
The case­study will make it clear that the treatment of terror detainees during pre­
charge detention is the subject of a justice or crime paradigm of terrorism, which requires 
a liberal approach to security to pursue terrorism. This will help Pakistan to choose the 
right approach to security for its crime or justice model on terrorism.  
Another purpose of this research is to remind Pakistan that it is in the midst of a 
constant struggle against terrorism which requires all three models—war, executive and 
crime—to operate within its respective boundaries. When Al­Qaida attacked the United 
States in September 2001, the United States did not wait long and retaliated to fight 
against Osama Bin Laden and his allies in Afghanistan.71 During the US retaliation, many 
Al­Qaida and Taliban members either died or were detained in Guantanamo Bay.72 
                                                          
71 Ali, T. (2003) The Clash of Fundamentalism: Crusades, Jihad and Modernity, London: Verso 
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Eventually, Osama Bin Laden was killed in a top­secret US Navy SEAL operation in 
Abbottabad, Pakistan.73 Since the inception of the ‘War on Terror’, many Al­Qaida and 
Taliban fugitives have either been killed in US drone attacks in Afghanistan, Pakistan and 
Yemen or they have been detained by the security forces of the respective countries. 
Similarly, Saddam Hussein, the then Iraqi president, was hanged for allegedly having 
connections with Al­Qaida.74 It follows that terrorism should have been over after the 
deaths of Saddam Hussein and Osama Bin Laden, and their close allies. However, this is 
not the case. Terrorism is still going on in many countries, including developed countries 
in Europe, America and Australia. These victories are in fact the ‘purely symbolic gains’ 
cited by Waldron in the struggle against terrorism, which would not last for long.75 One 
mode of fight is not enough to defeat terrorism. It needs a well­reasoned and objective 
approach to cope with terrorism. The case­study of the treatment of terror suspects in 
Pakistan will serve as a reminder to adopt to a liberal approach to security, especially 
when the crime or justice model is followed to counter­terrorism.   
The next objective is for Pakistan and the UK to learn from each other’s 
experience and to review their respective anti­terror laws governing the treatment of terror 
detainees during pre­charge detention and to reflect more liberal attitudes showing more 
respect for individual human rights. The case­study will identify what is the law on the 
treatment of terror suspects in Pakistan and how it ought to be. It also assesses the practice 
of Pakistan’s treatment of terror suspects during pre­charge detention to determine how 
terror suspects are actually treated in the country. Similarly, it also assesses the UK’s 
treatment of terror detainees in law and action though UK is also used as a comparator to 
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the main case­study—Pakistan. Lastly, other countries may also learn from the findings 
of this research.  
 
PART III 
1.3.0 HOW? The Methodology 
This scholarship is a case­study of Pakistan where UK will act as a comparator to 
carry out a diagnostic investigation of the pre­charge terror detention in Pakistan. The 
anti­terror laws governing pre­charge terror detention in Pakistan will be closely 
examined and analysed against the relevant laws in the UK. Likewise, similarities and 
differences in the operation of the laws in practice of the main case and its comparator 
will also be examined and analysed. The purpose of carrying out this case­study is to 
carry out an in­depth analysis and evaluation of the pre­charge terror detention in Pakistan 
and to borrow some useful lessons from its comparator—pre­charge terror detention in 
the UK. The purpose of case studies is ‘the precise description or reconstruction of a 
case.’76 A case is embedded in its context. Therefore, it is very important to carry out an 
in­depth examination in relation to its suitable representative or comparator to grasp the 
full picture.77 Part III of Chapter Two will ask if the UK is a suitable comparator for the 
main case­study (i.e. pre­charge terror detention in Pakistan). 
This scholarship will use liberal critique research methodology to evaluate the 
powers of pre­charge terror detention in Pakistan, as the primary focus, and the UK. The 
yardstick of the assessment will be the relevant human rights laws and principles. Many 
liberal scholars—such as David Luban, Lucia Zedner, Fernando Teson, Jeremy Waldron, 
David Cole, Anders Buhelt, Walker and Masferrer, and Tribe and Gudridge—have used 
                                                          
76 Flick, U. (2006) An Introduction to Qualitative Research, 3rd Edition, London: Sage, pp. 141 – 142. 
77 Ibid., See also Gillham, B. (2000) Case Study Research Methods, London: Continuum, pp. 1 – 15. 
Flyvbjerg, B. (2006) "Five Misunderstandings About Case­Study Research," Qualitative  
Inquiry, vol. 12, no. 2.  
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human rights laws and its norms to critique conservative approaches to security and 
defend rights to liberty and security of persons.78 
This scholarship will use relevant primary and secondary data to critique the 
powers of pre­charge terror detention in Pakistan and the UK. In the context of Pakistan, 
this study will use the Anti­Terrorism Act 1997 (hereafter, ATA 1997), the Protection of 
Pakistan Act 2014 (hereafter, POPA 2014), the Investigation for Fair Trial Act 2013 
(hereafter, IFTA 2013), and the Actions (in Aid of Civil Power) Regulation 2011 
(hereafter, AACPR 2011) as primary data. In the context of the UK, this study will use 
Schedule 8 of the Terrorism Act 2000 and Code H of Police and Criminal Evidence Act 
1984 (hereafter, PACE), the Anti­Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, the 
Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005, the Terrorism Act 2006, the Counter­terrorism Act 
2008, and the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 as sources of primary data. 
This primary data will expose the law on the pre­charge detention in the research 
settings of the two countries. To determine how the law on this topic ought to be, this 
research will also use another set of primary data, which is the core international human 
rights instruments applicable to the treatment of terror suspects during pre­charge 
detention, specifically: the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 (hereafter, 
UDHR), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966 (hereafter, 
ICCPR), and the United Nations  Convention  against  Torture  and  Other  Cruel,  
Inhumane  or  Degrading Treatment or Punishment 1984 (hereafter, UNCAT). In the 
research settings of the UK, the European Convention on Human Rights (hereafter, 
                                                          
78Luban, D. (2005) Eight Fallacies about Liberty and Security in Human Rights in the ‘War on Terror’ 
edited by Wilson, R.A. New York: Cambridge University Press. See also: Waldron, J. (2003) “Security 
and Liberty: The Image of Balance”, The Journal of Political Philosophy, vol. 11, No. 2; Cole, D. (2007) 
“The Poverty of Posner’s Pragmatism: Balancing Away Liberty After 9/11”, 59 Stan. L. Rev. 1735­1751; 
Zedner, L. (2003) “Too Much Security”, International Journal of the Sociology of Law. Tribe, L. and 
Gudridge, P. (2004) “The Anti­Emergency Constitution”, 113 YALE L.J. Buhelt, A. (2013) Policing the 
Law of Fear in ‘Justice and Security in the 21st Century: Risks, Rights and the Rule of Law’ edited by 
Barbara Hudson and Synnove Ugelvik London and New York: Routledge. Masferrer, A. and Walker, C. 
(2013) Counter­Terrorism, Human Rights and the Rule of Law, Edward Elgar Publishing Limited: Glos., 
UK.  
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ECHR) and the Human Rights Act 1998 will help in assessing the country’s powers of 
pre­charge terror detention to find out how we ought to treat terror detainees. Likewise, 
in the context of Pakistan, Fundamental Rights and Principles of Policies in the 
Constitution of Pakistan will be used as primary data to assess the powers of pre­charge 
terror detention. The second set of the primary data will act as a yardstick to critique the 
first set of the primary data.  
The secondary data will include General Comments, Concluding Observations 
and case laws of the United Nations Human Rights Committee and the United Nations 
Committee Against Torture. Domestic courts case laws of the two countries on the topic 
will also be used. The scholarship will also use relevant research articles and reports 
issued by different national and international non­governmental organisations (NGOs) 
particularly on the rights to liberty and security of persons. The purpose of using the 
secondary data is to find gaps between the laws and practices governing pre­charge terror 
detention in the two countries adding more credibility and validity to the conduct of this 
research.  
One may object the credibility and validity of this research because it includes 
secondary data to help the evaluation of the powers of pre­charge terror detention in the 
two countries. It may be suggested that this research should have used empirical research 
methods by conducting interviews to have obtained primary data on the topic.79 However, 
as stated previously, this research does not recruit participants for interviews, focus 
groups or their observations; rather, it will analyse and assess the powers of pre­charge 
detention in the two countries in light of different reports produced by NGOs and other 
international organisations, such as the UN Human Rights Committee. This is due to the 
handicap of research ethics. No researcher should be allowed to conduct research if it 
                                                          
79 Kvale, S. (2008) Interviews: An Introduction to Qualitative Research Interviewing, 2nd Edition, 
London: Sage, pp. 123 – 141. 
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makes him/her vulnerable due to ethical and security considerations.80 Therefore, 
interviewing people in war zones or places affected by internal disturbances, such as 
Pakistan, is not safe for empirical research, especially on sensitive issues such as 
terrorism. In addition, access to people in prisons is very cumbersome,81 let alone gaining 
access to people arrested under anti­terror laws. So, keeping within the ethical boundaries, 
it is wise to make use of secondary data available online and inside the library. 
 
PART IV 
1.4.0 Thesis Structure 
Chapter Two reviews the important literature on the relationship between security 
and liberty, identifying a niche and a framework wherein to position this thesis. This 
chapter features conservative and liberal approaches to security in their fight against 
terrorism in the aftermath of ‘War on Terror’ and their impact on the treatment of terror 
detainees during pre­charge detention. A liberal critique of the conservative attitudes to 
security delineates how conservative approaches to security ignore important human 
rights principles, such as reasonableness and proportionality, when dealing with terror 
detainees. This chapter concludes though conservative approaches to security may be 
useful in a war or executive model to counter­terrorism, the justice model requires a 
liberal security approach treating terror detainees in accordance with the human rights 
laws and principles.  
Chapter Three brings to the fore the important international, regional and domestic 
human rights laws governing the treatment of terror detainees during pre­charge 
detention. These obligations reflect liberal values and natural rights to safeguard people 
                                                          
80 British Sociological Association (2002) ‘Statement of Ethical Practice’ March 2002, updated May 04. 
Available at: http://www.britsoc.co.uk/about/equality/statement­of­ethical­practice.aspx last accessed 01 
April 2017. 
81 Kvale, S. (2008) Interviews: An Introduction to Qualitative Research Interviewing, 2nd Edition, 
London: Sage, pp. 123 – 141. 
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whose liberty and personal security is at stake at the hands of law enforcement agencies 
particularly during pre­charge terror detention. These obligations will reveal how a 
particular law related to the treatment of terror detainees ought to be. These human rights 
laws and norms will act as a carriage to assess the powers of pre­charge terror detention 
in Pakistan and the UK.  
Chapter Four examines, analyses and assesses the UK’s law and practice of the 
treatment of terror suspects. The purpose of this chapter is to grasp the powers of pre­
charge terror detention in the UK which will act as a comparator to the main case­study 
of Pakistan. Therefore, this chapter will identify the law on the treatment of terror suspects 
during pre­charge detention in the UK. It also asks what gaps exist in the law and action 
of the country when actually dealing with the terror detainees. Another purpose of this 
chapter is to find how terror detainees should be treated in accordance with the human 
rights law. This chapter will assess the UK’s legal response to terrorism and the country’s 
treatment of terror detainees during pre­charge terror detention which will later act as a 
comparator to the main case­study—Pakistan—to learn lessons from.   
Chapter Five is the most important chapter of this thesis because it focuses on the 
main case­study. It examines, analyses and assesses the anti­terror laws of Pakistan 
governing the treatment of terror suspects in law and in practice. The purpose of this 
chapter is an in­depth understanding of the powers of pre­charge terror detention in 
Pakistan. This chapter examines, analyses and assesses the laws and practices of the 
country on the topic to find out what these laws and practices are and how they ought to 
be. This chapter will contribute new knowledge in the area of human rights laws and 
terrorism in the context of Pakistan by assessing the treatment of terror detainees during 
pre­charge detention in the country. Chapter Five will also set a stage for the main case 
to be thoroughly studied in light of its comparator, to learn lessons thereof.   
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Chapter Six brings together the main case­study and its comparator to draw some 
useful lessons from. The main case­study in Pakistan is compared and contrasted against 
its comparator in the UK in terms of the thesis topic. This chapter concludes the 
evaluation of the treatment of terror detainees in the legal systems of Pakistan and the 
UK, and it puts forward some useful recommendations—asking what the two countries 
can learn from this study, with a particular emphasis on Pakistan. This chapter also 
highlights the importance of this research and its wider implications, together with a 
description of more research gaps that can be addressed by future research in the area. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.0 Introduction   
The primary purpose of this chapter is to identify a niche in the discourse of human 
rights law and terrorism, especially in the context of Pakistan, and to accommodate 
therein the contribution that this thesis is going to impart. The main argument of this 
thesis is that in the absence of a case­study on the treatment of terror detainees during 
pre­charge detention in Pakistan, the country is unable to differentiate among the three 
fights against terrorism, and consequently the country reflects the war or executive model 
in its legal response to terrorism. This argument will be positioned within the discourse 
of human rights and terrorism. This chapter will also identify a broad area of study for 
the argument by engaging liberal and conservative approaches to security in a debate on 
liberty and security in the discourse. The debate will appear in Part I. This part will also 
show how a liberal critique methodology has been used by various liberal scholars by 
using human rights laws and norms to critique conservative approaches to security. 
Several liberals have critiqued conservative approaches to security when dealing 
with terror detainees.82 For example, they have criticised the prolonged period of pre­
charge detention, certain police interrogation techniques, incommunicado detention and 
so on.83 This chapter will compile and review the important liberal critique of the 
conservative approaches to security to comprehend the liberal and conservative stances 
                                                          
82 Luban, D. (2005) Eight Fallacies about Liberty and Security in Human Rights in the ‘War on Terror’ 
edited by Wilson, R.A. New York: Cambridge University Press. See also: Waldron, J. (2003) “Security 
and Liberty: The Image of Balance”, The Journal of Political Philosophy, vol. 11, No. 2; Cole, D. (2007) 
“The Poverty of Posner’s Pragmatism: Balancing Away Liberty After 9/11”, 59 Stan. L. Rev. 1735­1751; 
Zedner, L. (2003) “Too Much Security”, International Journal of the Sociology of Law, 31; Neocleous, 
M. (2007) “Security, Liberty and the Myth of Balance: Towards a Critique of Security Politics”, 
Contemporary Political Theory, No. 6; Tokimi, I. (2015) “Liberty and Security in the Age of Terrorism: 
Negotiating a New Social Contract”, Plymouth Law and Criminal Justice Review, Vol. 1 
83 Ibid. 
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on the treatment of terror suspects during pre­charge detention, which will appear in Part 
II.   
This chapter underlines that there is a complete absence of research on the topic. 
There is hardly any case­study of the treatment of terror suspects in Pakistan, during pre­
charge detention, which should have used UK as a comparator on the topic. Consequently, 
this study enables one jurisdiction to learn from the experience of the other, and vice 
versa, thus occupying the niche. The indication of a gap in the current knowledge and the 
urge to occupy the niche in the realm about the topic will appear in Part III. This part will 
also justify UK as an important comparator to the main case­study. Finally, Part IV will 
conclude the chapter and it will also put forward four research questions that will be 
answered in the chapters to follow. 
 
PART I  
2.1.0 Theoretical Framework 
The purpose of this part is to identify the realm of study from where this thesis 
belongs to. Conservative and liberal approaches to security are engaged in a debate about 
liberty and security with a view to understand a liberal critique of the treatment of terror 
detainees. This will help to comprehend and differentiate between the respective stances 
of the conservative and liberal approaches to the treatment of terror suspects in the 
criminal justice system. This part commences with a review of the conservative 
approaches to security, which will be followed by its liberal critique and an assessment 
of the respective stances of each security approach to the treatment of terror suspects 
during pre­charge detention.   
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2.1.1 Conservative Approaches to Security 
This research draws on the debate related to the tension between liberty and 
security particularly in terrorism­related cases. What then is the relationship between 
liberty and security, especially when there is a danger from terrorism? Are these two 
conflicting or complementary virtues? Let us assume, for the time being, that these are 
two competing virtues—one undermining the other. It has been shown that whenever 
nations announce emergencies, it is often security that forgoes liberty.84 The general 
justification is that grave emergencies demand greater security, which requires less 
liberty. Many scholars have stressed the need, especially during public emergencies, to 
strike a right balance between the two.85 This process is called the ‘balancing approach’.86 
Followers of the conservative approaches to security always support more security over 
liberty. 
Ignatieff supports the infliction of torture to avert the threat from terrorism, calling 
it ‘the Lesser Evil’: 
Either we fight evil with evil or we succumb. So if we resort to the lesser evil, we 
should do so, first, in full awareness that evil is involved. Second, we should act 
under a demonstrable state of necessity. Third, we should choose evil means only 
as a last resort, having tried everything else. Finally, we must satisfy a fourth 
obligation: we must justify our actions publicly to our fellow citizens and submit 
to their judgment as to their correctness.87  
 
There is a clear shift in favour of security in Ignatieff’s balancing approach when he 
permits the infliction of torture to ensure more security, especially when there is a threat 
from terrorism, even though laws against torture are absolute and non­derogatory.  
                                                          
84 Tushnet, M. (2010) “Defending Korematsu? Reflection on Civil Liberties in Wartime”, Georgetown 
University Law Centre. 
85 Sunstein, C. (2005) Laws of Fear: Beyond the Precautionary Principle, Cambridge: University Press 
pp. 204 – 226. See also: Posner, R.A. (2006) Not a Suicide Pact: The Constitution in a Time of National 
Emergency, Oxford University Press: Oxford and New York; Walker, C. (2009) Blackstone’s Guide to 
the Anti­Terrorism Legislation, 2nd ed. Oxford University Press: New York. 
86 Ibid.  
87 Ignatieff, M. (2005) The Lesser Evil: Political Ethics in an Age of Terror, Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, p. 19. 
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The balance further tilts in favour of security when Richard Posner presents his 
own balancing approach—pragmatism.88 He says that the US Constitution is not a suicide 
pact but a ‘looser garment’, which must be adapted to changing circumstances.89 His 
phrase ‘not a suicide pact’ refers to the US Constitution as a product of ‘loose 
interpretations’ and, therefore, is subject to modifications when there is a threat from 
terrorism. He views ‘modern terrorism’ (especially threats from Al­Qaida) as the worst 
threat to American society. He fears that terrorists can potentially harm the United States, 
especially if they acquire nuclear weapons. This type of terrorism is described as an 
‘existential threat’ to the United States.90 
Posner would agree with Ignatieff, saying that we might ‘succumb’ to terrorism. 
Therefore, he supports the ‘ticking­bomb scenario’, which is described as follows: 
You have captured someone involved in a bomb plot. He is your only source of 
information about where the bomb is located and you have only a few hours before 
the bomb goes off, killing hundreds of innocent people (On some versions of the 
[scenario], it is a nuclear bomb in a large city.) He won’t talk. Do you torture him 
or not?91 
 
Before it is too late and the bomb explodes, Posner has a solution—a pragmatic response 
to the threat: let the executives promptly respond to such threats. Furthermore, the courts 
should have no powers to check the validity of such actions. He firmly believes that 
judges have ‘scant knowledge’ about security matters and, therefore, they should not be 
empowered to review the executive’s actions.92 Meaning thereby to torture suspected 
terrorists.  
                                                          
88 Posner, R.A. (2006) Not a Suicide Pact: The Constitution in a Time of National Emergency, Oxford 
University Press: Oxford and New York, pp. 147­158. 
89 Ibid, p. 152 
90 Ibid, pp. 1 ­ 15 
91 Luban, D. (2008) “Unthinking the Ticking Bomb”, Working Papers George Town University Law 
Centre, p. 4 
92 Posner, R.A. (2006) Not a Suicide Pact: The Constitution in a Time of National Emergency, Oxford 
University Press: Oxford and New York, p. 9 
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Posner considers that the US nation is prior to the Constitution.93 In other words, 
he thinks that the United States as a country existed before there was a Constitution—the 
Declaration of Independence came at the start of the war and the Constitution came at the 
end. If there is threat to the United States, then we should let the president use his 
prerogatives and defeat terrorism, even if constitutional rights are violated,94 even if the 
media is banned and even if terror suspects are regarded as unlawful combatants. There 
is nothing in the Constitution that is against torture, if there be any such need. The 
president, in Posner’s view, can pardon himself ex post action. In short, his pragmatism 
is an ‘extra­legal approach’, supporting more security and proposing emergency measures 
to enable executives to take ‘extra­legal actions’ to thwart any terroristic threat to the 
United States, even if these impinge upon civil liberties.95 
Mark Tushnet has taken the pragmatism of Richard Posner to another and higher 
level of security by introducing his ‘emergency powers outside the constitution’ 
approach.96 Tushnet says that all constitutions recognise and invoke emergency powers 
in a systematic manner, which he calls ‘patterns’.97 First, governments often exaggerate 
and over­react to the threat. Second, it is the executive who over­reacts to the threat. 
Third, courts are thoroughly aware that civil liberties are being violated but they justify 
emergencies ex post action. Next, society later finds that it was a mistake, which is never 
to be repeated in future. Tushnet shows that when an emergency repeats its cycle, the 
government does not learn from the last mistake and acts in the same manner. 
Consequently, the same pattern is followed each time that an emergency appears.98  
                                                          
93 Ibid, p. 4 
94 Ibid, p. 155 
95 Ibid, p. 154 
96 Tushnet, M. (2010) “Defending Korematsu? Reflection on Civil Liberties in Wartime”, Georgetown 
University Law Centre. 
97 Ibid. 
98 Ibid. 
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The reason why this pattern is persistent is that courts are usually deferential in 
times of emergency and so are the people.99 The emergency powers are included in the 
Constitution and these are manipulated (or creatively interpreted) in such a way as to 
justify the emergency. Tushnet says that this kind of ‘persistent emergency’ and its 
justification normalises the temporary as permanent. He refers to Carl Schmit by saying 
that a ‘state of exception’ is created.100 This state of exception has no limits and it has a 
tendency to spread over all geographic places and times. Tushnet believes that this pattern 
threatens our civil liberties. What then should be done to prevent the normalisation of the 
temporary as permanent? Tushnet suggests a model of the ‘emergency powers outside the 
constitution’ to deal with the threat from terrorism. Tushnet thinks that terrorism is not a 
war but it is a ‘condition’ of war. He further states that conditions are not emergencies.101 
He then adds that for the wrongful actions, there should be a reparation mechanism in 
‘calmer times’. Once the emergency is over, normalcy should return.102 In other words, 
Tushnet is ready to sacrifice more liberty for added security to thwart any threat from 
terrorism. 
Bruce Ackerman summarises almost all of Tushnet’s model in his ‘emergency 
constitution’.103 According to Ackerman, the war and crime paradigms of terrorism have 
failed.104 We know that terrorism is special, we know that special police are there, we 
know they have special powers, we know that terrorists are judged in a special court; 
however, we did not know beforehand that terrorism will also need a special constitution. 
Consequently, Ackerman argues that we need to find other means to contain the threat. 
The only way to do this is to draft an ‘emergency constitution’.105 He believes that this 
                                                          
99 Ibid. 
100 Ibid. 
101 Ibid. 
102 Ibid. 
103 Ackerman, B. (2004) “The Emergency Constitution”, Yale Law School, Faculty Scholarship Series, 
Paper 121 
104 Ibid. 
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constitution will uphold the ‘reassurance’ that the threat is going to be contained more 
effectively.106 Ackerman’s constitution allows for the detention of terror suspects for 60 
days without being challenged in any court of law.107 The emergency constitution will 
not damage the permanent rights incorporated in national constitutions. The threshold for 
the operation of the emergency constitution will be passed when there is an attack of a 
similar nature as 9/11.108 The legislature will authorise the duration of the further 
emergency (i.e., supermajoritarian escalator) for a maximum period of another three 
months.109 Only the executive can contain the threat (executive paradigm of terrorism). 
Although the courts, Ackerman argues, cannot challenge the invocation of the emergency 
constitution (i.e., macroadjudication), they will look into cases of compensation and 
whether or not detainees are fairly treated during emergencies (i.e., microadjudication).110 
Thus, Ackerman supports more security at the expense of liberty and proposes tough 
treatment of terror detainees through his emergency constitution. 
Oren Gross seems more nuanced about the need for more security through his 
‘extra­legal measure’ model.111 According to this model, during extraordinary security 
situations, public officials can act outside the normal legal order to respond to 
extraordinary security threats, such as 9/11.112 However, the officials should openly 
acknowledge their extraordinary actions in the public.113 Here, Gross agrees with 
Ignatieff, Tushnet and Ackerman in that public officials are accountable to the people and 
not to the courts. Their actions either receive ex post public ratification or refusal. 
Officials acting in bad faith do not receive any public ratification. On such a refusal, the 
official will be impeached by the people and the aggrieved party shall be paid 
                                                          
106 Ibid. 
107 Ibid. 
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110 Ibid. 
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reparation.114 Gross gives the following three reasons in support of his model:115 first, an 
emergency calls for an extraordinary response from government; second, ordinary 
constitutions do not normally stop a government from taking emergency actions; and 
finally, because emergency measures often penetrate ordinary laws, something needs to 
be done to stop this practice. Every public official in Gross’s model is the judge of his or 
her own actions to decide upon the ‘obvious question’—when to react to an emergency.116 
They are accountable to the public and not the judiciary for the ‘tragic question’—how 
the action was carried out.117 No doubt, Oren Grosse’s model is an executive response to 
terrorism asking to sacrifice liberty to respond to terrorism.  
These scholars all reflect Thomas Hobbes’s security approach. Hobbes is the 
father of the conservative approach to security.118 His famous Leviathan, written during 
the English Civil War (1642–1651), is the mainstream ideology for all pragmatists.119 
Hobbes had lived through more than a decade of civil war.120 His main fear was that when 
a state collapses, a ‘state of nature’ is the outcome, thus triggering the worst of human 
actions; in other words, ‘continual fear and danger of violent death, and the life of man 
solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.’121 How can one avoid drifting into a state of 
nature? Hobbes suggests that we need to surrender to our individual wills and ‘to erect a 
common power or a commonwealth’ conferring all powers upon one man or assembly of 
men.122 The commonwealth or central government transforms life into a social, rich, 
delightful, gentle and long­lived life but not to a free life. Therefore, liberty, in the 
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Hobbesian state, does not belong to an individual but solely to the central government.123 
The anxiety and agitation of Hobbes to avoid a state of nature gave birth to the idea of a 
strong central government where that state’s security has all value and an individual’s 
liberty has none. Therefore, it is reasonable to inflict torture pursuant to Ignatieff’s lesser 
evil argument for greater security. There is nothing wrong in dismissing the role of judges 
in security matters as propounded by Posner. There is nothing wrong in following 
Tushnet’s and Ackerman’s emergency constitution detaining people for months. Finally, 
there is no harm in adherence to Gross’s ‘extra­legal measures’ because Thomas Hobbes 
had said four hundred years ago that we should sacrifice liberty for the sake of more 
security. 
 
2.1.2 Liberal Critique of the Conservative Approaches to Security 
Many liberals have critiqued the conservative approaches to security using human 
rights as yardstick.124 They believe that terrorism is a crime, as opposed to the war or 
executive understanding of terrorism, for which liberal approaches to security are the 
most appropriate to respond to terrorism. Let the criminal justice system, by adherence to 
the human rights laws and principles, should respond to it. Therefore, they critique the 
above conservative approaches to security in light of the human rights. David Luban puts 
forward his ‘eight fallacies’ to prove that conservative security ‘conceals persistent 
fallacies’ when fighting terrorism.125 First, the question, ‘How much liberty should be 
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sacrificed for security?’ he argues, is the wrong question. Laws curtailing liberty are 
applicable to all within a state. Rather, we should ask, ‘Am I ready to be jailed for a 
minute added security?’126 Luban thinks that conservative approaches to security assume 
the division of people into separate groups of ‘Us’ and ‘Them’. Second, conservative 
security treats liberties and rights differently from security while rights themselves are 
forms of security against the coercive powers of the government.127 Third, ‘securicrats’ 
think that special powers are necessary to deal with the threat of terrorism and that more 
safeguards within the anti­terror laws will protect civil liberties, which is a form of power. 
However, how can mere safeguards protect civil liberties when the latter is power in 
itself? The next fallacy relates to the presumption of innocence, which is a universal 
human right of a suspect. How can tough­minded security laws presume the guilt of a 
terror suspect, thus negating the universal human right? His last fallacy relates to the 
‘militarization of civil life’ and ‘perpetual emergency’. How can a president (referring to 
the US presidential powers to declare formal war) under his civilian powers declare war 
on terrorism? Similarly, the emergency plea of the conservatives no longer makes sense: 
calling longstanding conditions (like standing danger of terrorism) an ‘emergency’ is 
confusing because emergencies are temporary departures from normal conditions.128 
Luban also criticises Posner’s support for the ticking­bomb scenario. The scenario has no 
real­life case, what he calls ‘cartoonish’.129 This artificially created plot works well as a 
propaganda device but is based on the wrong assumptions to legitimise torture. 
Like Luban, Jeremy Waldron also criticises conservative approaches to security. 
He believes that the idea of conservative security is ‘insidious…false…ill­concealed 
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sneer of outrage…objectionable.’130 He calls into question the conservative myth of 
balancing security at the cost of liberty and levels four main criticisms against it.131 First, 
liberty and security are abstractions and, therefore, cannot be quantified for precision and 
balancing purposes. These can neither be expressed in an algebraic formula or expression. 
Second, the idea of rights as ‘trump cards’ cannot be regarded as adjustable to routine 
changes. For instance, it is unacceptable to state that higher security threats always curtail 
liberty. Third, there is a strong issue with the distribution of liberty and security. For 
example, the perpetrators of 9/11 were foreigners, mostly Arab Muslims, so the cost of 
liberty can very easily be placed on the shoulders of an identifiable group. Like Luban, 
Waldron is also mindful that society should not be divided into ‘Us’ and ‘Them’. Finally, 
when subjected to adjustments, liberty becomes a ‘relational term’.132  This has dramatic 
ramifications in the long term on liberty. For instance, if liberty is negative—that is, it 
can be reduced by enhancing state powers—, then this diminution of liberty increases the 
fear of civil libertarians that these powers may be used against their liberty. In particular, 
Waldron states, “The existence of a threat from terrorist attack does not diminish the 
threat that liberals have traditionally apprehended from the state. The former 
complements the latter; it does not diminish it, and it may enhance it”.133 His last criticism 
reveals that the increase in state powers for security, in the presence of a terrorist threat, 
may enhance our fears.  
Similarly, Zedner identifies ‘six paradoxes of security’ and describes them as 
costs of security. One of the paradoxes enumerates that ‘security promises reassurance 
but in fact increases anxiety.’134 Here, Zedner rejects Ackerman’s belief that more 
security reassures people; rather, she endorses Waldron’s belief that more security 
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enhances our fears and anxieties. She argues that although security promises more 
freedom, it erodes our civil liberties.135 She also identifies that security is presented as a 
universal good but presumes social exclusion;136 that is, it is inimical to good society.137 
Here, she acknowledges the argument of Luban and Waldron that too much security 
divides a good society into two identifiable groups: ‘We’ and ‘They’.  
David Cole attacks Ackerman’s emergency constitution. In particular, he calls it 
‘a magic bullet where there is none’ in reality.138 Cole says Ackerman’s constitution will 
have a tendency to become ‘permanent’ if put in place.139 If this happens, then certainly 
it will create ‘lawlessness’.140 He says that the whole idea of Ackerman’s constitution is 
to reassure the public but, in fact, it does the opposite—creating anarchy. However, 
innocent people will be detained for 60 days and beyond without assigning any reason. 
Cole considers that ‘suspicionless detention’ is in fact arbitrary detention.141 After every 
terrorist attack, people will fear for their liberty in this lawlessness situation. In another 
example, David Luban expresses concern about innocent children in the West who 
exchange text messages or ‘flirt’ with a member from a terrorist network,142 and who may 
then find themselves detained for months. Here, Luban, Waldron, Zedner and David Cole 
all believe that more security does not reassure but instead enhances our fears of violating 
our civil liberties at the hands of excessive governmental powers.  
Laurence Tribe and Patrick Gudridge find that Ackerman’s constitution is 
“constitutional amnesia… a dead zone…constitution noire…a black hole”.143 They argue 
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Ackerman has reflected his own fear through this constitution.144 In addition, 
governments have ‘long wished’ to attain such powers and then use them against their 
own citizens.145 Tribe and Gudridge also believe that placing more powers in the hands 
of the government to fight against terrorism increase our fears of insecurity instead of 
giving reassurance.  
Anders Buhelt also dismisses conservative approaches to security and suggests 
the adoption of a ‘rightisation’ model to protect liberty in worse security situations.146 He 
argues that most security laws are the product of fear. Although the government aims to 
reassure the public through gaining symbolic achievements in the fight against terrorism, 
these achievements are short term—people continue to fear. The main reason for this is 
that security laws are the product of fear and are more focused on the threat than on 
liberty. These laws can only function if our liberty is diminished. Buhelt finds that the 
application of these laws enhances our fears. Consequently, he proposes a rightisation 
model where we can fight against terrorism more effectively ‘with our values rather than 
at their expense.’147 
Sunstein uses a different type of balancing approach, which he terms ‘second­
order balancing’.148 His balancing approach has three distinct features. First, unlike the 
executive, parliament should expressly authorise to limit civil liberties during emergency. 
Any curtailment of civil liberties by the executive is an example of ‘bad balancing’.149 
Second, the courts should give ‘special scrutiny’ to restrictions imposed on identifiable 
minority group within a country. His main aim here is to protect vulnerable groups from 
the tyranny of the majority. Given that there is no ‘political check’ on the abuses of the 
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majority against the selective group sharing the entire burden of emergency, it is 
imperative for courts to protect the latter. He calls for a balance to be struck because 
limiting the rights of an identifiable group is an example of ‘worse balancing’.150 Finally, 
the courts should carry out the balancing practice from case to case.151  
Fernando Teson developed the concept of ‘liberal security’,152 which considers 
that added security can only be justified if, “the amount of freedom it restricts is necessary 
to preserve the total system of freedom.”153 Liberal security is against the division of 
society into ‘We’ and ‘They’. Therefore, Teson’s concept of liberal security using human 
rights as yardstick to support the fair treatment of all suspects, including terror 
detainees.154  
Anderson researched the role of liberal security when fighting against terrorism 
abroad.155 She discourages the war model of terrorism (i.e. it is not advisable to wage war 
on terrorism).156 Anderson suggests that instead of going to war on terrorism in any 
particular country, such as Afghanistan or Iraq, why not to help the country to build its 
own institutions to further protect the life, liberty and prosperity of its own people?157 
Anderson has well justified liberal security over conservative security by using human 
rights laws and principles as carriage to protect liberty.  
Dunne describes how a liberal democratic state such as the United States would 
wage a ‘War on Terror’, especially after the 9/11 attacks.158 He calls this particular 
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approach the ‘second image of liberal thought’.159 In other words, Dunne, like Anderson, 
writes about the role of liberal security in the war paradigm of terrorism and the treatment 
of terror suspects, which he refers to as the ‘first image’ of the liberal security.  
Fiona Londras talks about the relationship between individual liberty and security 
and argues that the resilience of the international human rights has emboldened domestic 
courts in the United States and UK to protect the human rights of terror suspects.160 She 
rigorously examined the influence of international human rights laws on the decisions of 
the domestic courts in the countries on the detention of terror suspects.161  
Weinberg is also in search of a preferable action to successfully fight against 
terrorism. He has edited the work of many scholars in this regard.162 After reviewing their 
work, he strongly believes that the democratic response is the best answer to terrorism.163 
He rejects the notion that it is possible to defeat terrorism with ‘brute force’ because doing 
so would mean to sacrifice democracy in the fight.164 His work is mainly focused on the 
role of a particular form of government and its importance, which is democracy in his 
case, to eradicate the evil of terrorism. He comes in support of a legal response to defeat 
terrorism embraced with democratic values and human rights.  
Walker’s preferred method is to recourse to the principle of ‘constitutionalism’ if 
we wish to successfully fight against terrorism and save individuals from the arbitrary 
actions of the government during precarious security situations.165 This principle can be 
understood in three parameters. First, all rights need to be categorised and audited to 
determine which rights will diminish during the emergency. This process is termed as a 
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‘rights audit’.166 The rights should be categorised into absolute, fundamental and 
provisional rights. Absolute rights can never be conditioned or qualified, such as the right 
against torture. These rights can never be balanced or limited, however perilous situation 
it may be. Fundamental rights can be curtailed or balanced in very limited circumstances, 
such as liberty. Provisional rights can always be limited even during normalcy. Security 
laws must ensure that this will bear no adverse impact on absolute rights. The law can 
limit or curtail certain fundamental and provisional rights only if doing so is ‘necessary’ 
and ‘proportionate’ to a terrorist threat.167 The need for more security requires special 
powers, for which corresponding safeguards are inevitable.168  
The second parameter of constitutionalism is called ‘accountability’.169 This 
judges the utility, dispensability and proportionality of the security legislation through the 
democratic process. Accountability should be carried out through various institutions, 
such as parliamentary debates, by the executive through its review action programme, by 
courts through the judicial accountability mechanism, and by independent experts.  
The third aspect of constitutionalism relates to the ‘constitutional governance’ of 
the legislation.170 There should be provision in the special laws subjecting executive 
actions to the lawful interpretation of the courts. This impartially determines the scope 
and manner of the executive actions carried out under the anti­terrorism legislation. The 
judicial interpretation of the executive actions should consider the tenets of domestic 
constitutional law, such as principles of policy and fundamental rights and so on. In 
summary, Walker seeks the help of constitutionalism to save terror detainees from 
arbitrary treatment by the government.  
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Masferrer and Walker have pointed out a few grey areas surrounding the notion 
of terrorism in which conservative attitudes to security try to cross certain legal 
boundaries for the sake of national security.171 These areas create confusion when it 
comes to the understanding of the concept of terrorism; that is, whether terrorism should 
be treated as a crime or war. If it is a crime, then should ordinary or special courts try the 
terror suspects? If not, then is it a war? If so, then should the terror suspects be tried under 
the national or international laws?172 Masferrer and Walker carefully examined these 
boundaries and they have found that conservative approaches to security encourage 
counter­terrorism legislation to cross its boundaries for the defence of the state and, thus, 
violate the human rights of terror detainees in a legal response to terrorism. This research 
takes the crossing boundaries idea of Masferrer and Walker to evaluate and compare the 
treatment of terror detainees in Pakistan and the UK. The idea will support the thesis main 
argument: in the absence of an in­depth study on the treatment of terror detainees during 
pre­charge detention in Pakistan, the country is unable to differentiate among the three 
fights against terrorism. Pakistan follows a predominantly conservative approach to 
security on the treatment of terror suspects during pre­charge detention by reflecting the 
war or executive model in its legal response to terrorism.   
Macken argues that the practice of preventive detention in terrorism cases is 
fading173 and it is being replaced by pre­charge detention.174 Macken further elaborates 
that the detention and interrogation period should be short because the purpose of pre­
charge detention is to freeze time and we cannot freeze time for long.175 She strongly 
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suggests treating terror suspects humanely and in accordance with international human 
rights laws.176   
All of these liberal views derive in one way or another from John Locke—the 
father of civil libertarians. His famous work, Two Treatises of Government, published in 
1690, emphasises the positive role of law for the preservation, welfare and overall good 
of the society and individual.177 
 
PART II 
2.2.0 Liberal and Conservative Stances on the Treatment of Terror Suspects  
The literature review has been able to describe the conservative and liberal 
approaches to security on the treatment of terror detainees. All of the conservative 
scholars that were reviewed are in favour of enhancing security at the cost of liberty. 
Similarly, all of the liberals give more preference to liberty over security and advocate a 
fair treatment of terror detainees. This difference in attitudes to security has certain 
ramifications for the treatment of terror suspects in police custody. Next, it is important 
to map out the distinct and nuanced stances of both the conservative and liberal 
approaches because this will enable us to label and measure how far a particular anti­
terror legislation accommodates conservative or liberal attitudes affecting the treatment 
of terror suspects during pre­charge detention. Consequently, how conservative attitudes 
related to the treatment of terror detainees have crossed their legal boundaries for the 
treatment in a justice or crime approach to terrorism.  
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2.2.1 The Period of Pre-charge Detention 
The conservative attitudes to security support that prolonged detention period for 
terror suspects, such as Ackerman, demand a detention period of 60 days followed by a 
further extension of three months with no safeguards. To create a state of exception, this 
detention cannot be challenged in any court of law to determine whether it is unnecessary 
or unreasonable. Because the role of the court in the conservative approach is almost 
dormant, it is not incumbent to produce a terror suspect in court promptly. Why should 
conservative security provide for the prompt production of the suspect when he or she is 
regarded as an unlawful combatant? 
As opposed to the conservative approaches to security, civil libertarians 
recommend a shorter period of pre­charge detention. David Luban believes that the threat 
from terrorism is neither existentialist nor it should be considered as permanent, thereby 
paving the way to remain in a state of constant emergency to justify longer detention 
periods. Similarly, Macken is of the opinion that the period of pre­charge detention should 
be kept to a minimum to serve its purpose: to charge or release the detainee. David Cole 
introduces the idea of reasonableness and regards lengthy detention periods as 
unnecessary and against our civil liberties. He also regards ‘suspicionless detention’ as a 
kind of arbitrary detention. Liberal approaches to security are very clear that anti­terror 
legislation should refrain from empowering the police to keep people in detention for 
longer periods of time. They believe that detention should be short enough not to violate 
the human rights of terror suspects and long enough for the criminal justice system to 
decide whether to charge or set the detainee free. It is also evident from the critique that 
a terror detainee should promptly be produced before a court. In other words, there should 
not be an unreasonable delay in the production of a terror suspect before a court in the 
criminal justice system, as opposed to the war or executive paradigm of terrorism.  
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2.2.2 Police Interrogation and Questioning 
The conservative approach to security also has repercussions for the treatment of 
terror detainees during police interrogation. Because Posner regards terror suspects as 
‘unlawful combatants’, they do not deserve fair treatment when the police question them. 
They should be subjected to ‘brutal’ or ‘coercive’ police interrogations, not to prosecute 
but to get more information and prevent further terrorist attacks in future.178 Posner and 
Ignatieff would not object if terror suspects are subjected to torture or other inhumane or 
degrading treatment if it leads to information that prevents terrorism in a legal response 
to terrorism. Posner deems terrorism to be an ‘existential threat’, as does Ignatieff. 
Consequently, they would not mind if a terror suspect is subjected to interrogations for 
unlimited time. It is neither disproportionate nor unnecessary or unreasonable to interview 
a terror suspect for long hours, making him or her confess his or her guilt or provide more 
information, as long as doing so prevents another terrorist attack. They can be asked any 
questions, no matter if they are oppressive, to preserve national security. In addition, 
declaring terror suspects unlawful combatants also supports the attitude that terror 
suspects are the ‘enemy’. These attitudes divide society into two, ‘We’ and ‘They’. ‘They’ 
are the terrorists and ‘We’ are the peaceful citizens of our country. ‘We’ have every right 
to security and ‘They’ have no rights at all. So, police should interrogate the detainee for 
as long as they wish.  
In contrast, liberal approaches to security do not tolerate overly long sessions of 
police interrogations. For example, Buhelt’s rightisation model supports protecting 
human rights at every phase of a trial. No one can be an enemy or unlawful combatant. 
Meanwhile, Tribe and Gudridges’ criticism of Ackerman’s emergency constitution 
suggests that there is a need to stop the government from exercising its excessive powers. 
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One such power can be to prolong the duration of police interrogations. David Luban, 
Jeremy Waldron and Lucia Zedner reject the division of society into ‘We’ and ‘They’. 
This not only rejects the conservative conception of terrorists as enemy combatants but 
also emphasises the need not to torture or mistreat terror suspects during their detentions. 
So, we can infer that liberal approaches to security reject long police interviews and 
uphold humane treatment of terror suspects. 
 
2.2.3 Internal Police Review Mechanisms 
The conservative approaches to security are also indifferent towards the provision 
of an internal police mechanism to check police abuses of terror detainees. For example, 
Gross argues that every public official is the judge of his or her own actions. They have 
unlimited powers to treat terror detainees at their discretion to deal with the ‘existential 
threat’. Gross, Posner, Tushnet and Ackerman are unanimous that it is the job of the 
executive to deal with the terror threat where courts either have no or a very limited role 
to play considering cases of unlawful detentions for compensations only. Alternatively, 
public officials are accountable to the public for their wrongful actions and are exempt 
from judicial review of their actions. This infers that police review mechanisms to check 
the treatment of terror suspects during pre­charge detention have no importance because 
conservative approaches to security even deny the need for judicial review of the law 
enforcement actions, let alone the internal police review mechanism.   
Liberals, such as Walker through his constitutionalism, suggest that there is a need 
to keep internal checks on the abuses of police powers. As long as a detainee is in police 
custody, his or her record should be periodically reviewed within the police department. 
This right should be available to all detainees.  
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2.2.4 Police Records 
Conservative approaches do not seemingly believe in the active role of courts in 
terrorism cases. Hence, a terror suspect’s access to police records and accurate entries are 
not an important factor in the conservative paradigm on security. 
Liberals believe in the important role of courts in administering justice in 
terrorism cases. Police records should be accurate and maintained without prejudice 
because this record is very important for the court to decide to convict or release the 
person in custody. Walker’s constitutionalism suggests the need for accurate and timely 
documentation of police activities during investigation. 
 
2.2.5 Rights of a Terror Suspect to Contact the Outside World 
Similarly, conservative approaches place no importance on the need to ensure that 
a terror detainee is given the right to access his or her relatives or friends to help in 
preparing his or her defence. Because Posner is not interested in prosecuting terror 
suspects but seeks instead to interrogate them brutally to disrupt another terror attack, “[a 
terror] detainee who feels isolated and has no access to a lawyer can more easily be 
pressured to provide information sought by the government.”179   
David Cole, Tribe and Gudridge are against Ackerman’s concept of an emergency 
constitution. They believe that an emergency constitution would bring chaos and 
lawlessness. To infer from this and the rightisation model of Buhelt, a terror suspect has 
every right to contact his or her family or friends. Liberals, such as Walker, also believe 
that this will help in the administration of justice because it will provide an opportunity 
to the defendant to prepare his or her case on his or her behalf. In addition, Posner’s denial 
of the detainee’s right to contact a lawyer not only hampers the administration of justice 
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but also contradicts his view that judges have scant knowledge about security matters. If 
judges have less knowledge about security, then how can Posner, as an ex­judge, predict 
that a terror suspect will give more information if held in incommunicado detention? 
  
2.2.6 Detention Conditions 
Fair detention conditions (e.g., enough food and sleep, taking short and long 
breaks, attending to personal hygiene, reading prayers, books, doing light exercise, etc.) 
are not of importance for conservative approaches to security. The main reason is that 
followers of the conservative approaches to security remain more focused on security 
than the rights of terror detainees, which is why they try very hard to find extra­legal ways 
to defeat terrorists at any cost. Given that conservative approaches to security have the 
tendency to enhance security at the cost of liberty, adversely affecting the treatment of 
terror detainees in police custody has been subject to vehement criticisms by liberals.  
Liberals do not differentiate between an ordinary detainee and a terror detainee 
because they do not differentiate between ‘Us’ and ‘Them’. In addition, they believe in 
the greater role of the courts and fair treatment of all detainees. It can be inferred from 
this that liberals support fair detention conditions, such as reasonable food portions and 
breaks to attend to personal hygiene, carrying out light exercise, read their prayers, and 
so on. 
A close examination of the conservative approaches and their stance on the 
treatment of terror suspect suggests that they will always forgo liberty at the cost of 
security. Whether it is Posner’s pragmatism argument or Ignatieff’s lesser evil theory, 
both are focused on the torture of terror detainees. They are both focused on finding ways 
and means, no matter how harsh or inhuman these may be, to persecute terrorists or people 
suspected of terrorism. Posner would even circumvent the constitution because he thinks 
that it is ‘not a suicide pact’ but a body of loose interpretations and, therefore, it can be 
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disabled for the treatment of terrorists. Similarly, Ackerman’s emergency constitution 
idea and Gross’s extra­legal measures are aimed at empowering the executive with 
unfettered powers to capture or kill terrorists, with no check on these abuses by the courts. 
They believe that terrorists do not abide by any ethics and it is, therefore, lawful for us to 
fight them with brutal power. In other words, conservative approaches justify the use of 
all ‘unfair means’ in responding to terrorism. If terrorism is met with brute force, there 
would be no terror attacks.180 All of the conservative approaches advocate some sort of 
counter­terror strategy that do not abide by any human rights laws or principles.   
In contrast, liberal security approaches stress the importance of human rights 
when fighting against terrorism. They use human rights laws and principles as a potential 
yardstick to protect liberty. Both Luban’s ‘eight fallacies’ and Zedner’s ‘security costs’ 
are aimed at treating terror suspects with fairness and humanity. They both believe that 
to defeat terrorism, we need to respect the human rights of everyone. Similarly, Cole, 
Buhelt, Londras, Waldron, Teson, and Sunstein are mindful that we can more successfully 
combat terrorism by using liberal values to inform our security policies than we can with 
conservative security measures. These scholars think of terrorism as an ideology to be 
defeated. They are in agreement that we should not respond to terrorists in the same way 
that they carry out their terrorist operation but we can instead defeat them with all the 
good values that human beings are endowed with. They believe that terrorism cannot be 
eradicated by killing or torturing terrorists but through our firm adherence to civil 
liberties, so that people in general can easily differentiate between what is right and 
wrong, and what is just or cruel. Since liberal approaches to security emphasise the role 
of human rights laws and norms in a criminal justice response to terrorism, it is fair to 
adopt these approaches and critique the treatment of terror detainees in the administration 
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of justice of Pakistan (which is the basis of this thesis) and to use UK as a comparator to 
the main case­study to learn useful lessons from. 
 
PART III  
2.3.0 Indicating a Niche 
Although many scholars have conducted terrorism research in Pakistan, few seem 
to have touched upon the treatment of terror suspects particularly during pre­charge 
detention. Fasihuddin has carried out a qualitative research to explore the difficulties 
faced by police in investigating terrorism cases.181 He has identified and elaborated more 
than a dozen constraints faced by Pakistani police while investigating. He has also 
suggested a human rights friendly policing system for Pakistan.182 He thinks that this 
policing model is a ‘paradigm shift’ in police science in the country and has asked 
criminologists, field practitioners, and human rights experts to contribute more in the 
area. Even though has touched upon human rights, he did not examine the treatment of 
terror detainees during pre­charge detention in Pakistan. In addition, the UK has not been 
used as comparator to the main case­study i.e. Pakistan’s treatment of terror detainees 
during pre­charge detention.  
Suddle has compared and contrasted the Pakistani criminal justice and police 
system with that of the UK and Irish systems.183 He has suggested certain 
recommendations if the Pakistani police system is to be made a ‘people­friendly public 
service’.184 In addition, he gave a detailed historical account of the Pakistani policing 
system, which evolved during the period of colonisation following the ‘Irish 
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Constabulary’ model,185 which was famous for using brutal force to quell any civilian 
uprising.186 His work is mainly based on a historical analysis of the ordinary criminal 
justice and police system of Pakistan. However, because there is no dimension of his work 
touching upon terrorism and the tenets of human rights, his work offers little appreciation 
of the treatment of terror detainees. 
Similarly, Imam has critically discussed the development of the rule of law in 
Pakistan while focusing on the role played by police in the country.187 He proposes several 
recommendations to improve the deteriorating situation of the rule of law in Pakistan. His 
study refers to a policing system that existed during British India; however, it lacks any 
comparison with the UK. Therefore, his work is neither suspect­centred nor substantiated 
as a case­study. 
Hussain has analysed the causal connection between religion and terrorism in the 
country.188 His research findings show that religious extremism in Pakistan is the main 
source of terrorism in the country. In another paper, he tested Sherman’s theory of 
defiance.189 According to this theory, there is always defiance on the part of criminals 
under four necessary conditions, which are: first, when the offender perceives criminal 
sanctions as unfair; second, when the offender defines sanctions as stigmatising; third, 
when the offender is poorly bonded to the punishing community; and finally, when the 
offender refuses to accommodate shame. Hussain has researched 20 years of the police 
database and has concluded that arresting terrorists in Pakistan has always resulted in 
more retaliation.190 Therefore, he suggests using brutal force against them, preferring 
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killing terrorists over arresting them. To curb terrorist incidents in Pakistan, Hussain 
remarks,  
We [Pakistani police] need to break their [terrorists’] pride. I fear that humane 
treatment and fairness in court would add glamour to their situation. Fairness is 
likely to lead to failure of cases in the court as terrorists are terrorists not bound 
by any ethics.191 
 
Hussain has used quantitative research methodologies to establish that sectarian 
and religious extremism in Pakistan are the main causes of terrorism. However, he neither 
mentioned any human rights of the terror suspects nor did he compare, in this regard, 
Pakistan with the UK. As a senior police officer, Hussain looks at terrorists as being 
outside the purview of human rights, which is similar to Posner’s concept of unlawful 
combatant. His research methodology is also atypical of the liberal critique. He holds the 
typical extreme hard­nose security approach to anti­terrorism legislation, where national 
security is worshiped and protected at any cost. Hussain categorically denies fair 
treatment for terror detainees. However, he has neither focused on Pakistan’s human 
rights obligations or pre­charge detention nor has he compared Pakistan with the UK. He 
sounds very much like Posner, Ackerman and Gross.  
Hameed has critiqued both the broad definition of terrorism adopted in the Anti­
Terrorism Act 1997 of Pakistan and the role of the country’s criminal justice system under 
the Act.192 He thinks that Pakistan has adopted a very broad definition of terrorism, which 
even includes certain ordinary offences such as kidnapping and extortion of money. 
Consequently, many terror suspects have been released.193 He suggests that, ‘Pakistan 
must reform its criminal justice system in order to ensure that terrorism is being handled 
effectively’.194 However, this work is very broad, especially in its evaluation of the 
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function of the courts and police performance. In addition, this work lacks a specific focus 
on the treatment of terror detainees, such as a case­study on the total period of pre­charge 
detention in Pakistan, the duration of police interrogation sessions, internal police review 
mechanisms to check police excesses in detention centres, the rights of a terror suspect to 
contact and hire a lawyer of his choice and the detention conditions. Finally, Hameed has 
neither used a particular theoretical framework nor has he compared Pakistan with the 
UK.  
To enhance the professionalism of the police in Pakistan, Naqvi has carried out a 
comparative analysis of Pakistani, Indonesian and Turkish police models. However, this 
study only examined models of good police practice and it was not suspect­centred.195 A 
similar approach was adopted by Abbas and Kureshi, who undertook a comparative study 
of Pakistani police models with other states in South Asia (i.e., India, Sri Lanka and 
Bangladesh).196 Meanwhile, Ras has compared the South African police model with that 
of Pakistan and has suggested ways of improving Pakistani police responses to combating 
terrorism.197 In all of these studies, the treatment of terror detainees during pre­charge 
detention in Pakistan has not been used as a case­study where UK should have been used 
as a comparator on the topic. 
Kennedy has produced a chronological development of the anti­terrorism regime 
in Pakistan. In this work, his main contention is to evaluate Pakistan’s anti­terrorism laws 
to determine whether the purpose of the law is to punish terrorists or political 
opponents.198 Although his work seems useful to understand the evolution of anti­
terrorism laws in Pakistan, it is too general and lacks focus on the treatment of terror 
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detainees, which is the main concern of this present research project. Later, Raza 
responded to Kennedy’s work; however, he did not touch upon the treatment of terror 
detainees.199 
Ali has narrated the history of ‘War on Terror’ in the contexts of Pakistan, 
Afghanistan, the then Soviet Union and the United States.200 Likewise, Malik has 
elaborated Pakistan’s historical, political, socio­religious and geographical aspects in the 
context of the ‘War on Terror’.201 Similarly, a recent study of Pakistan that was conducted 
by Jalal, a prominent Pakistani historian, has linked the country’s history with the current 
threat of terrorism.202 Although these scholars have provided accounts of social, political 
and geographical perspectives of Pakistan, their contributions lack a comparison of the 
Pakistani anti­terror laws with those used in the UK. Their works do not touch upon 
human rights during internal disturbances, such as terrorism. Their research is far from 
helping to show that Pakistan’s anti­terror laws and practices endanger the human rights 
of people suspected of terrorism.   
So far, the latest research on the anti­terror legislation of Pakistan has been carried 
out by Sitwat Waqar Bokhari,203 who identified and commented on various pieces of the 
anti­terror laws in the country.204 Her historical exposition of the law covers the period 
from 1974 to 2013. In her work, she has briefly commented on each piece of legislation, 
providing an overview of Pakistan’s journey in the anti­terrorism legislation. In 
particular, Bokhari has identified several shortcomings in the law. One of the 
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shortcomings is the abuse of the law. By abuse of the law, she means that it has been used 
for political gains.205 Her work looks like an outstanding job in the sense that all of the 
anti­terror legislation used in Pakistan can be seen together with a commentary, which is 
unique; however, her work is neither suspect­centred nor has it been compared with the 
UK’s treatment of terror suspects. 
Rehman et al. have compared the counter­terrorism strategies of Pakistan, 
Malaysia and the UK.206 Their main focus is to survey the similarities and differences in 
the ‘prevention’ policies and laws in the three countries. However, their work is not meant 
to be a critique of the treatment of terror suspects in Pakistan. In addition, although there 
is a comparison of Pakistan with the UK on how to prevent people from been drawn into 
terrorism, it does not examine the treatment of terror suspects in the two countries. 
‘Prevent’ is an important component in the counter­terrorism strategy used in the 
UK. The strategy as a whole is called ‘CONTEST’.207 This works in four different areas, 
which are: ‘Pursue’, ‘Prevent’, ‘Protect’ and ‘Prepare’.208 The purpose of ‘Pursue’ is to 
stop terrorist attacks in the UK and abroad, such as stopping terrorism against British 
High Commissions around the world and other diplomatic and educational services. 
‘Pursue’ detects and investigates threats at the earliest possible stage, disrupting terrorist 
plans before they can endanger the public and most importantly prosecuting those 
responsible.209 ‘Prevent’ refers to stopping people from being drawn into terrorism and 
ensure that they are given appropriate advice and support. Consequently, ‘Prevent’ is an 
effort to stop the radicalisation of individuals.210 Rehman et al. have written about 
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‘Prevent’ in the research settings of the UK, Pakistan and Malaysia. The meaning of 
‘Protect’ is evident from its name: it protects the country’s vulnerabilities (i.e., public 
places where ordinary citizens gather and congregate, such as airports, religious places, 
shopping malls, train stations, etc).211 Meanwhile, ‘Prepare’ aims to mitigate the impact 
of a terrorist attack where that attack cannot be stopped. This includes work to bring a 
terrorist attack to an end and to increase the UK’s resilience to recover from its 
aftermath.212 Rehman et al. compared and contrasted ‘Prevent’ policies and laws in the 
UK, Pakistan and Malaysia with a primary focus seeking to stop people from being drawn 
into extremism and terrorism. However, their research fails in the ‘Pursue’ and not in the 
‘Prevent’ part of the CONTEST seeking to disrupt, investigate and prosecute terrorism 
cases. In particular, they do not discuss the fair treatment of terror detainees during pre­
charge detention.    
None of the studies detailed in this review have focused on the treatment of terror 
suspects during pre­charge detention in Pakistan. Given that there is no systemic 
investigation or an assessment of the treatment of terror suspects, it is reasonable to state 
that there is gap in the knowledge focusing on the treatment of terror detainees in the 
research settings of Pakistan. There is no case­study on the treatment of terror suspects 
during pre­charge terror detention of Pakistan where UK should have been used as a 
comparator on the topic. Although many scholars have studied terrorism in the context of 
Pakistan, the treatment of terror detainees and a comparison with the UK has not been 
addressed to date. In other words, there is a ‘complete absence’213 of research in the area. 
Consequently, this research will ‘occupy the niche’214 by evaluating the treatment of 
terror suspect in Pakistan during pre­charge detention and using UK as a comparator. In 
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particular, this scholarship will carry out a case­study of the prevalent period of pre­
charge detention in Pakistan. The case will include police interrogation of terror suspects, 
the duration of interrogation, its mode, place and the conditions of the place in which such 
interrogations are carried out. This research will adopt a liberal security approach to 
critique Pakistan’s detention conditions, in which suspected terrorists are kept during 
police custody. This study will also assess the country’s police records and the rights of 
a terror suspect to contact his or her family, friends and legal counsels in the light of the 
human rights law. Pakistan’s treatment of terror suspects will be evaluated in light of the 
human rights law to know how a terror suspect ought to be treated. Similarly, Pakistan’s 
treatment of terror suspects will be compared to their treatment in the UK to learn some 
lessons from.  
It is, therefore, reasonable now to argue that in the ‘complete absence’ of an in­
depth study on the treatment of terror suspects during pre­charge detention in Pakistan, 
the country does not understand the legal boundaries of a war or executive model of 
terrorism, as a result the models are reflected in the country’s legal response to terrorism 
mistreating terror detainees. A terror suspect arrested on a reasonable suspicion of 
committing an offence of terrorism comes under the crime or justice paradigm of 
terrorism, which requires the adoption of a liberal approach to security.  
In the absence of any systemic investigation or an assessment on the treatment of 
terror suspects in Pakistan, it is also reasonable to state in furtherance of the thesis 
argument that the way forward for the country is to learn from the UK’s experience when 
treating terror detainees during pre­charge detention. However, one can also counter­
argue about the reasons why we should use UK as comparator to the main case­study of 
Pakistan’s treatment of terror detainees, why should we not use other countries—the 
United States, Australia, France, Germany, Spain, Iraq, China, India or Afghanistan—as 
potential comparators to the main case­study.  
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There are several reasons why this research will use UK as a potential comparator 
to the main case­study. First, Pakistan has inherited most of its laws from the UK. 
Pakistan came into existence when British India was partitioned in 1947.215 Soon after its 
creation, the country faced many problems. Consequently, there was not enough time to 
enact new laws on important issues, so that it adopted various constitutional and legal 
codes of its predecessor—British India.216 For example, the very first constitution of 
Pakistan was a legacy of the British Empire, particularly the Government of India Act 
1935. The second major reason why this research will compare Pakistan with the UK, 
and vice versa, is that they share almost the same length of time in combating terrorism. 
For example, the UK has been dealing with the Northern Ireland Troubles since 1970,217 
while the first cycle of terrorism started in Pakistan in 1974.218 So fighting against 
terrorism is neither new to Pakistan nor to the UK. Third, the definition of terrorism in 
the UK and Pakistan is almost the same—Pakistan has borrowed this definition from the 
UK.219 In addition, the enemies or terrorist threats come from almost the same 
organisations: Al­Qaida, and its allies and its descendants. Lastly, and most importantly, 
the UK’s CONTEST strategy of 2011220 clearly stipulates that the highest threat to its 
national security comes from terrorism and most of the threats come from non­state actors 
in Pakistan. The main reason for this is that British Muslim communities have strong 
social and religious ties with Pakistan.221 Consequently, it makes sense to use UK as a 
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suitable comparator in this regard. This research will help policymakers in both countries 
to combat terrorism while keeping within the bounds of human rights limits. CONTEST 
also undertakes that the British government will collaborate with other countries for 
‘Prevent’ and ‘Pursue’ purposes to identify and disrupt any such threats nationally or 
overseas. In addition, why should the UK not be used as a strong comparator to the main 
case­study when, in the past, they have even jointly interrogated suspects of terrorism?222 
Finally, comparing the treatment of terror suspects of Pakistan with countries other than 
the UK is highly unlikely to bring about significant results. Consequently, it is arguably 
reasonable to use Pakistan as a case­study on the topic and to use the UK as a potential 
comparator in this regard.  
 
Part IV 
2.4.0 Conclusion 
To conclude, it is evident from this discussion that there is arguably a ‘complete 
absence’ in the current knowledge focusing on the treatment of terror suspects in Pakistan 
in the framework of the liberal and conservative approaches to security, and also to the 
relationship between liberty and security. This chapter has arguably indicated a potential 
gap in the topic and has also devised a strategy to occupy the niche to contribute new 
knowledge in the discourse of human rights law and terrorism. 
Although many scholars in the research setting of Pakistan have written about 
terrorism, none have focused on the treatment of terror suspects during pre­charge 
detention. This chapter has also assessed the liberal’s and securicrats’ viewpoints to 
comprehend their respective stances on the treatment of terror suspects during pre­charge 
detention. The finding is that the securicrats’ are in favour of a lengthy and prolonged 
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period of pre­charge detention while liberals believe that the administration of criminal 
justice system prefers to keep the period to a minimum and so avoid an incursion on 
liberty. Likewise, when talking about the period of each police interrogation session, the 
securicrats prefer longer interrogation to get important information from a terror detainee 
to prevent future terrorism, while liberals are in favour of shorter police interrogation 
session. Securicrats are not concerned about reviewing the work of an investigation 
officer while liberals see this a potential safeguard to save a suspected terrorist from the 
police abuses during detention. Police records are less important in the eyes of 
conservative approaches to security for securicrats (such as Posner, Ackerman, Tushnet 
and Gross) and they do not give much importance to the role of the courts in the fight 
against terrorism. Therefore, they are not serious about keeping and presenting an 
accurate account of all of the police record during pre­charge detention. In contrast, 
liberals (such as Walker, Macken, Luban, Fiona, Waldron and Cole) stress the importance 
of an accurate police record for the administration of criminal justice. Courts have very 
important role to play in the fight against terrorism, for which the production of an 
accurate account of the police records is extremely important. The conservative 
approaches to security do not believe in granting rights to a terror suspect to contact her 
or his family, friends, legal counsel and so on, while liberals consider these rights as 
complementary of the justice model. Finally, the detention conditions in which people 
suspected of terrorism are kept may not be a matter of concern for certain securicrats; 
however, to liberals the terror detainees should be kept in humane detention conditions. 
Because the treatment of terror detainees during pre­charge detention in Pakistan 
has not been evaluated, this research will initiate to take the opportunity and fill the gap. 
Similarly, it is also evident from the debate between liberals and securicrats on the 
treatment of terror detainees that the treatment in Pakistan has not been used as a main 
case­study to have used UK as a suitable comparator. This research urges the need for 
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Pakistan to learn from the liberal approaches to security and especially the UK’s 
experience in how to treat terror suspects in a justice system, and vice versa for the UK.    
The following research questions have been developed to address the gap in the 
current knowledge:  
i) Which human rights law govern the treatment of terror suspects 
during pre­charge detention? And, what treatment should they receive? 
ii) What is the law on the treatment of terror detainees during pre­
charge detention in the UK? To what degree the country complies with the 
human rights obligations in this regard? And, is there any gap between the 
UK’s law and practice when dealing with terror detainees during pre­charge 
detention?  
iii) What is the law on the treatment of terror detainees during pre­
charge detention in Pakistan? To what degree does the country comply with 
the human rights obligations in this regard? And, is there any gap between the 
Pakistan’s law and practice when treating terror detainees?  
iv) What can Pakistan learn from the UK’s treatment of terror 
detainees, and vice versa? What can the two countries learn from the human 
rights law in this regard? 
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CHAPTER THREE 
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REGULATING         
PRE­CHARGE TERROR DETENTION 
 
3.0 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to answer the first research question of this thesis, 
which asks: Which human rights laws govern the treatment of terror suspects during pre­
charge detention? And, what ought to be the treatment of terror detainees thereunder? To 
answer the first part, this chapter will begin by identifying the relevant international 
human rights law, with a focus on those provisions applicable to the treatment of terror 
suspects during pre­charge detention. The review of human rights law will also include 
certain regional and domestic human rights laws that are applicable in the jurisdictions of 
the UK and Pakistan. This section will also include a discussion of the nature of the human 
rights law, its classification, and the two countries’ commitment to adhere to their 
respective human rights obligations when fighting against terrorism. In summary, Part I 
is a brief introduction to the human rights laws (international, national, domestic) that 
cover the treatment of terror detainees.  
This chapter will then answer the second part of the research question: How 
should a terror detainee who is arrested on a reasonable suspicion of having committed 
an offence of terrorism be treated in accordance with the human rights law? In other 
words, how ought we treat a terror detainee as opposed to how is a suspect treated in a 
country’s anti­terror law. A human rights law assessment of the treatment of terror 
suspects will appear in Part II. This part will also identify the specific human rights laws 
and principles that are applicable to the treatment of terror suspects, covering the six 
categories/themes that were identified in the previous chapter. Part II will review the body 
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of human rights laws to find out how terror detainees ought to be treated in a criminal 
justice system. In particular, what ought to be the total period of pre­charge detention? 
How prompt should a terror suspect be brought before a court? What ought to be the 
period of further detention in police custody at a time? What should the duration of each 
police interrogation session without break be? Should there be an internal police review 
mechanism to remain a check on police officers and protect terror detainees? Should a 
terror suspect be allowed to contact his or her family, friends, or lawyer? What should be 
the detention conditions in which terror detainees are kept during pre­charge detention? 
The answers to these questions will act as yardstick or driving force to evaluate the powers 
of pre­charge terror detention in Pakistan and the UK, where the former will be a case­
study and the latter a comparator to the main case. Part III will conclude this chapter.  
 
Part I 
3.1.0 Human Rights Law in General 
This part aims to identify the human rights laws and their specific provisions 
governing the treatment of terror suspects in Pakistan and the UK. The human rights laws, 
for the purpose of this research, includes all important international human rights 
instruments (also called the International Bill of Rights), and regional and domestic 
human rights laws applicable in the jurisdictions of the two countries. 
 
3.1.1 International Human Rights Law 
The core international human rights instruments applicable to the treatment of 
terror suspects are the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 (hereafter, UDHR), 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966 (hereafter, ICCPR), and the 
United Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment 1984 (hereafter, UNCAT).  
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The UDHR is regarded as the mother charter of all human rights.223 The 
declaration has contributed to the growth of customary international law and is also cited 
in the decisions of various domestic courts in many states.224 No one can deny the 
significance of the UDHR; however, holistically the document is a declaration of the 
United Nations which is not legally binding. The non­binding nature of the declaration is 
clear from the following oft­cited words of Eleanor Roosevelt, chairperson of the United 
Nations Commission on Human Rights in 1948: 
In giving our approval to the declaration today, it is of primary importance that 
we keep clearly in mind the basic character of the document.  It is not a treaty; it 
is not an international agreement. It is not and does not purport to be a statement 
of law or of legal obligation. It is a declaration of basic principles of human rights 
and freedoms, to be stamped with the approval of the General Assembly by formal 
vote of its members, and to serve as a common standard of achievement for all 
peoples of all nations.225 
 
Notwithstanding the non­binding nature of the UDHR, some provisions of the 
declaration operate as customary international law and the principle of jus cogens which 
are considered binding. “Customary international law results from a general and 
consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal obligation.”226 
International law resources include treaties and customs. A treaty is made by the express 
consent of the state parties to it. A treaty (either bilateral or multilateral) is binding on the 
state parties alone. However, treaties that incorporate certain customary international 
rules also become binding on all states.227 The international customs are consistent states’ 
practices and they are not backed by express but by implied state consent; for example, 
the states’ practices on diplomatic immunity, respecting children, women, scholars and 
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all civilians during war under the four Geneva Conventions.228 Some parts of the UDHR 
are also binding due to the principle of jus cogens. The doctrine of jus cogens is also 
called peremptory norms and it includes: prohibition of the use of force; the law of 
genocide; the principle of racial non­discrimination; crimes against humanity; prohibition 
of slavery, piracy and torture; the right to life, liberty and security of persons.229 
Consequently, some of the rights enumerated in the declaration, particularly rights to 
liberty and security of persons, being parts of the customary international law and the jus 
cogens doctrine, are binding on all states. All states are obliged to respect the binding 
rights enshrined thereunder, including the UK and Pakistan.230  
In 1966, the rights enshrined in the UDHR were for the first time categorised, 
given considerably greater detail and more formally enforced through the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (hereafter, ICCPR).231 The ICCPR distinguished 
between the different right categories that were earlier enshrined in the UDHR.232 Thus, 
all rights mentioned in the ICCPR are categorised as ‘civil and political rights’,233 they 
are also known as the ‘first­generation rights’.234 These rights include the rights to life 
and liberty, freedom of speech and religion, rights against torture and other ill treatments, 
freedom from unlawful arrest and detention, right to nationality, right to participate in 
political life, and so on. The remaining rights of the UDHR were separately incorporated 
in the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights of 1966 
(hereafter, ICESCR).235 The ICESCR includes ‘social and economic rights’. These are 
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also known as ‘second­generation rights’.236 There is another a category of human rights 
that is known as ‘third­generation rights’,237 which are mainly group rights. The prime 
examples of these rights are minority rights, women’s rights, gay and lesbian rights, and 
children’s rights. Although it is not clear how far these rights fulfil the need of a human 
being, civil and political rights are prioritised over social and economic rights.238 This 
research project focuses on the treatment of terror suspects in detention, which comes 
under the first­generation rights—that is, civil and political rights. 
The ICCPR further elaborated the civil and political rights mentioned in the 
UDHR. For example, Article 5 of the UDHR refers to the notion of ‘punishment’ while 
ICCPR expands the notion by restricting capital punishment to most serious crimes 
only.239 The Second Optional Protocol to the ICCPR abolishes capital punishment.240 The 
ICCPR also created a more formal enforcement mechanism for civil and political rights. 
A treaty organ such as the Human Rights Committee, which was created under the 
ICCPR, provides institutional support to the Covenant norms.241 All state parties are 
under obligations to submit periodic reports to the Committee that is tasked with 
reviewing the human rights situation in these countries.242 The Committee then prepares 
its recommendations to help improve human rights in a particular state party.243 The 
Committee is also empowered to provide clarity on the interpretation of any clause or 
provision mentioned in the substance of ICCPR in the form of a ‘General Comment’.244 
The work of the Human Rights Committee forms the body of jurisprudence applicable to 
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all civil and political rights in the Covenant, including the treatment of terror suspects 
during pre­charge terror detention. 
The ICCPR came into force when it received sufficient state ratifications on 23 
March 1976.245 So far, there are 169 state parties to the Covenant.246 The UK ratified the 
ICCPR on 20 May 1976 and Pakistan ratified it on 23 June 2010.247 State parties can 
derogate from some of its provisions during a public emergency by making reservations. 
Initially, Pakistan made eight reservations248 to the Covenant but later on all of them were 
withdrawn.249 Similarly, there is no reservation as such on the part of the UK affecting 
the rights of terror suspects in the treaty. 
The ICCPR broadened the meaning and scope of the rights mentioned in the 
UDHR, just as the UNCAT had expressed in a fuller form the ‘right against torture and 
other ill treatments’. For instance, the ICCPR and the UDHR enshrine and restate the 
prohibition of torture and other ill­treatment in its Articles 5 and 7, respectively. However, 
the entire treaty of UNCAT is focused on torture and other cruel, inhumane or degrading 
treatment.250 It came into force on 26 June 1987, when it was ratified by a sufficient 
number of states.251 Currently, UNCAT has 162 state parties. The UK ratified it on 8 
December 1988 and Pakistan ratified it on the same day that it ratified the ICCPR—23 
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June 2010.252 Like the Human Rights Committee under the ICCPR, the Committee 
Against Torture under the UNCAT enforces rights against torture and other ill­
treatment.253 The Committee Against Torture receives reports about torture and other ill­
treatment from state parties and it then provides them with ‘General Comments’.254 Thus, 
the work of this Committee also forms an important part of the human rights laws. 
Consequently, this research will closely examine the UDHR, ICCPR, UNCAT, and the 
work of the two committees thereunder to find out which specific provisions of the human 
rights laws govern the treatment of terror suspects during pre­charge detention.  
 
3.1.2 Regional Human Rights Laws for the UK and Pakistan 
Apart from international human rights instruments, there are certain regional 
human rights arrangements applicable to states that are located in that specific region. For 
example, the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (hereafter, ECHR) came into force on 3 September 1953 to protect human 
rights in Europe. The convention received 10 ratifications, and thus came into force.255 
The convention currently has 47 member­states. The UK ratified the ECHR on the same 
day as it came into force—3 September 1953.256 
One of the distinctive features of the ECHR is that all rights therein are civil and 
political in nature, therefore, are justiciable,257 which means that the rights are enforceable 
in a court. The European Court of Human Rights (hereafter, ECtHR) hears cases from 
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around Europe, including the UK, on the human rights enshrined in the ECHR. This is 
why the rights enforcement mechanism in the ECHR is arguably much tighter than the 
ICCPR.258 The UK, as a signatory to the ECHR, is under a strong obligation to respect 
the human rights enshrined in the instrument when fighting against terrorism. 
Consequently, this research will use, especially in the UK context, the ECHR and the 
ECtHR case laws to find the regional human rights stance on the treatment of terror 
suspects during pre­charge terror detention. 
In the context of Pakistan, unfortunately, there is no regional arrangement for the 
protection of human rights.259 Pakistan is situated in South Asia, its neighbours include 
India, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Bhutan, Burma, Nepal and the Maldives.260 There is a 
forum of regional global society, called the Asian Forum for Human Rights and 
Development, which strives for the creation of a mechanism similar to other regional 
mechanisms for the protection of human rights in the region.261 In August 2014, scholars, 
delegates and activists met in India and Nepal to initiate steps for the creation of a 
mechanism governing regional human rights in the region, which is yet to be fulfilled.262 
Given that there is no formal mechanism in the region for the protection of human rights, 
Pakistan is under no regional obligation to respect human rights, let alone the rights of 
terror suspects. However, this does not mean that the country is absolved of any 
international or domestic human rights obligations.  
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3.1.3 Domestic Human Rights Laws for the UK and Pakistan 
The UK has a long history to the commitment of human rights, including the 
Magna Carta of 1215 and the development of common law. This research will use the 
Human Rights Act 1998 and some recent court decisions to find the domestic human 
rights obligations of the UK on the treatment of terror detainees during pre­charge 
detention.  
One of the salient features of the Human Rights Act 1998 is that all of the 
decisions made by the European Court of Human Rights are relevant to all British courts 
regarding the convention rights. This means that the British courts should follow the 
European courts’ decisions. However, this does not mean that the decisions are binding 
on the UK courts. Section 2 states that the UK courts or tribunals must only ‘take into 
account’ any European court decision. The same principle applies to all UK legislation in 
this regard.263 Similarly, if a court in the UK finds that any piece of legislation is against 
the letter or spirit of the ECHR rights, then such laws may be declared incompatible as 
per Section 4(2).264 The declaration of incompatibility is elaborated more in Chapter Four.  
Under the Human Rights Act 1998, Section 14, as well under the ECHR, Article 
15 (1), the UK is entitled to enter a valid derogation whereby any provision of law can be 
retained by the country even if such law goes against the ECHR rights. A derogation, in 
respect of Article 5 (Right to liberty and security of person), can validly be made. The 
UK has made such derogations in the past. For example, an initial derogation was made 
as a result of the decision made in the Brogan case.265 In this case, a further detention 
period was extended by the UK government under the Prevention of Terrorism Act 1974 
without the approval of the national court, which was held to violate Article 5 of the 
ECHR by ECtHR. The UK government consequently entered a derogation regarding 
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Article 5 on the basis that there was emergency in Northern Ireland at that time and it was 
apt to enter the derogation. That derogation has now been lifted.266  
A second derogation was entered by the UK regarding the Anti­Terrorism, Crime 
and Security Act 2001, which authorised the indefinite detention of foreign terror suspects 
(i.e. not UK nationals). The derogation referred to powers to extend the detention period 
indefinitely if a terrorist suspect on the basis of reasonable suspicion was a foreign 
national. The government argued that international suspects can neither be taken to trial 
in case they are arrested on the basis of intelligence that cannot be disclosed in the public 
nor can they be deported because they might be subjected to torture or other ill­treatment 
in the country to which the detainee was to be deported. The House of Lords declared 
such derogation disproportionate and discriminatory contrary to Articles 14 and 15 (1) of 
the ECHR. Currently, there are no derogations in place.267  
In the context of Pakistan, the domestic human rights laws appeared in its 1973 
constitution.268 All domestic human rights in Pakistan are called ‘Fundamental Rights’,269 
which includes security of persons, safeguard as to arrest and detention, right to fair trial, 
inviolability of the dignity of man, and freedom of movement, assembly, association and 
so on. The courts interpret these rights in light of the ‘Principles of Policies’ given in the 
constitution.270 
All of the fundamental rights mentioned in the Pakistan’s constitution are 
justiciable. This means that the fundamental rights can be enforced through the courts. 
An aggrieved person can make an application to the High Court of Pakistan if his or her 
fundamental right is violated.271 The High Court can also direct any authority in the 
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country to produce any detainee to ascertain whether or not such person is detained 
lawfully—habeas corpus.272 Similarly, the Supreme Court also has jurisdiction to hear 
fundamental rights­related cases under Article 184(3).  
Another distinctive feature of a fundamental right is that no laws should be 
enacted against them. It is one of the duties of Pakistan not to make any laws that are 
either inconsistent with or in derogation of the fundamental rights.273 In the case of 
Benazir v President of Pakistan, the Supreme Court of Pakistan has observed that the 
interpretation of the fundamental rights should be ‘dynamic, progressive and liberal’.274 
The reason behind the liberal interpretation is to provide the maximum possible benefits 
of the fundamental rights enshrined in the constitution.275 The Supreme Court further 
observed that while interpreting the fundamental rights, not only the letter but also the 
spirit of the constitution should be kept in mind. The same view has been upheld in the 
case of Arshad Mahmood v Government of Punjab.276 The Supreme Court and the High 
Court can declare any law null and void if it is found to either be in conflict with or in 
derogation of the fundamental rights or its interpretation as understood by the courts. 
There is a strong judicial review concept in Pakistan. The declaration of incompatibility, 
in the context of the UK, is an example of a limited judicial review which will be 
elaborated in Chapter Four.  
The fundamental rights can be suspended when the President of Pakistan is 
satisfied that there is an emergency that threatens the security of the country.277 In this 
case, the President makes a proclamation of an emergency in the whole or in part of the 
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country. The fundamental rights are then restored after the emergency is revoked through 
a subsequent proclamation.278    
There are certain non­justiciable provisions in the constitution of Pakistan, which 
are called ‘Principles of Policy’.279 These are included in Part II, Chapter Two of the 
Constitution, including the promotion of the Islamic way of life, the promotion of local 
government institutions, full participation of women in national life, the promotion of 
social justice and eradication of social evils, promotion of economic well­being, and so 
on.280 However, these provisions are merely aspirational and the state laws or actions are 
not judged against these directives or aspirations. Although these principles cannot be 
enforced through the courts, they are taken into consideration when interpreting the 
fundamental rights or any provisions of the constitution.281 Consequently, this present 
research will examine all of the fundamental rights and principles of policies applicable 
to the treatment of terror detainees to find how should a terror detainee be treated in the 
domestic human rights laws of Pakistan. 
In summary, the human rights laws applicable to the treatment of terror detainees 
spread over international, regional and domestic levels. On the international level, this 
research will use the UDHR, ICCPR, UNCAT and the work of the respective committees 
thereunder. On the regional level, the ECHR and case laws from the ECtHR will be used. 
On the domestic level, in the context of the UK, the Human Rights Act 1998 and the 
country’s common law will be used; and, in the context of Pakistan, the country’s 
fundamental rights and principle of policies together with the country’s court decision 
will be used. Now that the whole body of the human rights law related to the treatment of 
terror detainees has been identified, this research will next identify the specific provisions 
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to answer the second part of the first research question—how a terror suspect ought to be 
treated. 
  
Part II  
3.2.0 Human Rights Law Regulating the Treatment of Terror Suspects 
Part II will attempt to answer the second part of the first research question: How 
terror detainees ought to be treated in a criminal justice system? This part will use the six 
categories/themes that were identified in the previous chapter on the treatment of terror 
suspects to find how long a terror detainee may be kept in police custody, the duration of 
each police interrogation session, the opportunities that a terror suspect should have to 
contact the outside world, the standard of maintaining police records, the safeguards that 
should be included in the law to ensure internal police review mechanisms to protect 
terror detainees from police abuses, and the detention conditions in which a terror 
detainee is detained. Consequently, this part will bring to the fore all of the important 
human rights obligations of the UK and Pakistan applicable to the treatment of terror 
detainees during pre­charge detention. These specific provisions will serve as yardstick 
to evaluate the treatment of terror detainees during pre­charge detention in the two 
countries, Pakistan being the principal focus and the UK acting as a comparator.  
 
3.2.1 The Period of Pre-charge Detention 
The denial of liberty is a source of ‘substantial concern’ in all countries.282 The 
lengthy period of pre­charge can further aggravate the concern. Thus, what ought to be 
the period of the pre­charge detention to mitigate the level of concern? Article 9 of the 
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ICCPR embodies very important substantive and procedural safeguards in this regard, as 
follows:  
1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be 
subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention. No one shall be deprived of his 
liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with such procedure as are 
established by law. 
2. Anyone who is arrested shall be informed, at the time of arrest, of the reasons 
for his arrest and shall be promptly informed of any charges against him. 
3. Anyone arrested or detained on a criminal charge shall be brought promptly 
before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power 
and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release. 
4. Anyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled 
to take proceedings before a court, in order that that court may decide without 
delay on the lawfulness of his detention and order his release if the detention 
is not lawful. 
5. Anyone who has been the victim of unlawful arrest or detention shall have an 
enforceable right to compensation.283 
 
Article 9 embraces two important principles: the principle of promptness and the 
principles of reasonableness. According to the principle of promptness, an arrested person 
must be presented before a court as soon as possible.284 The Human Rights Committee 
thinks that the term ‘promptly’ may vary in its meaning but that ‘delays should not exceed 
a few days from the time of arrest’.285 The Committee further believes that 48 hours is 
ordinarily sufficient to produce the detainee before the court.286  
The principle of reasonableness is also called the principle of justice.287 This 
principle goes into the substantive part of any legal provision in question and takes its 
objective assessment.288 This is what should be the purpose of a legal provision. This 
principle is an important part of the concept of law.289 The principle is also read and 
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applied in ‘context’, extending not only in vertical but also in horizontal dimensions.290 
In other words, the principle of reasonableness (in this particular case) questions what the 
purpose of the pre­charge detention is.291 The purpose of pre­charge detention is to 
determine whether or not to bring a criminal charge or set free any person arrested on 
reasonable suspicion of committing an offence, as is evident from Article 9. In fact, this 
is to ‘freeze time’ and facilitate investigation.292 Hence, promptness and reasonableness 
are both liberal concepts that try to discourage prolonged and unnecessary detention 
periods, the opposite of which is ‘arbitrariness’. The Human Rights Committee, in its 
General Comment No. 35, provides a further explanation of Article 9 and says that liberty 
rights are “precious for their own sake.”293 The Committee believes that the word 
‘arbitrariness’ is broader than unlawfulness and includes “elements of inappropriateness, 
injustice, lack of predictability, and due process of law, as well as elements of 
reasonableness, necessity and proportionality.”294 
Article 9 of the ICCPR and the opinions of the Human Rights Committee clearly 
oppose Ackerman’s emergency constitution, which provides for an initial detention up to 
two months followed by a further detention of three months—five months in total. 
Instead, they embrace the idea of reasonableness as pronounced by David Cole.295 
International human rights laws also support Macken296 and Luban’s297 liberal security 
attitudes not to freeze time forever. In other words, there is no express time period of the 
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pre­charge detention in the ICCPR but it and the Human Rights Committee encourage 
that state to keep it to the shortest possible period.   
The right to liberty is historically valuable in the UK. In 1215, the Magna Carta, 
the oldest written constitution in the world, guaranteed the right to liberty and security of 
person in the following words: 
No free man shall be taken or imprisoned or dispossessed, or outlawed or exiled, 
or in any way destroyed, nor will we go upon him, nor will we send against him 
except by the lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of the land. 
 
Liberty is an inherent right of human beings. The Magna Carta recognised this 
and enshrined that liberty must be cherished. It can only be taken away through just laws. 
Similarly, British courts are the defenders of personal liberty and security of persons. The 
courts have long ago resisted any encroachment by the executive in this regard. For 
example, in 1931, during the British colonial period in Nigeria, the governor ordered 
Eleko, a British subject, to leave a specified area. It was argued in this case that a court 
of law had no authority to challenge the legality of the executive orders. In reply, the 
Privy Council held that “no member of the executive can interfere with the liberty or 
property of a British subject except on the condition that he can support the legality of his 
action before a court of justice”.298 In other words, the Privy Council believes that though 
liberty is conditional, however, the laws that deprive someone of his/her liberty must be 
reasonable or just.  
In another case, Lord Atkin warned the executive branch against encroaching 
upon the right to liberty and authorised a judicial review of all actions violating personal 
liberty and security:  
In England amidst the clash of arms the laws are not silent. They may be changed, 
but they speak the same language in war as in peace. It has always been one of 
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the pillars of freedom, one of the principles of liberty for which, on recent 
authority, we are now fighting, that the judges are no respecters of persons, and 
stand between the subject and any attempted encroachments, on his liberty by the 
executive, alert to see that any coercive action is justified in law. In this case, I 
have listened to arguments, which might have been addressed acceptably to the 
Court of King’s Bench in the time of Charles I.299 
 
In the famous case of Belmarsh, where 10 international terrorist suspects were indefinitely 
detained under the Anti­terrorism Crime and Security Act 2001, the House of Lords 
declared incompatible the provision related to indefinite detention contained in the Act 
and ordered the release of the detainees.300 The court also considered another argument 
that liberty is something very precious and the judiciary should decide whether it would 
be proportionate to deprive someone of his or her liberty against any possible terrorist 
threat. The government argued that it is within the discretion of the democratic organ of 
the state to decide on such questions. The court upheld the government’s point of view 
on this,301 which means that liberty is conditional in the UK’s conception of domestic 
human rights law.  
Although the right to liberty and the security of the person are fundamental rights 
in the UK, the former can be curtailed or limited. There are strict criteria given in the 
Human Rights Act 1998 to fulfil certain conditions before detaining someone. The right 
to liberty and security of person is guaranteed under Article 5 of the ECHR, and the same 
text is incorporated in Schedule 1 of the Human Rights Act 1998. The Article provides 
material scrutiny of detention rather than mere consideration of provisions regulating 
arrest and detention under any ordinary or special criminal laws.302 In particular, Article 
5 (1) states: “Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be 
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deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure 
prescribed by law.” The Article further enlists conditions from Clauses (a) to (f) in which 
Clause (c) is directly related to this thesis because it relates to the pre­charge detention. 
Consequently, pre­charge detention must be carried out ‘lawfully’ and ‘in accordance 
with a procedure prescribed by law’. Clause (c) also contains another safeguard against 
arbitrary arrest or detention and that is ‘reasonable suspicion’. Reasonable suspicion is 
different from mere suspicion that ‘presupposes the existence of facts or information 
which would satisfy an objective observer that the person concerned may have committed 
the offence’.303 
Similarly, detentions should not be ‘arbitrary’. An additional procedural safeguard 
against arbitrary detention is that an arrested person shall be informed promptly of the 
reason of his or her arrest or of the charge against him or her. Article 5(2) clearly enshrines 
this safeguard, which states: “Everyone who is arrested shall be informed promptly, in a 
language which he understands, of the reasons for his arrest and of any charge against 
him.”  
In the case of Saadi, a Kurdish asylum seeker in the UK who was told the reasons 
for his detention 76 hours after his arrest. The European Court of Human Rights declared 
that although it was not a breach of Article 5(1), Article 5(2) was clearly violated by 
informing the detainee so late of the reasons for his arrest.304  
Another important procedural right that comes under the umbrella of treatment of 
terror detainees during pre­charge detention is enshrined in Article 5 (3), which states: 
Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 
1(c) of this Article shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer 
authorised by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a 
reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by 
guarantees to appear for trial. 
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This guarantees the prompt production of any suspect before a court. The clause stipulates 
that the period of the pre­charge detention should be ‘reasonable’. In addition, if a terror 
detainee is not charged within that reasonable period, then he or she must be released 
immediately. This guarantees the right to liberty in the same way as Article 9 of the 
ICCPR.  
Pakistan’s domestic human rights are protected in Part II of the 1973 Constitution 
of Pakistan, which expressly protects citizen’s liberty. The right to life and liberty is 
recognised and protected under Articles 9 and 10, respectively. Liberty as enshrined in 
Article 9 is judicially interpreted by the Supreme Court of Pakistan in the case of Faisal 
v the State.305 In this case, the Supreme Court stated that the liberty of an accused can be 
‘circumscribed’ because the person is ‘accountable’ before the state and society.306 The 
Supreme Court further interpreted that the full liberty of the accused can be relegated to 
a ‘limited liberty’,307 which means that only the detainee’s freedom of movement is 
curtailed and the detainee is entitled to all other rights available to a free person, including 
fair treatment. The Supreme Court, in a series of cases, has upheld that although liberty 
can be curtailed, it is open to judicial review.308 The court has followed, in most of the 
liberty­related cases, the dissenting judgement of Lord Atkin in the famous case of 
Liversidge v Anderson, as reported in 1941 in England.309 Consequently, the UK’s and 
Pakistan’s human rights stances on the importance of individual liberty are the same. 
Liberty in Pakistan is protected against any attempted encroachments by the 
government in the same way as they are protected by the domestic and regional human 
rights laws in the UK. Liberty is a fundamental right but not absolute. Chapter Two has 
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309 Ibid. 
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identified the difference among fundamental, absolute and no­absolute rights. 
Consequently, the Pakistani judiciary views liberty as a conditional or non­absolute right 
that the government can put certain reasonable restrictions on. All such restrictions are 
subject to judicial interpretation.  
Article 10 recognises ‘arrest and detention’ as necessary measures depriving 
certain individuals of their liberty. The Supreme Court of Pakistan is of the view that the 
state is under a ‘strict liability’ to respect, ensure, guarantee and safeguard the limited 
liberty of the accused.310 The Supreme Court has given two reasons for this decision: first, 
limited liberty is very precious to the accused; and second, the duty of care on the part of 
the state is increased when the accused is arrested or detained.311 The state is under strict 
liability as long as the accused is in custody. The Supreme Court further declared that 
although the accused is accountable, the state is responsible.312 The principle of strict 
liability stems from English Common Law.313 The principle was first stipulated in Ryland 
v Fletcher.314 According to this principle, a defendant is liable for his or her inadvertent 
acts causing harm to the plaintiff while keeping or using dangerous products. The duty of 
care increases under this liability and the defendant is bound to safeguard others from the 
risks of dangerous products.315 Strict liability is also known as absolute liability; that is, 
a liability having no exceptions. In the case of the liberty under Article 9 of Pakistan’s 
constitution, the state is doing something dangerous—that is, curtailing the liberty of its 
citizens—and, therefore, is duty bound to provide for adequate safeguards. Consequently, 
                                                          
310 Faisal v the State, PLD 2007 Karachi 544 available at http://pakistanconstitutionlaw.com/p­l­d­2007­
karachi­544/ 
311 Ibid. 
312 Ibid. 
313 Rylands v Fletcher 1868 UKHL 1; see also, Calabresi, G., and Hirschoff, J. T. (1972) Towards a test 
for strict liability in torts. Yale Law School. Available at 
http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3044&context=fss_papers&sei­
redir=1&referer=http%3A%2F%2Fscholar.google.co.uk%2Fscholar%3Fq%3DRyland%2Bvs%2Bfletche
r%2Bstrict%2Bliability%26btnG%3D%26hl%3Den%26as_sdt%3D0%252C5#search=%22Ryland%20vs
%20fletcher%20strict%20liability%22 (last accessed 18 October 2017). 
314 Ibid. 
315 Ibid. 
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Article 10 recognises certain substantive safeguards protecting people against arbitrary 
treatment during arrest and detention. First, any person who is arrested or detained shall 
be informed as soon as possible of the grounds of such arrest or detention.316 There is an 
obligation on the State of Pakistan to communicate with the accused in language which 
he or she understands and, thus, informs him or her of the charges. The Supreme Court 
of Pakistan interprets liberty as including the right of access to justice.317 The Supreme 
Court is of the view that the limited liberty of the accused must be protected because it is 
precious and at the same time vulnerable. As stated in Chapter One a detainee is 
vulnerable to be mistreated during pre­charge detention. If he/she is a terror detainee the 
vulnerability further rises up. Owing to this vulnerability of terror detainees during pre­
charge terror detention, there are certain safeguards to protect them against any possible 
maltreatment. So, every person arrested shall be produced before a magistrate within 24 
hours of such arrest.318 Article 10 has used the word ‘shall’ to impose an obligation on 
the State of Pakistan to refrain from arbitrary arrest and detention.  
On this basis, the human rights laws (ICCPR, ECHR, the Human Rights Act 
1998—in the context of the UK—and liberty rights in the constitution of Pakistan) does 
not expressly provide the period for the pre­charge detention of a terror suspect. However, 
the human rights law does say that the period ought to be reasonable, meaning thereby 
not exceeding more than a few days in total. The terror detainee should also be promptly 
produced before a court for the administration of criminal justice. Therefore, human rights 
law expresses liberal values to protect liberty during pre­charge detention thus 
recognising the need that terror detainees are more vulnerable to be mistreated during that 
period.   
                                                          
316 Constitution of Pakistan 1973. Available at 
http://www.pakistani.org/pakistan/constitution/part2.ch1.html (last accessed 18 September 2014). 
317 Constitution of Pakistan 1973. 
318 Constitution of Pakistan 1973. 
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3.2.2 Police Interrogation and Questioning 
International human rights governing the treatment of terror suspects during 
police interrogation also embody liberal values and state that all detainees shall be ‘treated 
with humanity’.319 In its General Comment No. 21, Human Rights Committee elaborates 
on this by saying that treating detainees with humanity is fundamental, universal and thus 
applicable to all deprived of their liberty.320 The Committee, while elaborating Article 9, 
states that the term ‘everyone’ includes civilians, soldiers, aliens and “even persons who 
have engaged in terrorist activity.”321 So, persons arrested under the anti­terrorism 
legislation are entitled to be treated with humanity. Detainees are “persons who are 
particularly vulnerable”;322 therefore, no hardships or constraints should be imposed on 
them. They enjoy “all the rights set forth in the Covenant, subject to the restrictions that 
are unavoidable in a closed environment.”323 Therefore, any interrogation session during 
police custody will go against the human rights of terror suspects if it is of unreasonable 
length or duration. This can be both a physical hardship to answer police questions for a 
long period and also a constraint affecting a detainee’s sleep, meal, or any other short 
breaks.   
All states are obliged not to subject terror detainees to ‘torture or to cruel, 
inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment’, as enshrined in the UDHR.324 The 
ICCPR also prohibits torture, cruel, inhumane and degrading treatment as per Article 7.325 
No state parties can derogate from the Article (prohibition of torture).326  
                                                          
319 Ibid., Article 10(1). 
320 The Human Rights Committee (1992), General Comment No. 21, 44th session at para. 2 and 4 
321 The Human Rights Committee (2014), General Comment No. 35, CCPR/C/GC/R.35/Rev.3, para 2 
322 The Human Rights Committee (1992), General Comment No. 21, 44th session at para. 3 
323 Ibid. 
324 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), Article 5. Available at 
http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/ (last accessed 18 September 2014). 
325 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966), Article 7. Available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx. 
326 Ibid., Article 2. 
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The UNCAT further elaborates and provides details of rights against torture and 
other ill­treatment. This treaty defines torture in Article 1 as: 
Any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is 
intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a 
third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third 
person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or 
coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any 
kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the 
consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official 
capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or 
incidental to lawful sanctions. 
 
Therefore, Article 1 provides greater details than the UDHR and ICCPR on the torture 
meaning and its essentials; that is, perpetrator and victim of torture, its purpose or motive, 
and its methods. It further differentiates between torture and other ill­treatment. All state 
parties have certain obligations under the UNCAT to respect the dignity of all terror 
detainees and ensure that they are not treated contrary to the provision of the treaty.327 
They are under an obligation ‘to prevent’ torture on their soil, as per Article2.328 In its 
General Comment No. 2, the Committee Against Torture further elaborates on Article 2. 
The Committee emphasises that state parties should name and define torture and other ill 
treatments in their respective penal laws.329 The Committee further clarifies that the 
codification of torture and other ill treatments will emphasise the need for its appropriate 
punishment to deter its perpetrators.330 The Committee further says that the executive and 
judiciary should also play an active role in preventing torture. The Committee states that 
prohibition against torture is absolute and non­derogable.331 It is further laid down that 
torture and other ill­treatment are difficult to be differentiated in practice; therefore, these 
                                                          
327 United Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, available at http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CAT.aspx, the Preamble 
and Article 2 (last accessed on 10 November 2017). 
328 United Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment. Available at http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CAT.aspx, Article 2 (last 
accessed on 10 November 2017). 
329 The Committee Against Torture, General Comment No. 2 CAT/C/GC/2, para 11 
330 Ibid. 
331 Ibid., para 5. 
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are indivisible, interdependent and interrelated.332 The prohibition against torture has 
attained the status of customary international law.333 The prevention of torture shall 
prevail at all times, including during war, public emergency or any other political 
instability.334 Orders from superiors can never be invoked as justifications for torture. In 
other words, there is no defence to torture; for example, a subordinate acting on the 
instruction of his or her superior to perpetrate torture will not be regarded as justification 
of torture.335 
International human rights on the treatment of terror suspects during police 
interrogation adopt liberal security attitudes and oblige on all states to treat such detainees 
with humanity. The law has refrained from designating terror suspects as unlawful 
combatants to have authorised torture, as suggested by Posner336 and Ignatieff.337 So, all 
terror detainees should be treated in accordance with the human rights law. This stance 
of human rights laws has also discouraged their suggestion to divide a community into 
two identifiable groups—‘We’ and ‘They’—and interrogate and torture ‘them’ for 
unlimited time. Rather, human rights laws fully reflect the views of Luban,338 Waldron,339 
and David Cole340 not to divide a community during heightened security situations. 
In the regional and domestic contexts of the UK, the ECHR and the Human Rights 
Act 1998 place the same burdens on the country when questioning or interrogating a terror 
detainee.   
                                                          
332 Ibid., para 3. 
333 Ibid., para 1. 
334 United Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment. available at http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CAT.aspx, Article 2 (last 
accessed on 18 September 2014). 
335 Ibid. 
336 Posner, R.A. (2006) Not a Suicide Pact: The Constitution in a Time of National Emergency, Oxford 
University Press: Oxford and New York, 
337 Ignatieff, M. (2005) The Lesser Evil: Political Ethics in an Age of Terror, Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 
338 Luban, D. (2005) Eight Fallacies about Liberty and Security in Human Rights in the ‘War on Terror’ 
edited by Wilson, R.A. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
339 Waldron, J. (2003) “Security and Liberty: The Image of Balance”, The Journal of Political Philosophy, 
vol. 11, No. 2 
340 Cole, D. (2004) “The Priority of Morality: The Emergency Constitution’s Blind Spot”, 113 Yale L.J. 
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In the context of Pakistan, Article 14 in the constitution of Pakistan recognises the 
right to respect for human dignity and obligates the prohibition of torture. This is one of 
the positive obligations of Pakistan to stop torture and self­incrimination; that is, a suspect 
should not be compelled to make confession.341 Positive obligations refer to the state’s 
duties to act or provide for the realisation of civil and political rights.342 Civil and political 
human rights were explained previously in this chapter. The state is no longer considered 
to be only under negative obligations; that is, not to interfere in individual rights.343 The 
human rights law, especially the law governing civil and political rights, has transformed 
the state obligations from negative to positive. The individual is regarded as an active 
agent and is not merely a passive recipient of the rights. Therefore, states are under 
positive obligations to ensure that all civil and political rights are protected and 
guaranteed.344 Thus, Pakistan is under positive obligations to prevent and criminalise 
torture. Only voluntary confessions should be admissible in court. Pakistan is 
constitutionally bound to provide equal protection under the law to all citizens without 
any discrimination.345   
In summary, in terms of the treatment of terror suspect during police 
interrogations, international and regional, and also the UK’s and Pakistan’s domestic 
human rights laws not only prohibit torture and other ill­treatment but they also recognise 
the fact that states should not create hardships for detainees because they are vulnerable, 
which infers that long interrogation sessions are deemed to create hardships for detainees. 
The human rights laws clearly reject the conservative attitudes of Posner346 and 
                                                          
341 Constitution of Pakistan 1973, Article 13(b) 
342 Fredman, S. (2006) “Human rights Transformed: Positive Duties and Positive Rights”, Research 
Paper, University of Oxford, Faculty of Law. Available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=923936. 
343 Ibid. 
344 Ibid. 
345Constitution of Pakistan (1973). 
346 Posner, R.A. (2006) Not a Suicide Pact: The Constitution in a Time of National Emergency, Oxford 
University Press: Oxford and New York. 
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Ignatieff347, which support torture and designate terror suspects as unlawful combatants. 
Instead, it embodies the liberal attitudes of Cole348, Luban349 and Waldron350, which 
discourage the use of torture and the division of the community into ‘We’ and ‘They’. 
The human rights laws are also mindful of the fact that terror detainees are more 
vulnerable to be mistreated during police interrogations, therefore, discourage lengthy 
police interrogation sessions.   
 
3.2.3 Internal Police Review Mechanisms 
Article 11 of the UNCAT specifically makes all state parties duty bound to review 
the actions of those who are responsible for the custody, treatment and interrogation of 
all detainees, including terror suspects.351 The provision did not accommodate Gross’s352 
conservative attitudes on this that every public official is the judge of his own actions. 
Neither does it support Posner’s,353 Tushnet’s354 and Ackerman’s355 conservative point of 
view that it is the job of the executive to deal with the terror threat where courts have 
either no or only a very limited role to play. This is to infer that human rights laws give 
more importance to the police review mechanism to check the treatment of terror suspects 
during pre­charge detention. This provision has fully embraced the liberal attitudes of 
                                                          
347 Ignatieff, M. (2005) The Lesser Evil: Political Ethics in an Age of Terror, Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press 
348 Cole, D. (2004) “The Priority of Morality: The Emergency Constitution’s Blind Spot”, 113 Yale L.J. 
349 Luban, D. (2005) Eight Fallacies about Liberty and Security in Human Rights in the ‘War on Terror’ 
edited by Wilson, R.A. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
350 Waldron, J. (2003) “Security and Liberty: The Image of Balance”, The Journal of Political Philosophy, 
vol. 11, No. 2. 
351 United Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment. Available at http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CAT.aspx, Article 11 (last 
accessed on 18 September 2014). 
352 Gross, O. (2003) “Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crisis Always be Constitutional”, 
The Yale Law Journal, vol. 112:1011 
353 Posner, R.A. (2006) Not a Suicide Pact: The Constitution in a Time of National Emergency, Oxford 
University Press: Oxford and New York. 
354 Tushnet, M. (2010) “Defending Korematsu?: Reflection on Civil Liberties in Wartime”, Georgetown 
University Law Centre. 
355 Ackerman, B. (2004) “The Emergency Constitution”, Yale Law School, Faculty Scholarship Series, 
Paper 121 
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Walker,356 where he supports initial and periodic review of the treatment of terror suspect 
during the entire period of his pre­charge detention. 
 
3.2.4 Police Records 
We cannot conceive of a justice system without the courts. These courts rely on 
the police records to administer criminal justice. They receive complaints from aggrieved 
persons, and they then look into the facts and records maintained by the authorities in 
charge of the detainee’s custody. Accurate police records are very important for the 
administration of criminal justice. The courts and committees resort to the record and 
base their decision on the available record. In addition, human rights are justiciable and 
it is due to this reason that the courts and committees are able to rely on accurate and 
timely updated police records. Here, human rights laws adopt a full liberal stance on the 
accurate and timely maintenance of the police record.  
 
3.2.5 Rights of a Terror Suspect to Contact the Outside World 
The ICCPR believes that the family is a natural and fundamental unit of society 
that needs protection.357 Article 17 of the ICCPR also recognises the right of a detainee 
to contact his or her family or home.358 There should be no unlawful or arbitrary 
interference with such contact. Similarly, Article 9 (3) and (4) clearly recognise the right 
of an accused to defend his or her case. Therefore, international human rights laws give 
a suspect the right to access the outside world (including lawyers, family members, 
friends, doctors or interpreters) to help prepare his or her defence.359 The ECHR Articles 
                                                          
356 Walker, C. (2009) Blackstone’s Guide to The Anti­Terrorism Legislation 2nd edition, Oxford 
University Press: New York; See also, Walker, C. (2011) Terrorism and The Law, first edition, Oxford 
University Press: New York. 
357 ICCPR, Article 23. 
358 Ibid., Article 17. 
359 Walker, C. (2009) Blackstone’s Guide to the Anti­Terrorism Legislation, 2nd Edition, Oxford, 
England: Oxford University Press. 
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6 and 8, and the Human Rights Act 1998 in the UK also recognise the right of a suspect 
to contact the outside world.360  
Article 10 of the Pakistani Constitution places an important negative obligation 
on the state not to deny a detainee the right to contact a legal practitioner of defence for 
her or his case. This is one of the important rights of suspects to contact the outside world. 
On the right of a terror suspect to contact the outside world, international, regional, 
UK and Pakistani domestic human rights laws are very clear. These laws resonate with 
the liberal security paradigm and they fully embrace Buhelt’s361 rightisation model and 
Walker’s362 constitutionalism to recognise the terror suspects’ rights during pre­charge 
detention and to give them the opportunity to defend their cases.  
 
3.2.6 Detention Conditions 
The preambles of the International Bill of Rights (UDHR, ICCPR and UNCAT) 
believe in the ‘inherent dignity’ of mankind. All three instruments stress the fair and 
humane treatment of people under arrest. The same is true with the ECHR and the 
domestic human rights laws of the UK and Pakistan, which state that detainees should be 
treated with fairness and humanity. This suggests that human rights reflect more liberal 
security attitudes, and authorise enough food and water, enough hours of sleep, and breaks 
for praying, exercising or attending to personal hygiene when in police custody. These 
human rights do not recognise the viewpoints of Posner363, who would treat terror 
detainees as unlawful combatants and deprive them of their right to life or security of 
person while in detention. 
                                                          
360 ECHR, Articles 5, 6 and 8; See the Human Rights Act 1998. 
361 Buhelt, A. (2013) Policing the Law of Fear in ‘Justice and Security in the 21st Century: Risks, Rights 
and the Rule of Law’ edited by Barbara Hudson and Synnove Ugelvik London and New York: Routledge. 
362 Walker, C. (2009) Blackstone’s Guide to The Anti­Terrorism Legislation 2nd edition, Oxford 
University Press: New York p. 17 – 21. See also, Walker, C. (2011) Terrorism and The Law, first edition, 
Oxford University Press: New York 
363 Posner, R.A. (2006) Not a Suicide Pact: The Constitution in a Time of National Emergency, Oxford 
University Press: Oxford and New York. 
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Part III  
3.3.0 Conclusion 
This chapter has answered the first research question: which human rights law 
govern the treatment of terror suspects during pre­charge detention? And, what ought to 
be the treatment of terror detainees thereunder? The human rights, whether it is the 
International Bill of Rights (UDHR, ICCPR, UNCAT), ECHR or the UK’s and Pakistan’s 
domestic human rights laws, regard the liberty and security of detainees as being very 
important. Liberty and security of person have attained the jus cogens character. No 
person can be deprived of his/her liberty ‘save in accordance with the law’. The human 
rights law provides sufficient safeguards to protect the residual liberty of a detainee. 
The human rights law clearly lays down certain substantive and procedural 
safeguards to guarantee the fair treatment of detainees, including terror detainees, during 
pre­charge detention. The human rights law prescribes how a terror detainee should be 
treated. The ICCPR and the Human Rights Committee tell that the period of pre­charge 
detention should be ‘reasonable’—not more than a few days. A detainee must promptly 
be produced before a court either to charge or release him. These human rights laws and 
principles reflect a liberal stance on the interrogation of terror detainees; that is, not to 
torture or humiliate a terror detainee during police interrogation. They also tell us that the 
detention conditions in which a terror suspect is kept should be humane. In addition, they 
expressly grant detainees the right to contact the outside world, including his or her 
family, friends, or a legal counsel. Similarly, police records and mechanisms to check the 
abusive powers of the police also form an important part of the human rights laws. 
Consequently, the human rights laws and principles set a standard for the treatment of 
terror detainees during pre­charge detention. The standard will act as a yardstick to assess 
the treatment of terror detainees in Pakistan and the UK in the following chapters. This 
human rights law driven case­study of Pakistan will further unearth the thesis main 
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research argument: in the complete absence of a context­based study (case­study) on the 
treatment of terror suspects during pre­charge detention in Pakistan, the country follows 
the war and executive paradigm of terrorism in its legal response to terrorism thus 
adversely affecting the human rights of terror detainees. The way forward for Pakistan is 
let the country should learn from the human rights laws and the UK how to treat terror 
detainees in its criminal justice systems, and vice versa. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
PRE­CHARGE TERROR DETENTION IN 
FOCUS: AN ASSESSMENT OF THE LAW AND 
PRACTICE IN THE UK 
 
4.0 Introduction 
This chapter attempts to answer the second research question, which is: What is 
the law on the treatment of terror detainees during pre­charge detention in the UK? To 
what degree the country complies with the human rights obligations in this regard?  And, 
is there any gap between the UK’s law and practice when dealing with terror detainees 
during pre­charge detention? This chapter will use liberal critique research methodology 
to assess the UK’s anti­terror laws and practices on the topic in light of the human rights 
laws and norms. The UK’s treatment will be used as comparator to the main case­study 
of Pakistan in the following chapters to learn some useful lessons from.   
This chapter begins by highlighting all of the major terror incidents in the UK, 
starting from the Irish Troubles and moving on to the recent terror attacks in Manchester 
and London, which justify the country’s need to have anti­terror laws for its legal response 
to terrorism. The terror incidents appear in Part I.  
The second part of this chapter will assess the treatment of terror detainees during 
pre­charge detention in the UK. It will first identify which anti­terror laws are applicable 
to the treatment of terror suspects during police custody. Next, the country’s actual 
practices related to the treatment of the detainees are also identified. In addition, and most 
importantly, a human rights assessment of the treatment of terror suspects during police 
custody in the UK will consider their treatment in human rights law to understand the 
differences between how terror detainees are actually treated in the country as opposed to 
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how they ought to be treated. For example, what is the period of pre­charge detention in 
the UK? And, how is it different from the human rights law conception of the period? 
How are terror detainees interrogated in the UK? And, how different is this treatment 
from police interrogation in the human rights law? What rights does a terror suspect enjoy 
in the UK to contact his/her family, friends and a lawyer as compared to the rights under 
the human rights law? What is the status of internal police review mechanisms in the UK? 
And, how far the mechanisms comport with the human rights obligations? What is the 
condition of detention centres in the country? Does it comply with the human rights laws 
and principles requirement? Finally, another assessment of the country’s treatment of 
terror suspects in law and its actual practices will be carried out to see if there is any gap 
between the treatments at the two different levels (i.e. law and action).    
If the UK’s treatment is found to be in accordance with its various human rights 
obligations related to the six categories/themes of the treatment of terror suspects that are 
used in this research project, then the UK’s legal response to terrorism seems to remain 
intact in its legal boundary. The UK is credited for knowing the difference among the 
three responses to terrorism—war, executive and the administration of criminal justice. It 
can also set an example for other states, such as Pakistan, to learn from. So, the country 
can be used as a suitable comparator. However, in the unlikely finding that terror 
detainees are treated harshly and are denied their rights under the human rights law during 
pre­charge detention, then the UK seemingly will fail to be used as a comparator to the 
main case­study. If the country is unable to fulfil its human rights obligations in exercising 
its powers of pre­charge terror detention, then this will not only harm its human rights 
image but will also lose its credibility to be used as a potential comparator. Finally, Part 
III concludes this chapter.  
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Part I 
4.1.0 Major Terror Incidents in the UK 
The UK has a long history of terrorist attacks, particularly in Northern Ireland, 
stemming from the Irish ‘Troubles’.364 The Troubles refer to the conflict of two 
communities over civil rights in Northern Ireland, which started in the late­1960s.365 The 
Unionist, significantly Protestant majority in the region, wished to continue to be part of 
the UK. On the other hand, the aim of the nationalist Republicans, who were almost a 
Catholic minority, was to accede from the UK to the Republic of Ireland. During the 
conflict, many terrorist attacks were launched, killing over 3,600 people and maiming or 
injuring more than 50,000, while the number of people who were psychologically 
damaged due to those attacks is unknown.366  
The Troubles spanned a period of 30 years (1968–1998).367 This period witnessed 
the rise and fall of many militant organisations claiming to liberate Northern Ireland from 
British rule.368 The Irish Republican Army (IRA), a paramilitary organisation, emerged 
as the major Irish republican militant group.369 In 1970, the IRA split into the ‘Provisional 
IRA’ and the ‘Official IRA’. It was the Provisional IRA who waged the main terrorist 
activities against British rule during the Troubles. Other noteworthy splinter groups 
include the ‘Continuity IRA’, the ‘Irish National Liberation Army’, and the ‘Real IRA’, 
who all had different strategies to achieve their main goal—freedom from British control 
of the north of Ireland.370  
                                                          
364Dingley, J. (2001) “The Bombing of Omagh, 15 August 1998: The Bombers, Their Tactics, Strategy, 
and Purpose Behind the Incident” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 24 at 463 
365 “BBC History (N.d.) “More Information About: The Troubles” Available at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/troubles last accessed 10 February 2015. 
366 Ibid. 
367 Ibid. 
368 Ibid. 
369 Ibid. 
370 Dingley, J. (2001) “The Bombing of Omagh, 15 August 1998: The Bombers, Their Tactics, Strategy, 
and Purpose Behind the Incident” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 24 at 451­452. 
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In 1971, Northern Ireland, then governed by the UK, introduced new anti­terror 
laws that provided for internment (indefinite detention) without trial, which led to three 
days of violence and the death of 23 people.371 The downward spiral of the Troubles 
intensified soon after the killings, and this led to an increase in the number of terrorist 
attacks. For example, on 21 November 1974, two bombs were exploded at pubs in 
Birmingham, killing 19 people and injuring over 180.372 In 1976, a gunman ambushed a 
van near the County Armagh village of Kingsmills, killing 10 textile factory workers.373 
On 27 August 1979, at least 18 soldiers were killed at Warrenpoint, close to the border 
with the Irish Republic, when a bomb was detonated, hitting a vehicle carrying British 
soldiers. On the same day, Lord Mountbatten, the Queen’s cousin, was killed by a bomb 
in the Irish Republic.374 The Provisional IRA accepted responsibility for these attacks.375 
One of the worst atrocities came on Remembrance Sunday in 1987 when the IRA 
detonated a bomb in Enniskillen detonated that killed 11 civilians.376 On 15 August 1998, 
a car bomb exploded in a market near the town centre of Omagh,377 killing 29 people and 
injuring over 200 others. The Real IRA accepted responsibility for these attacks.378  
A number of political solutions attempted to put an end to the Troubles, including 
the 1973 Sunningdale Agreement, the 1985 Anglo­Irish Agreement, and the 1998 Good 
                                                          
371 “BBC News (2005) “Provisional IRA: War, ceasefire, endgame?” Available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/static/in_depth/northern_ireland/2001/provisional_ira/1971.stm last 
accessed 11 February 2015. 
372“BBC News (2008) “1974: Birmingham pub blasts kill 19” On This Day. Available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/november/21/newsid_2549000/2549953.stm  last 
accessed on 10 February 2015. 
373 Dingley, “The bombing of Omagh, 15 August 1998,” at 456. 
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Friday Peace Agreement.379 Years later, in late­July 2005, following the Good Friday 
Agreement, the IRA officially renounced violence and promised to work within the 
political and democratic process of the north of Ireland. Tony Blair, then British Prime 
Minister, regarded this move as a “step of unparalleled magnitude in the entire peace 
efforts of the Troubles.”380  
The Irish Troubles had not yet completely come to an end when the ‘War on 
Terror’ knocked at the door of the UK.381 On 7 July 2005, a series of coordinated terrorist 
bombs exploded during the morning rush hour, hitting London’s public transport 
system.382 This attack killed 52 and another 700 were injured. It caused severe disruption 
and affected the nation’s telecommunication systems.383 Haroon Rashid, a member of Al­
Qaida, was the mastermind of the attacks.384 A year later, an airline bomb plot was 
disrupted, which aimed to kill more than 1500 passengers flying from London Heathrow 
Airport to various airports in the United States. Ali, Sarwar and Hussain all were found 
guilty of conspiring to kill the crew and passengers by using homemade liquid bombs.385 
On 30 June 2007, two Islamist extremists attempted a terrorist attack when they drove a 
jeep into the doors of the main terminal building at Glasgow Airport in Scotland.386 When 
the vehicle came to a halt, they threw gasoline over it and attempted to detonate the 
vehicle.387 The two men were overpowered and arrested.388 In 2008, a 22­year­old convert 
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to Islam attempted to kill members of the public in the Giraffe restaurant in Exeter using 
homemade bombs.389 The recently converted Muslim confessed that the attempt was to 
avenge the oppression of Muslims around the world. Another atrocity occurred in 
Woolwich, southeast London, on 22 May 2013, when Fusilier Lee Rigby of the British 
army was murdered as he returned to his barracks.390 Rigby had served in Afghanistan. 
He was dragged into the road and attacked: his killers considered themselves to be the 
‘Soldiers of Allah’.391 One of the killers was recently sentenced for life and the other was 
ordered to serve 45 years in prison.392 
More recently, the UK has been hit by a series terror attacks in 2017. The people 
of Manchester witnessed a particularly horrible terror attack that was perpetrated mostly 
on young children.393 Salman Abedi, a 23­year­old of Libyan descent from Manchester, 
carried out a suicide attack, killing at least 20 people and leaving 119 injured.394 Within 
just two weeks of the Manchester attack, a terror attack in London killed seven people 
and left 48 injured. Three terrorists drove a white van over pedestrians on London Bridge 
and then left the van, stabbing more people in a nearby market.395 At the time of writing, 
the latest terror attack was carried out by Darren Osborne, a 47­year­old man and a father 
of four, who he drove a van into a group of Muslim worshippers in Finsbury Park London 
on 19 June 2017: killing one man and injuring another nine.396  
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Owing to the terrorist attacks that started in the aftermath of the War on Terror, 
the UK has been regarded as under an ‘increased threat of nuclear attack’. Duncan 
Gardham, security correspondent, is quoted as saying: 
Bomb makers who have been active in Afghanistan may already have the 
ability to produce a ‘dirty bomb’ using knowledge acquired over the 
internet. It is feared that terrorists could transport an improvised nuclear 
device up the Thames and detonate it in the heart of London. Bristol, 
Liverpool Newcastle, Glasgow and Belfast are also thought to be 
vulnerable.397 
 
The same opinion has been translated by the Home Office as a national threat: 
The threat to the UK and our interests from international terrorism is 
severe. This means that a terrorist attack is highly likely. The terrorist 
threats we face now are more diverse than before, dispersed across a 
wider geographical area, and often in countries without effective 
governance. We therefore face an unpredictable situation.398 
 
Consequently, the British government has launched a counter­terrorism strategy called 
‘CONTEST’ in an attempt to overcome the threat.399 All four of the important 
components—‘Pursue’, ‘Prevent’, ‘Protect’ and ‘Prepare’—have been discussed before 
in Chapter Two.400 In a televised speech in the aftermath of the recent attacks in 
Manchester and London, the Prime Minister Theresa May said that, ‘It is time to say 
“Enough is enough”’.401 She reiterated the previous commitment of the country to fight 
against terrorism and renewed the resolve to bring changes in the fight against terrorism. 
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The UK government is, therefore, fully committed to respond to terror threats. In 
this regard, the country has legislated against terrorism since the Irish Troubles and has 
also actively responded through legal means to cope with the ongoing episode of the Third 
Millennium Terrorism. Why then would the country not enact anti­terrorism laws when 
it has international as well as regional obligations to do so? The UK is under an 
international obligation to fight terrorism. For example, in March 2001, the UK ratified 
the UN International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism 
1999.402 Likewise, the ECHR imposes obligations on the country to combat terrorism for 
the protection of the human rights of its own citizens. Under Article 15(1), the country 
may “take measures derogating from its obligations under this Convention [ECHR] to the 
extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation.” Similarly, Article 17 of the 
Convention reiterates that the government should combat any threat or act “aimed at the 
destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth” in the convention. It will be 
interesting to see how the UK balances its responsibilities to fight against terrorism and 
its human rights obligations to treat terror detainees with fairness.    
 
Part II  
4.2.0 Pre-charge Terror Detention in the UK: Law, Practice and Assessment 
This part will cover the treatment of terror suspects during pre­charge detention 
in the UK. It will also bring to the fore all legal provisions governing the treatment of 
terror detainees during pre­charge detention in the country. It also embarks upon police 
practices in this regard. This part will then analyse all of the legal provisions applicable 
during pre­charge detention to the treatment of suspected terrorists to find out what is the 
law on the treatment of terror suspect in the country.  
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The schema of Part II is to identify what is the law on the treatment of terror 
suspects during pre­charge detention in the UK, followed by what the law ought to be in 
this regard. The identification of the law and its human rights law assessment will appear 
in subsection A of this part, which will analyse the period of pre­charge detention, police 
interrogation, police records, internal police review mechanisms, rights of a terror suspect 
to contact the outside world, and the detention conditions in which terror suspects are 
kept. Similarly, an assessment of the country’s practices on the topic will appear in 
subsection B, related to the same six categories/themes.  
 
  4.2.1.A. The Period of Pre-charge Detention: Law and Assessment 
The previous chapter found that both ICCPR and ECHR expressly recognise the 
principles of promptness and reasonableness. These impose important human rights 
obligations on all member states not to detain someone, including a terror suspect, for an 
unnecessary or unreasonable period. For example, a terror detainee must ‘promptly’ be 
produced before a judge (habeas corpus).403 He or she must ‘promptly’ be informed of 
any charges against him or her.404 The judge, without delay, should decide upon the 
lawfulness of his or her detention; that is, to charge or release him or her.405 If charged, 
his or her trial must be arranged within a ‘reasonable’ time.406 These principles are 
procedural safeguards against arbitrary detention with an aim to discourage a prolonged 
period of pre­charge detention. 
The UK’s anti­terror laws governing the treatment of terror detainees are located 
in Schedule 8 of the Terrorism Act 2000 and Code H of the Police and Criminal Evidence 
Act 1984 (hereafter, PACE).407 Schedule 8 of the Terrorism Act 2000 provides a 
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comprehensive framework on the treatment of terror detainees, which is supplemented 
through the Anti­Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, the Prevention of Terrorism 
Act 2005, the Terrorism Act 2006, the Counter­terrorism Act 2008, and the Protection of 
Freedoms Act 2012. These laws will be examined in their historical and contemporary 
perspectives, moving from the Troubles in Northern Ireland to the current problem of 
Third Millennium Terrorism. The aim of this review is to find the legal provisions 
applicable to the period of pre­charge detention in the current anti­terror laws of the UK.  
The Irish Troubles era in the UK has geared­up anti­terrorism legislation in the 
country. When civil unrest in Northern Ireland peaked in 1971, the country invoked 
powers to detain IRA organisers, leaders, and members indefinitely and without trial in 
pursuant of the Civil Authorities (Special Powers) Acts (Northern Ireland) 1922.408 The 
Acts, however, did not disturb the period of pre­charge detention, which was regulated in 
accordance with ordinary criminal law.409 Therefore, an arrested person was to be brought 
before a court within 24 hours. For the first time in the country’s history, the period of 
pre­charge detention was extended from 24 hours to 48 hours by virtue of Section 132 of 
the Magistrate’s Courts Act (Northern Ireland) 1964.410 Under this Section, a police 
officer could extend without limit such period and only then did the suspect have to be 
brought before judicial authority. There was another increase in the period of the pre­
charge detention to a maximum of 72 hours under Section 10(1) of the Northern Ireland 
(Emergency Provisions) Act 1973 (hereafter, EPA 1973).411 The rationale behind this was 
that the police might require more time to effectively investigate the case and at the same 
time it would give more time to Secretary of State to decide to make an interim custody 
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order of the arrested person.412 Under the prevailing law, the Secretary of State was able 
to issue interim custody orders for detainees.  
The increase in the period of pre­charge detention did not stop at 72 hours. The 
UK parliament enacted the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1974 
(hereafter, PTA 1974), which not only conferred more police powers but also increased 
the period of pre­charge detention to seven days.413 The PTA 1974 expressly allowed that 
after 48 hours, a police officer could apply to the Secretary of State to extend the detention 
period for another five days—altogether constituting seven days. 
The seven­day police detention was challenged in the ECHR by four men who 
were arrested and then released without charge in Brogan v United Kingdom.414 The Court 
evaluated the period of seven days in the light of Article 5(3) of the ECHR, wherein a 
suspect, after arrest, shall be brought ‘promptly’ before a judicial authority. This Article 
has been examined in detail in Chapter Three. In this case, the Court held that seven days’ 
detention period is too lengthy and that it not only violates the rights protected under 
Article 5(3) but would also import a potential procedural weakness that would damage 
individual rights.415 This decision surprised the UK government and it subsequently 
rushed to apply for derogation under Article 15 of the ECHR. 
Since this decision, the UK government has regularly reviewed its anti­terrorism 
legislation, seeking ways and means to combat terrorism while at the same time 
complying with Article 5 of the ECHR. In this regard, John Rowe QC carried out annual 
reviews of the UK’s anti­terrorism legislation.416 He later suggested that there should be 
a judicial control in the process of granting an extension in detention cases. In other 
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words, a judge or judicial authority if involved in granting further detention, would aim 
to comply with the provisions of the ECHR. Before this point, the executive, usually the 
Secretary of State, granted these extensions. Rowe also suggested that the production of 
terror detainees before a court should not be delayed by more than 48 hours in total.  
Rowe’s recommendations were accepted and included in the Terrorism Act 2000. 
According to Section 41(3) of this Act, an arrested person shall be brought before a judge 
no later than 48 hours after arrest. This period could be further extended by involving a 
judicial authority to decide on such an extension.417 However, the Act did not alter the 
seven­day pre­charge detention period. 
The terrible events of 9/11 demanded more anti­terror legislation and, like many 
other countries, the UK introduced further terror legislation, particularly the Anti­
Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001. Even at this time, the UK government did not 
change the period of the pre­charge detention. However, two years after 9/11, pre­charge 
detention was doubled to 14 days through a provision of the Criminal Justice Act 2003.418 
Terrorist incidents often increase public demand for strict laws that provide lengthy 
detention. Soon after the London bombing in 2005, the government pushed to increase 
the pre­charge detention period to 90 days. However, it was defeated in parliament and 
instead a period of 28 days was included in the Terrorism Act 2006.419 Another attempt 
was made to increase the 28 days period to 42 days during PM Gordon Brown’s 
government in 2008 but, once again, the attempt was defeated in parliament.420 
Many scholars have expressed concerns about the 28­day period of pre­charge 
detention and its compatibility with Article 5 of ECHR. Therefore, when there was a 
change in government in 2010, the new coalition government decided to reduce the period 
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to 14 days, which was introduced by the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012. The recent 
terror attacks at Manchester Arena and London Bridge have once again brought the debate 
back to 10 Downing Street to increase the period of pre­charge detention.421 However, so 
far there has been no increase in the pre­charge detention period in the UK.    
To date, no change has occurred in the total period of pre­charge detention in the 
UK.422 Since 2012, a terrorist suspect cannot be detained longer than 14 days.423 A 
terrorist detainee can remain in police custody up to a maximum of 48 hours after arrest. 
The detention can be further extended by involving the judiciary, up to a maximum of 12 
days or 14 days in total from arrest. A warrant for further detention can never be 
authorised for more than six days at a time.424  
When a person who is suspected of terrorism is arrested in the UK, he or she can 
remain in police custody for up to 48 hours. Their detention can then be further extended. 
A prosecutor or a police officer of at least the rank of superintendent may apply to a 
judicial authority for the issue of a ‘warrant of further detention’. Further detention shall 
not be more than 12 days. However, the period of such warrant of further detention, at 
one time, shall not be more than six days.425 As mentioned previously, seven days’ 
detention was previously granted by the Secretary of State but now the judiciary makes 
pre­charge detention provisions compatible with Article 5 of the ECHR and Article 9 of 
the ICCPR. An application for warrant of further detention shall be made to a judicial 
authority within 48 hours of the person’s arrested or within six hours of the end of the 48 
hours of detention. The official applying for the issuance of warrant of further detention 
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must fulfil certain requirements to satisfy the judicial authority before authorising the 
warrant. First, the official must satisfy the judicial authority that there are reasonable 
grounds either to obtain or preserve relevant evidence. Second, the former must convince 
the latter that the investigation concerning the case is carried out ‘diligently and 
expeditiously’.426  
So far, it is clear which anti­terror laws and provisions are applicable to regulate 
the total period of pre­charge detention in the UK and what is the law on the total period 
of pre­charge detention, its management in chunks or parts, and the period of production 
of a terror detainee before a court. These form the second research question. 
Consequently, a human rights law assessment of this part will be carried out to find out 
what ought to be the total and part period of the pre­charge detention in which to decide 
either to charge or release a terror suspect, and how promptly a terror suspect should be 
produced before a court to authorise his or her further detention.  
Regarding the first 48 hours detention during police custody and its compatibility 
with Article 9 of the ICCPR and Article 5 of the ECHR, such period is in compliance and, 
therefore, is compatible with the safeguards mentioned in the articles. Several scholars, 
such as Walker, Dickson, Awan, Macken and Greer, have assessed pre­charge detention 
in terrorism cases in the UK but none has objected to the first 48 hours in favour of 24 
hours of detention.427 These authors did not consider that 48 hours in police custody 
would contravene the liberty safeguards in international human rights law. Similarly, the 
Human Rights Committee thinks that “48 hours are ordinarily sufficient to transport the 
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individual and to prepare for the judicial hearing.”428 The Committee adopted its view in 
a communication following the case of Michael Freemantle, who alleged a violation of 
Article 9 when he was produced for the first time before a court of law four days after his 
arrest. The Committee remarked that “in the absence of a justification for a delay of four 
days before bringing the author to a judicial authority, the Committee finds that this delay 
constitutes a violation of Article 9, paragraph 3 of the covenant.”429 In another Brisenko 
case, the Committee adopted the view that even a delay of three days violated the 
principle of promptness as mentioned in Article 9, paragraph 3 of the covenant.430 So, 48 
hours, or two days delay, is clearly compatible with the UK’s international human rights 
obligation to produce a terror detainee before a court.  
Next, is the UK’s period of six days, at a time, in compliance with Article 9 of the 
ICCPR? In the UK, an application for a warrant of further detention shall be made to a 
judicial authority within 48 hours of the person’s arrest or within six hours of the end of 
the 48 hours of detention. The official applying for the issuance of a warrant of further 
detention must fulfil certain procedural safeguards to satisfy the judicial authority before 
authorising the warrant. First, the official must satisfy the judicial authority that there are 
reasonable grounds either to obtain or preserve relevant evidence. Second, the former 
must convince the latter that that the investigation of the case is carried out ‘diligently 
and expeditiously’, as discussed previously.431 After the court is satisfied, a terror 
detainee can be remanded in police custody for six days, at a time, to get further evidence 
to help make a decision of whether to bring a charge against or release him/her. Walker, 
                                                          
428 General Comment No. 35, para 33, available at 
http://docstore.ohchr.org/SelfServices/FilesHandler.ashx?enc=6QkG1d%2fPPRiCAqhKb7yhsrdB0H1l59
79OVGGB%2bWPAXjdnG1mwFFfPYGIlNfb%2f6T%2fqwtc77%2fKU9JkoeDcTWWPIpCoePGBcMs
RmFtoMu58pgnmzjyiyRGkPQekcPKtaaTG last accessed 13 March 2016 
429 Freemantle v Jamaica 625/1995, para 7.4 
430 Brisenko v Hungary 852/1999, para 7.4 “With regard to the claim of a violation of article 9, paragraph 
3, the Committee notes that the author was detained for three days before being brought before a judicial 
officer. In the 
absence of an explanation from the State party on the necessity to detain the author for this 
period, the Committee finds a violation of article 9, paragraph 3 of the Covenant.” 
431 Terrorism Act 2000, Schedule 8, para. 32. 
Page 119 of 272 
 
Dickson, Awan, Macken and Greer did not shed any light on this issue. Similarly, the 
Human Rights Committee has not even mentioned this in its response to the recent 
periodical reports on the UK laws and practices.432 It seems evident that the six days’ 
period at a time in the UK anti­terror laws is reasonable and, thus, compatible with the 
safeguards mentioned in Article 9.    
Finally, is the 14 days’ total period of pre­charge detention from arrest compatible 
with the guarantees mentioned in Article 9? Although the UK reduced the period of 
detention from 28 days to 14 days in 2012, the Human Rights Committee expressed its 
concern about 14 days and suggested the UK further reduce the duration.433 Liberty, a 
human rights NGO in the UK, has criticised the 14­day pre­charge detention period:  
Fourteen days is still the longest period of pre-charge detention of any 
comparable democracy. In the USA the limit is two days, in Ireland it is seven, in 
Italy it is four and in Canada it is just one. Extended detention without charge 
flies in the face of our basic democratic principles of justice, fairness and liberty. 
Unjustifiable and unnecessary, it is also counterproductive in practice, alienating 
innocent people, their families and communities.434  
 
This clearly shows that the UK will find it hard to justify its power to detain terror suspects 
for 14 days in light of its international human rights obligations. First, the country 
provides one of the highest pre­charge detentions in the Western world. The West faces 
almost the same threat level from international terrorism as the UK but provides pre­
charge total detention period ranging from one to seven days. Hence, the UK is more 
likely to fail the tests of reasonableness and proportionality. It will be quite interesting to 
see how the UK will reply to the concerns of the Human Rights Committee on its 14­day 
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pre­charge detention. Second, on productivity, 14 days of detention does not seem more 
convincing as a negligible number: 8% of terror detainees was kept in detention up to 14 
days while 92% were charged in less than a week.435 The Manchester Arena and London 
Bridge attacks have pushed Theresa May to seriously consider an increase in the current 
14­day pre­charge detention period. An increase is likely to further upset the Human 
Rights Committee and other NGOs.  
On balance, the UK’s current power of pre­charge detention seems to be placed 
in­between the liberal and conservative attitudes to security. In the Western world, 
countries such as Canada, the United States, Italy and Germany limit pre­charge detention 
to less than a week. Consequently, the UK’s criminal justice model of terrorism in terms 
of the power to detain terror suspects can be seen to be a liberal­cum­conservative 
approach to security. 
The UK’s domestic and regional human rights obligations are grouped together to 
assess the treatment of terror suspects in the country. Although this has been justified 
earlier in this work, it can be briefly put that there are no significant differences between 
the UK’s domestic and regional human rights obligations when it comes to the treatment 
of terror suspects. First, the preamble of the Human Rights Act 1998 categorically states 
to “give further effect to rights and freedoms guaranteed under the European Convention 
on Human Rights.” Second, the main articles (Right to Liberty and Security of Persons) 
for the assessment guaranteed in the ECHR and the Act are exact copies. Third, the UK 
courts do ‘take into account’ the earlier decisions of the ECHR. Lastly, the UK courts 
may issue a ‘declaration of incompatibility’ regarding any provisions of the primary 
legislation or any action taken if they are found to be incompatible to the Convention.436 
This does not ipso facto invalidate the provision in respect of which the declaration is 
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df last accessed on 06 July 2016 
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issued.437 The declaration is not even binding on the parties to the proceedings.438 Courts 
in the UK can invalidate only those actions or decisions that are improperly or unlawfully 
taken by the executive.439 The courts can declare invalid an unjust decision or improper 
action carried out by the executive; however, they cannot strike down any provisions 
made by parliament.440 This is due to the constitutional concept of the sovereignty of 
parliament in the country.441 Owing to the sovereignty of parliament, courts in the UK 
can only exercise a “limited judicial review”.442 The incompatibility of the provision in 
question may be removed by a minister who thinks there are ‘compelling reasons’ to do 
so.443 The minister may exercise his ‘power to take remedial action’ and thus may make 
an amendment to the effect.444 Remedial actions are fairly fast for it is not mandatory for 
the amendments to observe the entire parliamentary process as it would have required to 
enact a new statute.445    
Although the British people have voted for Brexit and it has already been 
triggered, the UK’s obligations under the ECHR remain binding because the ECHR is 
independent of the EU and is established by the Council of Europe.446 However, if the 
UK’s current government repeals the Human Rights Act 1998, as it has already promised 
to do, then it would not be just to group together the country’s domestic and regional 
human rights obligations.447 The current government has promised to repeal the Human 
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Rights Act 1998 in favour of the British Bill of Rights, empowering national courts to 
overrule the ECtHR decision. The UK government might also change the wording of the 
Right to Liberty and Security of Person article.448 Theresa May, in a very emotional public 
speech, said that she would ‘rip up human rights’. In case it does happen and domestic 
human rights are materially changed, then two separate assessments of the UK’s treatment 
of terror suspects will be carried out—each in light of its domestic and regional 
obligations. So, it is reasonable to group together the domestic and regional human rights 
obligations of the UK for now and to carry out the assessment of its anti­terror laws in 
light thereof.  
Is the pre­charge detention period in the UK compatible with Articles 5(3) and (4) 
which, respectively, state that everyone arrested or detained ‘shall be brought promptly 
before a judge’, and they ‘shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness 
of his detention shall be decided speedily’? Here again, three sub­questions arise. First, 
is the 48 hours detention in police custody compatible with the principle of promptness 
in Article 5(3)? Second, is it in compliance with the clauses to keep a terror detainee in 
police custody for a maximum of six days, at a time, after his warrant of further detention 
is authorised by a court? Third, is the 14­day total detention period a reasonable time 
period for a speedy decision to be made to determine the lawfulness of detention (i.e., to 
set free or charge a detainee) in terror cases? 
Regarding 48 hours police custody, one can counter­argue and ask why it is not 
possible to produce a terror detainee, arrested without warrant, before court within 24 
hours of the arrest? Several scholars, such as Walker, Dickson, Awan, Macken and Greer 
have assessed pre­charge detention in terrorism cases in the context of the UK but none 
has objected to the first 48 hours in favour of 24 hours’ detention.449 This suggests that 
                                                          
448 Ibid. 
449 Walker, C. (2009) Blackstone’s Guide to the Anti­Terrorism Legislation 2nd edition, New York: 
Oxford University Press. See also Dickson, B. (2009) “Article 5 of the ECHR and 28­day Pre­charge 
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48 hours’ detention in police custody is reasonable, proportionate and thus compatible 
with Article 5 (3) of the ECHR. Why would the provision not be compatible when it has 
been in force since 1964 and has remained so without any objection by any of the 
independent reviewers?450 Likewise, the ECtHR has decided that 48 hours’ detention in 
police custody does not infringe on the right to be brought promptly before a judge in 
Article 5(3).451 Similarly, these authors point out that the Court did not object to keeping 
a terror detainee in police custody for six days at a time on further warrant of arrest.452 
Perhaps, this period is also reasonable and proportionate in their eyes? However, the 
Brogan case,453 as already discussed here, makes it clear that any detention in police 
custody longer than six days, without the authorisation of a court of law, will violate 
Article 5(3). Though this case relates to the first seven days of arrest in police custody 
before a further warrant of detention, perhaps it has set the time limits for a further warrant 
of detention. This is the reason why six days’ detention does not violate Article 5(3). 
Finally, how does the total 14 days’ detention comply with Article 5 guaranteeing 
‘prompt’ production and ‘speedy’ review of an arrested terror suspect, either to charge 
him/her or set him/her free? In Magee v United Kingdom, when three terror suspects were 
detained for a total of 12 days, the Court held that it was a reasonable period in terrorism 
cases on reasonable suspicion.454 If the court is in agreement with 12 days, then it should 
also be in agreement with 14 days. The ECHR, at present, does not have any issue with 
the UK’s 14­day pre­charge detention duration. Middleton thinks that 14 days’ pre­charge 
                                                          
Erosion of Civil Liberties: Pre­charge Detention and Counter­terror Laws”, The Police Journal 84. 
Macken, C. (2011) Counter­terrorism and the Detention of Suspected Terrorists: Preventive Detention 
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450 Blackbourn, J. (2014) “Evaluating the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation. Research Note 
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453 Brogan v United Kingdom (1989) 11 E.H.R.R. 117 
454 Magee v United Kingdom (2016) 62 E.H.R.R. para 105, “In the present case the applicants were 
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by the existence of a reasonable suspicion that they had committed a criminal offence.” 
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detention is ‘piecemeal’ in terrorism legislation and is one of the ‘modest improvements’ 
in the UK’s history of terror laws that has been ‘well received’.455 However, once again, 
in comparatively similar jurisdictions, the UK provides the highest detention duration; as 
was argued at a time when 28 days’ pre­charge detention was in force in the country.456 
The next highest pre­charge detention period in force in a country, after the UK, is France 
with six days. Spain and Russia both provide five days each, while in Italy it is four days. 
Germany and the United States only provide two days.457 At present, the 14 days’ pre­
charge detention period seems compatible with Article 5 of the ECHR, though the UK 
comparatively still has the lengthiest period of pre­trial detention. To conclude, the total 
pre­charge detention period of the UK is in compliance with Article 5 of the ECHR as far 
as the country’s domestic and regional human rights obligations are concerned. However, 
the UK’s 14­day pre­charge detention will contravene its international human rights 
obligations under ICCPR, Article 9 because it is one of the highest among the comparable 
jurisdictions, the same objection has also been raised by the Human Rights Committee. 
On balance, in view of the UK’s international, regional and domestic human rights 
obligations, the country follows its major human rights obligation for the prompt 
production of a terror suspect before a court and it can keep the detainee in six­day 
detention at a time. However, the total period of the pre­charge detention means that the 
country does not seem to fulfil its human rights obligation to detain a terror detain during 
pre­charge detention for a ‘reasonable’ period that is not more than a few days. In other 
words, not more than seven days in total. So, the country follows a liberal­cum­
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conservative security approach by keeping the period of pre­charge detention in law as 
14 days in total. 
 
4.2.1.B.  The Period of Pre-charge Detention in Practice 
The previous section, on the UK’s power to detain a terror suspect, reveals that at 
present the country can detain a terror suspect for not more than 14 days in total. The next 
section will attempt to find whether someone can be detained for more than the permitted 
period in force at that time. In other words, this section will try to identify any gaps 
between the law and action or practice on the principles of promptness and 
reasonableness.   
To identify police excesses in the UK, various NGO annual reports, since 2001, 
were examined. These NGOs are Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and 
Liberty. There are no records in these NGO reports of an arrestee who was detained for 
more than the permitted period or whose appearance before the court was delayed.  
There are, however, two reported instances regarding the violation of the principle 
of promptness in the UK’s history: the first is Brogan v United Kingdom also known as 
the Brogan case458 and the second is the Brannigan case (Brannigan and McBride v the 
United Kingdom).459 In the Brogan case, four men were arrested under terror charges 
during the Irish Troubles and were kept in police custody for more than six days without 
being brought before a judge. The court held that their right of prompt production before 
a court was violated. The case of Brannigan and McBride v the United Kingdom is almost 
the same but the court decided that no right was violated due to the fact the UK, at that 
time, had entered a valid derogation under Article 15 of the ECHR.460 
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Both of these cases reveal that police actions were not in excess of the law in force 
at that time. With reference to the Brogan case, during the Troubles the UK parliament 
had enacted PTA 1974, which not only conferred more police powers but also increased 
the period of pre­charge detention to seven days.461 The Act expressly allowed that after 
48 hours, a police officer could apply to the Secretary of State to extend the detention 
period for another five days—altogether constituting seven days without judicial control. 
The police in fact did not exceed their powers in the Brogan case but followed the law in 
force at that time. So here it was not the police action to detain the four men for more than 
six days without judicial oversight but the law, authorising such detention, that was held 
to be in contravention of the ECHR. In the Brannigan case, because the UK had entered 
a valid derogation, it was legal for the police to detain a terror suspect for more than six 
days. Consequently, the UK’s law enforcement agencies do not further prolong the 
permitted pre­charge detention period in practice or action and neither have they delayed 
the production of any terror suspect before a court. Therefore, the UK’s law enforcement 
agencies possess liberal attitudes to security when it comes to the period of pre­charge 
detention in practice. 
There is no gap between the laws as stated and the law applied in practice in the 
UK on the period of pre­charge detention. Police practices have not violated the law, 
which is why the UK’s practice reflects a liberal approach to security. A police staff 
member is not a judge of his or her own action; therefore, this goes against what Oren 
Gross, Bruce Ackerman and Richard Posner suggest that the executive should judge their 
own actions and courts have nothing to do with these. Perhaps, the police are well­aware 
that conservative attitudes to security divide community into ‘We’ and ‘Them’, as 
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discouraged by liberals such as Fiona, Sunstein, Luban, Waldron and Cole. The police 
are also aware of the costs mentioned by Zedner not to create fear among the public. 
A combined assessment of the law and practice of the UK’s period of pre­charge 
detention suggests that although the country reflects liberal attitudes in actions, in its laws 
it reflects liberal­cum­conservative security attitudes.    
 
4.2.2.A. Police Interrogation and Questioning: Law and Assessment 
Once a terror suspect is arrested under Section 41 of the Terrorism Act 2000, he 
or she is handled by three different police officers; that is, the custody, review and 
investigation officers. The powers and roles of the custody and review officers will be 
assessed later in this thesis. Before assessing the investigative powers of the police, it is 
important to know which powers an investigating officer has. An investigating officer has 
full knowledge of the case in which the arrest is made.462 The investigating officer 
interviews or questions the arrested person on suspicion of being a terrorist. Before the 
suspect is interviewed, he or she is cautioned and informed of the grounds of such arrest 
and are given some information relating to his or her involvement in the offence.463 All 
of the interviews are carried out in places that are specifically designated for detention. 
Use of oppressive questions to compel confession or elicit any statement during an 
interview is forbidden.464 The interviews are video recorded.465  
A detainee is allowed to take at least 8 hours of rest in 24 hours.466 Before any 
interview is conducted, it must be made sure that the detainee is fit for the interview. 
Then, he or she should be interviewed by the investigating officer in an interview room 
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that is lit and heated adequately.467 He or she should not be made to stand up to answer 
any questions during the interview. A police interrogation does not last for an indefinite 
duration. Its maximum duration is two hours, after which the detainee is allowed to take 
a 15­minute break.468 If it coincides with a mealtime, then there should be a break from 
the interview. A total of 45 minutes should be provided for a meal break, after which the 
interview should be resumed.469 During the entire interview session, the investigating 
officer takes the custody officer’s responsibility in relation to the safety and care of the 
detainee.470  
The investigation officer is authorised to interview or question a terror suspect for 
two hours to get further evidence, information, or confession for the administration of 
justice.471 The officer can only further prolong the duration if there are ‘reasonable’ 
grounds to do so.472 These grounds are risk of harm or serious damage to people and 
property, respectively, and prejudicing the outcome of the investigation for which the 
arrest is made.473  
The question is whether the two hours of continuous questioning and its further 
extension at the discretion of the investigation officer are in compliance with the UK’s 
international, regional, and domestic human rights obligations. None of the human rights 
instruments lays down a time frame for the police investigation in terrorism cases. This 
has perhaps been left to the discretion of each country, reflecting its anti­terror laws and 
actions.   
Various scholars such as Walker, Hoffman and Rowe, Macken, Greer, Dickson, 
and Awan have assessed the anti­terrorism legislation of the UK in light of its various 
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human rights obligations but none of them has felt the ‘need’ to assess the two­hour 
interrogation session permitted by the PACE Code H in the UK. What does this suggest? 
Perhaps, this provision does not contravene any individual human rights? Perhaps, it is 
very much in comport with the UK’s human rights obligations to treat terror detainees 
with ‘humanity’? Perhaps, PACE Code H and paragraph 12 and 12B are so exhaustive 
and codifying of certain liberal provisions that even prominent human rights writers do 
not feel the need to bring any human rights argument against these? For example, Walker 
assesses six investigative powers mentioned in Schedule 5 of the Terrorism Act 2000 but 
he did not touch upon the power to hold terrorist interviews for two hours.474 Macken 
talks about the investigative powers and police practices in terrorism cases. She states that 
evidence obtained through police impropriety shall be excluded from a court hearing.475 
However, she did not either discuss or evaluate the two­hour interrogation duration of 
terrorist suspects at all in her book. Similarly, Hoffman and Rowe talk about terrorist 
investigation such as disclosure of information and search of persons and premises but 
they did not mention the two hours questioning session of the terrorist suspects.476 And 
the same is the case with other writers—Awan, Greer and Dickson—who have all 
assessed the total duration of pre­charge detention in the context of the UK but have not 
given any space in their articles to the two­hour interrogation session for terrorists. 
Likewise, the Human Rights Committee is seemingly fine with the duration because it, 
like the other legal scholars, has not raised any concerns about the first two hours of a 
police interrogation sessions in the country.477 
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There has hardly been any attempt to critique or substantiate the duration of 
interrogation sessions in the UK and this is where we can say that the country has adopted 
a liberal security approach for several reasons. First, there is a break of 15 minutes after 
every two hours of interrogation in which short refreshments are served. Second, the 
sessions are normally run during the day because the suspects are generally allowed to 
take at least eight hours of rest, ‘free from questioning’, during night time.478 Third, they 
can have drinks on request, even during the interview session.479 In addition, during the 
two hours, the suspects are not required to stand up, which legally acknowledges respect 
for the personal dignity of persons detained on terror charges. Lastly, the two­hour 
interrogation session is reasonable and almost the same time is required for a patient to 
visit hospital, for a business person to hold a business meeting, or for a university student 
to attend a postgraduate lecture, followed by 10 or 15 minutes and of course some light 
refreshments. Here the UK’s anti­terror laws are in comport with its international, 
regional and domestic human rights obligations. The country does not consider Richard 
Posner’s ‘coercive interrogation’480 or Michael Ignatieff’s ‘lesser evil’481 argument to 
torture a terror suspect.  
 
4.2.2.B. Police Interrogation and Questioning in Practice 
This section will find out if there is any gap between the UK’s law and its practices 
when interrogating a terror detainee during pre­charge detention. Although I have 
analysed many reports from NGOs such as Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, 
and Liberty, there is hardly any evidence to suggest that the UK’s practices have violated 
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any provision of its anti­terrorism law governing the interrogation of terror suspects. This 
account might be true as far as a terror detainee is seen in a crime or justice model of 
terrorism and is on the British soil, but what is the conduct of British security forces and 
law enforcement agencies abroad when acting under the war paradigm of terrorism? In 
its concluding observation, the Human Rights Committee has substantiated a strong case 
against British ‘overseas’ human rights violations.482 For example, Baha Mousa, a young 
hotel receptionist in Iraq, died within just 36 hours of his arrest in the custody of British 
troops in 2003.483 A public inquiry was held and the report clearly held that members of 
the British troops were responsible for his death.484 The UK government has even publicly 
apologised for his death in its Seventh Periodic Report before the Human Rights 
Committee. 
Two detailed reports of the UK’s overseas treatment of terror detainees have been 
published: the Handling of Detainees by UK Intelligence Personnel in Afghanistan, 
Guantanamo Bay and Iraq of 2005,485 and the Detainee Inquiry of 2013.486 On a number 
of occasions, reports have held that although the British troops were not keeping terror 
detainees in their custody, they were aware of their torture and ill­treatment at the hands 
of US troops.487   
In another case, British law enforcement agents were suggested to have been 
involved in the torture and ill­treatment of five British citizens who were arrested and 
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detained in Pakistan from 2004 to 2007.488 There is credible evidence that the detainees 
were tortured during investigation by the Pakistani law enforcement agencies and that the 
British officers were aware of this.489 Human Rights Watch claims that Britain was 
complicit in these abuses.490 The organisation has put forward many recommendations to 
stop British overseas human rights abuses in their fight against terrorism.491 However, the 
UK continues to deny these allegations.  
Blakely and Raphael have recently argued that the UK cannot defend its post­9/11 
abuse of terror detainees. They argue that these denial of the use, condonation or 
facilitation of torture or other ill­treatment is a new “British approach to torture in the 
‘War on Terror’”.492 These authors further explain that the UK’s elected representatives 
categorically deny their complicity in the abuses while the non­elected representatives 
(bureaucracy and law enforcement agencies), who act as ‘petty sovereigns’, continue to 
perpetrate the human rights violations.493  The overseas human rights abuses show that 
the UK’s hands are not clean. Consequently, the country’s counter­terror actions abroad 
reflect the dominant conservative attitudes of Richard Posner494 (e.g. torture and coercive 
interrogation) and Ignatieff’s495 lesser evil argument. 
One can counter­argue that there was no specific law in force in the UK on the 
treatment of terror suspect when the British agencies committed these overseas human 
rights violations. However, this defence cannot legitimise the UK’s overseas human 
rights abuses. The Detainee Inquiry of 2013 and the Detainee Report of 2005 have time 
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and again referred to the third Geneva Convention and other memos issued from time to 
time wherein a terror detainee is protected against torture or other ill­treatment during 
police or security agencies questioning. Similarly, and as stated previously, right against 
torture comes under customary international and jus cogens.   
The effects of UK’s human rights violations abroad are being felt within the 
country. The main reason for this is that nearly all of these abuses were perpetrated against 
Muslim detainees abroad. The UK is home to more than three million Muslims.496 
Currently, one in every 20 Britons is a Muslim.497 British Muslims seem quite 
disappointed at the British government’s policies and approaches to security in many 
Islamic countries abroad.498 They also think that the British anti­terror legislation is 
primarily aimed at Muslims.499 Whenever the UK government speaks of increasing police 
powers, lengthening the period of detention, or broadening the scope of the offence of 
terrorism, fears in the Muslim community surge about possible targeted policing and 
discrimination.500 This is exactly what the liberal critique of the conservative approaches 
to security stipulates—conservative security attitudes divide society into two identifiable 
groups, ‘We’ and ‘They’. According to a recent report that was presented in the House of 
Commons, of those detained on terror charges, 97% are Muslim.501 This figure is 
overwhelming and is the reason why Rehman terms the UK’s anti­terror legislation and 
its adverse impact on the Muslim community an “agenda of short­sightedness and 
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hysteria”.502 The agenda of hysteria will spread fear in the British Muslim community. 
This is Zedner’s and Waldron’s security cost. David Anderson QC, a reviewer of UK 
anti­terror legislation, has also admitted in a recent press release that the UK has had a 
‘spying programme’ to tackle extremism and terrorism within Muslim communities.503 
According to Anderson, there is a genuine and ‘real fear’ among Muslims that the 
programme targets not radicalisation but the ‘practice of Islam’.504 This means that the 
British overseas human rights violations, coupled with its spying programme within the 
country, trigger a real fear among the three million British Muslims. 
The investigation powers in the UK’s anti­terror laws may well be in compliance 
with its human rights obligations and, thus, reflective of liberal security attitudes; 
however, in practice, and especially in its operations abroad, it clearly reflects dominant 
security attitudes because the country is accused of complicity in torture. However, the 
UK’s overseas human rights violation of terror detainees come under the war paradigm 
of terrorism. This research is related to the UK’s legal response to terrorism, which comes 
under the justice or crime paradigm of terrorism seeking the prosecution of terror 
detainees to pursue terrorism. There is hardly any evidence available to show that the UK 
police have interrogated a terror detainee during pre­charge detention for more than two 
hours at a time. Furthermore, none of the leading NGOs or the Human Rights Committee 
have raised any concern about the police interrogation of terror suspect during pre­charge 
detention in practice. So, when it comes to the investigative powers of the UK in terrorism 
cases, the country fulfils its human rights obligation on how to treat terror detainees in a 
criminal justice system. There is hardly any evidence that the UK has used the war or the 
                                                          
502 Rehman, J. (2007) “Islam, “War on Terror” and the Future of Muslim Minorities in the United 
Kingdom: Dilemmas of Multiculturalism in the Aftermath of the London Bombings”, Human Rights 
Quarterly, vol. 29 p. 877 
503 “Now, I’m sure those fears are exaggerated, and they are certainly not what the programme is 
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executive model in its criminal response to terrorism. This suggests that the country is 
well­aware of the legal boundaries of the three models of counter­terrorism, and the 
country therefore does not allow to cross the criminal justice boundaries and reflect 
therein the war or executive paradigm of terrorism. 
 
4.2.3.A. Internal Police Review Mechanisms: Law and Assessment 
 This section will find if there is a law in the UK anti­terrorism legislation that 
provides for internal police review mechanisms. The law will then be assessed in light of 
the human rights law conception of the internal police review mechanism. 
As mentioned previously, during pre­charge detention, there are three police 
officers who deal with a terror suspect and who have responsibility for investigation, 
custody and review. The review officer’s job is to check whether a terror detainee has 
been treated in accordance with the law. The updated Schedule 8 of the Terrorism Act 
2000 has made it obligatory that the arrested person’s detention “shall be periodically 
reviewed by a review officer” to ensure the validity of the detention.505 A review officer 
differs from the investigating and custody officers (i.e., they are an officer neither 
investigating nor keeping custody of the arrested person).506 The review officer is required 
to carry out a review of the treatment of the terror detainee “as soon as reasonably 
practicable after the time of the person’s arrest”. One of the requirements, during the 48 
hours of detention, is to carry out subsequent reviews. The review officer must carry out 
such subsequent reviews at intervals of not more than 12 hours.507 The subsequent review 
may be postponed in three situations: first, an investigating officer must satisfy a review 
officer that “an interruption of the questioning to carry out the review would prejudice 
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the investigation in connection with which the person is being detained”; second, when a 
review officer is not available, the review can be deferred; and lastly, the review can also 
be postponed for “any other reason”.508 
Detentions are not automatically continued. To authorise continued detention, a 
review officer must be satisfied on any of the grounds. First, that it is necessary to 
authorise continued detention to obtain or preserve relevant evidence. Second, that it is 
necessary to wait for the outcome of an examination with a view to obtaining relevant 
evidence. Third, the review officer must be satisfied that the detainee is about to be 
deported and in this connection the Secretary of State is being contacted. Lastly, 
continued detention can also be authorised where a decision is awaited regarding whether 
the detained person should be charged with an offence. The review officer can decline 
continued detention if he or she is not satisfied that the investigation in which the person 
is detained is not being conducted “diligently and expeditiously”.509 
A review officer shall give an opportunity to the person detained to challenge the 
legality and treatment about the detention by making representation himself/herself or 
through a legal counsel. The review officer acts here in the capacity of quasi­judicial 
authority, giving the detainee the right of being heard. The representation may be refused 
if the person detained is unfit to make such representation due to his/her condition or 
behaviour.510 
How should an internal police review mechanism proceed in accordance with the 
human rights law? The internal police review is a distinct review process that is separated 
from other external reviews, such as judicial review, external independent reviews, and 
independent police complaints; however, this is not expressly recognised as a human right 
in the ECHR or the Human Rights Act 1998. The UNCAT specifically makes all state 
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parties duty bound to review the actions of those who are responsible for the custody, 
treatment and interrogation of all detainees including terror suspects.511 The right to an 
internal police review also has a very strong relationship with the administration of justice 
to determine the lawfulness of pre­charge detention, which is a human right expressed in 
Article 5 ECHR and Article 9 ICCPR. The Human Rights Committee believes that “every 
decision to keep a person in detention should be open to review periodically.”512 The 
Committee has used the word ‘review’, thus including all types of review. Consequently, 
the Human Rights Committee ensures that there should be an internal police review 
mechanism during pre­charge detention. This obligation is applicable to all member 
states, including the UK. Thus, the UK is under an obligation to provide for internal police 
reviews periodically as long as the suspect remains in police custody. Does the UK fulfil 
this obligation? 
The UK’s anti­terror law is clear on police reviews but only up to the first 48 hours 
pre­charge detention. The review includes certain important safeguards to protect a terror 
detainee from police abuses. After a terror suspect is arrested on reasonable suspicion, an 
initial police review (first safeguard) is carried out by a review officer “as soon as 
reasonably practicable after the time of the person’s arrest.”513 Because police reviews 
are periodic and systematic, subsequent reviews (second safeguard) are carried out “at 
intervals of not more than 12 hours.”514 A review officer, not an investigating officer, 
shall authorise continued detention to obtain or preserve relevant evidence.515 The 
extension of detention is not automatic (third safeguard), it is authorised by the review 
officer internally and then by the court (as explained previously). The review officer is 
                                                          
511 United Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading Treatment or 
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accessed on 18 September 2014. 
512 A v. Australia 560/1993, UN Doc CCPR/C/59/D/560/1993, para 9.4 
513 Terrorism Act 2000, Schedule 8, Part II, para 21 
514 Ibid. 
515 Ibid, para 22. See also PACE Code H, para 14B. 
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barred from putting questions to the detainee regarding his or her involvement in the 
offence (fourth safeguard).516 If a review is delayed, then the grounds thereof must be 
documented, forming part of the record (fifth safeguard).517 The UK anti­terror laws have 
a strong police review mechanism, which flows expressly from Schedule 8 and then 
reinforced by the PACE Code H. Sadly, the review is available only for a limited time; 
that is, during the first 48 hours.518 This is one of the drawbacks of the police review 
mechanisms in the UK anti­terror laws. If a terror suspect is detained in police custody, 
after his or her continued detention is authorised by the court, there ceases to be further 
police review checks to balance the powers of the investigating officer who interrogates 
the suspect. The lack of this check or balance may expose the detainee to maltreatment 
during police interrogations. Walker has suggested the internal police review mechanism 
in the country to run formally for the whole period of pre­charge detention.519  In addition, 
the review can be postponed ‘for any other reasons’. This means that the police can easily 
deprive a terror detainee of his/her right to review during pre­charge detention.   
On balance, it is reasonable to conclude that the UK’s police review mechanism 
fulfils its main human rights obligations because the mechanism is not only expressly 
recognised in the law but has also incorporated several procedural safeguards to protect 
the detainee from police maltreatment. Although the protection is guaranteed for the first 
48 hours, it does not continue until the end of the entire period of pre­charge detention; 
that is, it does not cover the full detention period of 14 days. The UK fulfils its human 
rights obligations here but, unfortunately, it does not do so throughout the whole period 
of pre­charge detention. Therefore, the country reflects liberal­cum­conservative attitudes 
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in powers to question terror detainees without police review beyond 48 hours. Lastly, the 
review is not firmly enacted because it can be postponed ‘for any other reasons’.  
 
4.2.3.B. Internal Police Review Mechanisms in Practice 
There is nothing reported so far to indicate that the police reviewing powers have 
been misused. The country has adopted liberal attitudes in the exercise of its authorised 
internal police review mechanisms. A review of the various NGO reports and the 
concluding observations of the Human Rights Committee on the UK’s human rights 
obligations shows there are no reported discrepancies in action regarding this point. 
Therefore, it is appropriate to say that the UK reflects liberal security attitudes in action 
by sticking to the proper standards of the initial and subsequent internal police review 
mechanism in force. 
 
4.2.4.A. Police Records: Law and Assessment 
What is the law on police records in the UK? Record keeping is the duty of all 
officers, including the investigation officer, review officer and custody officer. The 
country’s anti­terror laws clearly provide for the keeping of full and accurate records of 
the treatment of terror suspect during the pre­charge detention. Whether the record 
pertains to custody, investigation or review, it is available to the court beforehand to 
decide the lawfulness of detention.520 For accountability purposes, it is the duty of the 
review officer to keep written records of all of the activities carried out during the 48 
hours of detention. The officer shall make such records in the presence of the detainee 
and the former must inform the latter about authorising continued detention and the 
grounds thereof.521  
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What is the human rights law assessment of the UK’s police records? Interviews 
are audio and video recorded (first safeguard).522 There is nothing to indicate the use of 
Walker’s ‘off the record’ in terrorism cases.523 The person interviewed shall be given the 
opportunity to go through his or her recorded interview and sign it as correct or refuse to 
do so and write his or her disagreement note to that effect (second safeguard).524 Anything 
stated by the suspect outside the context of the interview is also limited to writing and 
makes part of the record (third safeguard).525 Here, the UK clearly fulfils its human rights 
obligations by keeping full and accurate records of the detainee’s custody, interviews, 
and reviews. The country’s anti­terror laws show that very humane approach has been 
adopted. The UK’s anti­terror laws governing the police record reflects a liberal approach 
to security because it fulfils its human rights obligations on the topic.  
 
4.2.4.B. Police Records in Practice 
As explained in Chapters One and Two, police records form the foundation on 
which to build and realise other human rights, such as the right to be brought promptly 
before a court, the right to challenge the lawfulness of detention, the right to know the 
reasons of arrest and detention, the right to be released or charged in reasonable time, and 
the right to a fair trial. The courts would be helpless to administer justice if timely and 
accurate police records were not provided. The UK’s law relating to police records fulfil 
human rights standards but what about the country’s actual practices in this regard? 
None of the NGOs has documented any discrepancies in the UK’s police record 
since 2001 particularly during pre­charge detention. Walker has also provided a full 
account of police record in terrorism cases and did not mention a single instance of 
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inaccuracy or any other issue.526 Because police records in the UK are accurate, there is 
83% conviction rate of terrorism cases in the country.527  
One can counter­argue and question the UK’s accuracy of police record of terror 
detainees abroad. In the majority of the terror cases abroad, the UK did not keep the 
detainees in its custody.528 The British law enforcement and security agencies only 
interviewed terror suspects or handed them over to other countries.529 The agencies did 
not keep a proper record of these interviews, which has remained the subject of the 
ongoing criticisms of the UK’s overseas human rights violation episode.530 It seems that 
the UK did not fulfil its obligations abroad. As mentioned previously, the UK’s abroad 
operation against terrorism come under the war or executive paradigm to disrupt terrorism 
which is not the main focus of this research. The main focus of this research is the 
treatment of terror detainees during pre­charge detention which comes under the criminal 
justice model of terrorism.   
On balance, the UK reflects liberal security attitudes as long as a terror detainee 
is on UK soil and is related to the administration of criminal justice in terrorism cases. 
However, the UK departs from this and follows a conservative approach to security by 
not documenting accurate records of the interviews of terror detainees conducted abroad. 
This highlights how the UK fails to keep a record of terror detainees under the war 
paradigm of terrorism, which is outside the purview of this research project. Here, the UK 
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does not reflect the war or executive paradigm of terrorism in its legal response to 
terrorism through its criminal justice system.   
 
4.2.5.A. Rights of a Terror Suspect to Contact the Outside World: Law and 
Assessment 
The UK anti­terror law expressly embodies the right to access the outside world. 
For example, the reviewing officer, after authorising continued detention, shall inform 
the detainee of his/her rights to contact the outside world.531 In these cases, the outside 
world includes a friend of the detainee, a relative, a person who takes interest in his/her 
welfare, or a solicitor.532 Interpreters, consular officers, custody visitors, faith 
representatives, members of either Houses of Parliament, and security services officials 
also come under the purview of the outside world.533  
If a person is arrested under the Terrorism Act 2000 (Section 41), then he or she, 
upon request, is entitled to contact, as soon as reasonably practicable, a friend, a relative, 
or any person known to the arrested or detained person.534 The right to contact a solicitor 
is also expressly recognised.535 In Scotland, these rules are more strict. It is the 
responsibility of the police to inform the detainee’s relatives and solicitor of their arrest.536 
Furthermore, these rights have also been reinforced in PACE Code H. The detainee is 
informed by a reviewing officer to contact his family and solicitor. Schedule 8 lays down 
a detailed list of situations where access to these contacts may be denied if it involves 
interference with or without harm to evidence, physical injury to any person, the alerting 
of persons who are suspected of having committed a serious offence, and so on.537  
                                                          
531 Ibid., para. 27. 
532 Ibid., para. 6­7. 
533 Walker, C. (2009) Blackstone’s Guide to the Anti­Terrorism Legislation, 2nd Edition, Oxford, 
England: Oxford University Press at 152 
534 Schedule 8, Part I, para 6, see also PACE Code H, para 5 
535 Ibid, para 7 
536 Ibid, para 16 
537 Ibid, para 8 
Page 143 of 272 
 
The right to access the outside world or the right not to be held incommunicado is 
an important human right for persons under arrest or detention. As mentioned in Chapter 
Three, a person under arrest or detention is entitled to contact his or her family or home, 
lawyer, doctor, or an interpreter to assist him or her to either challenge the legality of his 
or her arrest or detention, or to prepare his or her defence. The ECHR clearly recognises 
the right to contact family or home and it prohibits any unlawful interference with this 
right by a public authority, as per Article 8(1).538 Similarly, Article 2(3) of the ICCPR 
believes that the family is a natural and fundamental unit of society which needs 
protection, as per Article 17.539 The Covenant also recognises the right of a detainee to 
contact his or her family or home.540 How far then does the UK fulfil this obligation in its 
laws when treating terror suspects during pre­charge detention? 
The UK’s approach on the rights of a terror suspect to contact the outside world 
seems to be in compliance with its international, regional and domestic human rights 
obligations. There can be denials but only in cases permitted by law, which are also in 
compliance with the conditions specified in the ECHR and ICCPR because of their 
conditionality and proportionality. These instruments are unanimous on the conditionality 
of the rights to contact family and solicitors. The conditional phrases are,  
Except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic 
society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-
being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of 
health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.541  
 
Hence, the UK is not violating the human rights of a person detained under the anti­terror 
laws to contact family or solicitors by delaying them in accordance with the law and in 
compliance with the conditions mentioned in ECHR and ICCPR. 
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There are clear rules in PACE Code H on access to medical personnel. A custody 
officer must make sure that each detainee receives appropriate medical care as soon as is 
practicable.542 There must be daily medical check­ups beyond 96 hours detention.543 
Under the law, in Scotland, a medical examination is carried out towards the end of the 
48 hours. In Northern Ireland, a medical examination is carried out soon after arrival in 
police station, followed by daily checks, before any interview and on release.544 Similarly, 
the right to contact or arrange an interpreter has clearly been given due importance in 
PACE Code H.545 
On balance, the UK’s anti­terror laws on the right to contact the outside world 
seems quite liberal and in favour of the person in detention. The detainee’s right to access 
family members, solicitors, medical officers, or interpreters is expressly guaranteed. 
Other public figures can also visit a detainee. This of course helps the detainee to prepare 
his or her case and look after his or her physical and emotional health by staying in touch 
with lawyers, medical personnel and his or her family or home, respectively. This is 
humane treatment and a genuine reflection of liberal security ideals. 
 
4.2.5.B. Rights of a Terror Suspect to Contact the Outside World in Practice 
There is nothing in the annual reports of various NGOs such as Human Rights 
Watch, Amnesty International, Liberty, or Reprieve to suggest that someone arrested on 
terror charge would have been detained incommunicado.  
In the case of Ibrahim and Others v the United Kingdom, the country’s law 
enforcement agencies have been found in violation of this right. This case relates to the 
judgement of the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR on the unexploded bomb plot in London 
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on 21 July 2005.546 In this case three suspects were arrested and later convicted of 
conspiring to detonate four bombs, which fortunately did not explode. The fourth person 
as a potential witness, was charged with the same offence on 3 August 2005 after several 
interviews as a witness and later as a terror suspect. The suspect’s access to his lawyer 
was denied by the authorities on the pretext that it would prevent further acts of terrorism. 
Eventually, he was convicted in the UK courts of committing the offence. However, the 
Grand Chamber of the ECtHR held that the fourth applicant’s right to access his lawyer 
was denied, which prejudiced his trial, culminating in his conviction in domestic courts. 
The Grand Chamber held that the three suspects’ rights to contact their solicitors were 
rightly denied because of further threats of terrorism at that time. The Chamber, however, 
stressed that in the case of the fourth applicant, the situation did not demand the need to 
have denied his right to contact his lawyer. The main reasons for this are that he was 
charged at a time when a further act of terrorism was not imminent, so there was no need 
to have denied his right to contact his counsel. In addition, the police did not caution him 
when he was about to incriminate himself during the interviews. Consequently, the 
Chamber held that in the case of the fourth suspect, his right to access his lawyer was 
infringed. 
Apart from this single instance, the UK’s actions on the rights of a terror suspect 
to contact the outside world do not often violate their human rights because no violations 
have been reported. This research finds that if there is a gap between the law governing 
the right of a terror suspect to contact the outside world and the police actions on the 
grounds, then it is negligible. Therefore, the UK’s actions to allow terror suspects to 
contact the outside world seem liberal. The UK rejects Posner’s suggestion to keep a 
terror suspect in incommunicado detention as a means of helping extract more 
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information from him or her. Rather, it follows liberal security attitudes of Buhelt, Cole, 
Tribe and Gudridge in rejecting the emergency constitution of Ackerman and the extra­
legal measures of Posner and Oren Gross. Here, the UK truly reflects human rights in its 
law and practice.  
 
4.2.6.A. Detention Conditions: Law and Assessment 
When a person is arrested under Section 41 of the Terrorism Act 2000, he or she 
is brought before a custody officer.547 The custody officer is primarily responsible for the 
detainee’s safe custody and care.548 They are also responsible for the custody record’s 
accuracy and completeness.549 This section will assess the custody officer’s duties, 
particularly the safety and care of a terror detainee during pre­charge detention. 
There are several duties imposed upon the custody officer in relation to the care 
and safety of the detainee. Cells should be provided for detention and not more than one 
detainee should be placed in each cell.550 The cell should be adequately ventilated, lit, 
cleaned and heated. The detainee’s bedding supplies (pillows, mattresses, blankets, etc.) 
should be in a sanitary condition. The detainee must have access to personal hygiene and 
washing.551 He/she must be allowed two light meals and one main meal in 24 hours. 
Specific dietary needs as sanctioned by certain religious beliefs of a detainee must be 
fulfilled.552 Families and friends may also provide food for the detainee; the custody 
officer should allow this after thorough consideration and inspection. A detainee should 
also be allowed brief outdoor exercise or religious prayer.553 A separate room should be 
provided for religious prayers and uncontaminated religious books should be provided.554 
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Other resources are also provided for reading.555 Juveniles are detained separately and 
should never be placed in adult cells.556  
British society is arguably founded on the principles of democracy, the rule of 
law, and individual liberty and, more significantly, it should impose obligations on people 
and government to “treat others with fairness”.557 Thus, the fair treatment of detainees 
stems from the British common law. Similarly, the Human Rights Act 1998, the ECHR, 
the ICCPR and the UNCAT all emphasise the humane treatment of all those deprived of 
their liberty and dignity. Likewise, the Human Rights Committee concludes that a 
violation of Article 10 of the ICCPR occurs if a detainee is given “insufficient food, of 
very low nutritional value, no access whatsoever to recreational or sporting facilities… 
or even basic hygienic facilities, medical or dental care, or any type of educational 
services”.558 This then is how a terror detainee should be treated in accordance with the 
human rights law. How similar or different is the UK’s law from the international human 
rights law on the detention conditions in which terror suspects are kept during pre­charge 
detention? 
The UK’s anti­terror laws governing the conditions of detention are very clear on 
the guarantees stated in various human rights instruments. The UK’s treatment of terror 
detainees during detention is very much in compliance with the country’s international, 
regional, and domestic human rights obligations. We can find from the concluding 
observation of the Human Rights Committee that such conditions are in compliance with 
the human rights standards.559 The Committee did not refer to the facilities and conditions 
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provided to detainees under the PACE Code H. Consequently, the UK’s laws on the terror 
detention conditions follow the human rights law approach.  
This shows that the UK’s attitudes to security are very liberal when it comes to 
the conditions and facilities provided to the people detained under its anti­terror laws. The 
country treats them with humanity and dignity. The UK has not departed from its human 
rights obligations. Every effort has been carried out to frame these rules to be more 
humane. As far as the law is concerned, there are clear provisions governing the 
conditions of detention from arrest until formal charges are framed, and beyond. Any 
gaps between the law and action or practice will be raised in the next section. 
 
4.2.6.B. Detention Conditions in Practice 
There is hardly any evidence to state that terror suspects who are on charge are 
kept in arbitrary, inhumane, cruel, or degrading detention conditions in the UK. However, 
there is one exception to this, which is the plight of Belmarsh Detention Centre. The 
conditions of Belmarsh may be outside the purview of this research project because it 
focuses on pre­charge detention; however, it is worth mentioning Belmarsh here for 
reference because the UK’s history on the detention conditions is not as fair as it may 
appear from its recent NGOs reports.  
The Belmarsh Detention Centre was a high security prison for several indefinitely 
detained (as was permitted by law in force at that time to do so)  foreign nationals on 
account of their various links to international terrorism.560 The detention centre was 
closed following a court decision (as discussed previously). Amnesty International at that 
time had repeatedly reported on the inhumane, cruel, harsh, and degrading detention 
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conditions in the prison.561 Human Rights Watch had also substantiated a full report on 
the UK’s harsh detention conditions in the prison.562 The abuses at Belmarsh were also 
picked up by the UK’s leading media.563 In particular, Rehman refers to one of the media 
reports and reconfirms that, owing to the detention conditions in Belmarsh prison, it can 
be called the ‘British Guantanamo Bay’.564  
There have been no further instances of the inhumane or ill­treatment of terror 
detainees in the current UK actions, especially after Code H was introduced in July 2006. 
Since then, no reported gaps in the law and in action have been suggested. So, on the 
treatment of terror detainees, especially on the detention conditions, the UK has adopted 
a strict liberal approach to security by reflecting its human rights obligations in law and 
in practice in its legal response to terrorism. There is hardly any evidence of the violations 
of human rights on the magnitude of the Belmarsh prison in the country’s legal response 
to terrorism. The Belmarsh prison was an executive response to terrorism, the reflection 
of which is absent in the country’s detention centres for terror detainees on suspicion of 
terror charges.  
PART III 
4.3.0 Conclusion 
The laws governing the treatment of terror detainees in the UK are to be found in 
Schedule 8 of the Terrorism Act 2000 and Code H of PACE.565 Schedule 8 of the 
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Terrorism Act 2000 provides a contemporary framework for the treatment of terror 
detainees, which was supplemented through the Anti­terrorism, Crime and Security Act 
2001, the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005, the Terrorism Act 2006, the Counter­
terrorism Act 2008, and the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012. In the UK, a terror suspect 
shall be produced before a court within 48 hours of her/his arrest. S/he shall not be 
detained for more than 14­days in total, starting from her/his arrest. In addition, the 
detainee shall not be kept for more than six days detention at a time. The duration of a 
police interrogation session shall not be more than two hours at a time. There shall be a 
break of 15 minutes between interrogation sessions. All interviews are audio and video 
recorded. The police are duty bound to maintain an accurate and proper police record for 
the administration of criminal justice. The UK provides an internal police review 
mechanism during the first 48 hours. The law also permits the review to be postponed for 
any reason. The law relating to the rights of a terror suspect to contact the outside world 
is also clear and allows a terror suspect to contact his/her family, friends or a lawyer for 
the defence of his/her case. There are clear laws and rules governing the facilities in which 
terror detainees are kept during pre­charge detention.  
Here, a human rights law assessment of these laws was carried out by deploying 
a liberal critique research methodology to assess if the UK’s position on the treatment of 
terror detainees is in compliance with its human rights obligations. There are four 
categories/themes under which the country fulfils all of its human rights obligations and 
these are based on the detainee’s right to access the outside world, the country’s detention 
conditions, the maintenance of police records, and conducting police interrogation during 
pre­charge detention. In the remaining two categories, the UK partly fulfils its human 
rights obligations. The first partial fulfilment is the total period of the pre­charge 
detention, which is 14­days in total. The Human Rights Committee and Liberty have 
objected to this total period. The second partial fulfilment is the internal police review 
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mechanism. The human rights law demands that a review of the treatment of terror 
suspects should cover the entire period of pre­charge detention to safeguard the detainee 
during detention. The same objection is also raised by Walker.566 
There have also been a few notable human rights violations in the country’s anti­
terror operations abroad, mainly related to the detention of terror suspects abroad. Given 
that this research mainly focus is on the treatment of terror detainees during pre­charge 
detention (i.e. the treatment under the justice system), the UK’s overseas human rights 
violation will not contribute to the human rights assessment in this research.  
The human rights assessment of the UK’s law related to the treatment of terror 
detainees suggests that the UK reflects most of its human rights obligation in this regard. 
However, a couple of failures have also been noted in the country’s justice system. This 
partial fulfilment of the country’s human rights obligation in the UK model is a reflection 
of a liberal­cum­conservative security approach. 
In summary, the UK fulfils all of its major human rights obligation in the treatment 
of terror detainees during pre­charge detention, except in two categories. This suggests 
that the UK’s security approach oscillates between liberal and conservative views. The 
UK’s approach is neither purely liberal nor purely conservative in nature but is instead a 
combination of both. Since the UK fulfils the majority of its human rights obligations in 
law and practice, it can be used as an example for Pakistan to learn from. Consequently, 
it is reasonable for the main case­study—Pakistan—to use UK as a comparator on the 
topic.  
 
 
 
                                                          
566 Walker, C. (2009) Blackstone’s Guide to the Anti­Terrorism Legislation, 2nd Edition, Oxford, 
England: Oxford University Press. p. 162 “police reviews should formally continue after forty­eight 
hours.” 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
PRE­CHARGE TERROR DETENTION IN 
PAKISTAN: AN ASSESSMENT OF THE LAW 
AND PRACTICE 
 
 
5.0 Introduction 
This chapter aims to answer the third research question: What is the law on the 
treatment of terror detainees during pre­charge detention in Pakistan? To what degree 
Pakistan complies with its human rights obligations in this regard? And, is there any gap 
between the country’s law and practice when treating terror detainees? This chapter will 
first identify and examine all of the legal provisions applicable to the treatment of terror 
detainees during pre­charge detention in Pakistan followed by an assessment in light of 
the human rights laws and principles identified in Chapter Two.  
All states are under certain obligations to enact, enforce and apply anti­terrorism 
laws in such a manner as not to significantly violate the human rights of the terror 
suspects. Pakistan has many such obligations under its domestic human rights laws, such 
as the fundamental rights protected under its constitution. Pakistan also has certain 
international obligations under the core international human rights legal instruments to 
respect and ensure the rights of the people detained under its anti­terror legislation. The 
national and international obligations of the country demand fair treatment of terror 
detainees. These human rights obligations have been discussed in detail in Chapter Two. 
Although there have been some shocking terror incidents in the country’s history, these 
do not mean that Pakistan should resort to the maltreatment of terror detainees.  
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The principal focus of this research is to prepare a case­study of the powers of 
pre­charge terror detention in Pakistan. In this chapter, an evaluation of the treatment of 
terror detainees during pre­charge detention will be carried out in light of the human rights 
law. The case­study, which is the first in the context of Pakistan, will reveal how 
different/similar the legal treatment of Pakistan is to the human rights law treatment of 
terror suspects. The case­study of the treatment is related to the six categories/themes that 
have been identified in this scholarship, which are: the period of pre­charge detention; 
police interrogation, police records, internal police review mechanisms; rights of a terror 
suspect to contact the outside world; and the detention conditions in which terror suspects 
are kept during pre­charge detention.  
The case­study will also include an assessment of the treatment in practice to find 
if there is a gap between the country’s laws and practices on the topic. This assessment 
will also be limited to the six categories/themes that were mentioned in the preceding 
paragraph and throughout this research. These assessments are intended to support the 
main argument of the thesis: in the absence of an in­depth study of Pakistan’s treatment 
of terror detainees during pre­charge terror detention, the country continues to follow a 
dominant approach to security that might be viable for the war or executive paradigm of 
terrorism but is not viable for the justice model or paradigm of terrorism.  
This chapter begins with a chronological account of terror incidents, including all 
of the major terror incidents in Pakistan that have posed threats to its national security, 
public order and peoples’ lives, necessitating the enactment of anti­terror laws and 
measures to contain the threat of terrorism.  
The actual assessment of the treatment of terror detainees during pre­charge 
detention of Pakistan will appear in the second part of this chapter. The assessment will 
be split into two parts: assessing the anti­terror laws of Pakistan governing the powers of 
pre­charge terror detention and the anti­terror practices thereof using human rights laws 
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and principles as a yardstick to carry out the assessments. This will pioneer a rigorous 
case­study of the treatment of terror suspects in the context of Pakistan, for which the UK 
will be used as a comparator to learn some lessons from. The final section concludes the 
chapter.  
 
Part I 
5.1.0 Major Terror Incidents in Pakistan 
Pakistan has a long history of terrorism. Since 1974, it has experienced four cycles 
of terrorism.567 The first cycle started in 1974 and ended in 1978, which was mainly 
committed by foreigners against foreign targets inside Pakistan568 but the cycle also 
witnessed political terrorism due to separatist movements in the province of 
Balochistan.569 The second cycle started in 1979 and lasted until 1986. This era witnessed 
indiscriminate terrorism,570 including political terrorism aimed at General Zia (the then 
Pakistani leader) allegedly by surviving members of the family of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, 
the Pakistani leader before General Zia.571 The third cycle was mostly sponsored by 
sectarian and linguistic­based terrorist organisations, which started in 1987 and continued 
until 2002. This emerged in the Sindh province where the Urdu­speaking community 
clashed with other ethnic communities on a largely linguistic divide.572 The current cycle 
of terrorism, post 9/11, started in 2003 and is regarded as one of the worst terror cycles 
                                                          
567Hussain, S. (2012) “Myths About Terrorism in Pakistan”, in Stabilizing Pakistan through Police 
Reforms, Asia Society Report by the Independent Commission on Pakistan Police Reforms at 46. 
568Ibid. 
569Bansal, A. (2006) “Balochistan: Continuing Violence and Its Implications”, Strategic Analysis 30(1) at 
49. 
570 Ibid. 
571BBC News (15 March 1981) “Pakistani jet hostages released”, available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/march/15/newsid_2818000/2818437.stm, last accessed 
14 August 2014. 
572Irshad, M. (2011) “Terrorism in Pakistan: causes & remedies”, available at 
http://www.qurtuba.edu.pk/thedialogue/The%20Dialogue/6_3/Dialogue_July_September2011_224­
241.pdf, last accessed 15 August 2014. 
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in the country’s history.573 To date, it has claimed more than 60,000 lives.574 These attacks 
are being carried out by Al­Qaida and its associates, such as Tehreek­e­Taliban Pakistan 
(hereafter, TTP).575 Civilians, law enforcement agencies and the Pakistani military are the 
direct targets.576  
One may object to the baseline of the inception of terrorism in Pakistan that this 
research makes reference to in the year of 1974. For example, one may refer to the Bengali 
insurrection, prior to the baseline for this research, of 1971 and counter­argue why this 
study did not regard the insurrection as a first cycle of terrorism Pakistan. A detailed 
rebuttal, based on certain historical facts and accounts during the Bengali insurrection of 
1971, is presented here. 
When Pakistan came into existence after the partition of British India in 1947, the 
country had two main provinces—East Pakistan and West Pakistan.577 East Pakistan is 
now the People’s Republic of Bangladesh or simply Bangladesh.578 The formal title of 
West Pakistan is the Islamic Republic of Pakistan or simply Pakistan.579 Bangladesh came 
into existence after a prolonged insurrection (January 1971—December 1971) by the 
Bengalis against Pakistan.580 
                                                          
573 Hussain, S. (2012) “Myths About Terrorism in Pakistan” , in Stabilizing Pakistan through Police 
Reforms, Asia Society Report by the Independent Commission on Pakistan Police Reforms at 46. 
574 South Asia Terrorism Portal (2017) “Fatalities in terrorist violence in Pakistan 2003­2017”, available 
at http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/database/casualties.htm , last accessed 3 July 2017. 
See also Z Hameed, Z. (2012) “Antiterrorism Law”, in Stabilizing Pakistan through Police Reforms, Asia 
Society Report by the Independent Commission on Pakistan Police Reforms at 50. Here the number of 
casualties is more than 50,000 because the account is till 2012. 
575Boone, J. (24 September 2013) “Pakistan church bomb: Christians mourn 85 killed in Peshawar suicide 
attack” The Guardian, available at http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/23/pakistan­church­
bombings­christian­minority, last accessed 2 March 2014; see also Ahmad, M. (2010) “Implications of 
the War on Terror for Khyber Pukhtunkhwa, Pakistan” Journal of Critical Globalization Studies 3. 
576Fasihuddin, (2012) “Terrorism Investigation in Pakistan: Perceptions and Realities of Frontline Police”, 
Pakistan Journal of Criminology 3(3) at 55. 
577 Alavi, H. (1989) “Formation of the Social Structure of South Asia under the Impact of Colonialism”, 
in Sociology of Developing Societies: South Asia, ed. Alavi & Harris. London: Macmillan Education Ltd 
578 Laporte, R. Jr. (1972) “Pakistan in 1971: The Disintegration of a Nation”, Asian Survey, Vol. 12, No. 
2, pp. 97 – 108  
579 Ibid. 
580 Ibid. 
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The Bengali insurrection did not start in 1971. When Ayub Khan, the then 
President of Pakistan, handed over his government to General Agha Muhammad Yahya 
Khan in 1969, who was a second military dictator of the country, Sheikh Mujibur 
Rahman, who later laid the foundation of Bangladesh, formally asked for certain 
autonomous demands for East Pakistan from the new government.581 Those demands 
were related to the economic, administrative, social and linguistic developments of the 
other wing of the country and a return to democracy.582 To put an end to his military rule, 
General Yahya Khan promised to hold elections in the country as quickly as possible, so 
national elections were held in December 1970. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman won all seats 
except two in East Pakistan, with 72% of the vote.583 Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, a prominent 
leader in West Pakistan, who later also became the Prime Minister of Pakistan, gained 81 
seats in West Pakistan. These elections shocked the nation because people generally 
believed that Mr. Bhutto would win the majority of the national seats in the elections.584 
Even though Pakistan completed its national elections, the transfer of power to civilian 
government was never granted. Consequently, the Bengalis resorted to a national 
resistance against the General Yahya’s government in Pakistan and demanded a separate 
country for themselves under their leader, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman.585 
In the early months of 1971, military and civilian clashes erupted in Dacca, now 
the capital of Bangladesh, and later in the whole of the East Pakistan.586 Over 300 people 
died in the Dacca riots. These were the first riots of the insurrection. General Yahya 
ordered the military to restore peace in the country by quelling the armed struggle587. 
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was arrested and charged with treason. He was later released 
                                                          
581 Ibid. 
582 Ibid. See also, Maniruzzaman, T. (1975) “Bangladesh: An Unfinished Revolution”, Journal of Asian 
Studies, Vol. 34, No. 4, pp. 891 – 911.  
583 Ibid, See also, Baxter, C. (1971) “Pakistan Votes – 1970”, Asian Survey, Vol. 11, No. 3, pp. 197 – 218.    
584 Ibid. 
585 Ibid. 
586 Ibid. 
587 Ibid. 
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when Mr. Bhutto intervened. On the return of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the resistance 
became more violent and it spread to all parts of the East Pakistan and attained the status 
of a civil war.588 Many Bengali soldiers were either incarcerated or disarmed while many 
fled to India, where they formed Mukti Bahini, the main organisation that fought a 
guerrilla war against Pakistani army and non­Bengalis in East Pakistan.589 India actively 
trained members of the Mukti Bahini. Pakistan accused India of interfering in its internal 
affairs. The Indian interference also led to the War of 1971 between Pakistan and India. 
India succeeded and separated the East part of Pakistan from the West, and thus 
Bangladesh came into existence. It is estimated that 200,000 to 1.5 million people died 
during the Civil War and the War of 1971 between Pakistan and India.590 
This scholarship does not consider the Bengali insurrection as terrorism because 
at that time Pakistan did not use the word ‘terrorists’ to describe the Bengalis, they were 
referred as ‘miscreants’ or ‘rebels’.591 According to the Oxford dictionary, a miscreant is 
a, “person who has done something wrong or unlawful.” General Yahya used to refer to 
the members of Mukti Bahini as rebels and miscreants.592 Soon after the cessation of East 
Pakistan, when General Yahya had stepped down and Mr. Bhutto had assumed the status 
of Civil Martial Law Administrator in 1972, the latter ordered the formation of a 
commission to investigate the Bengali insurrection. Chief Justice Hamoodur Rahman was 
appointed as the head of the commission to report on the facts and calamities of the 
insurrection. Even in the commission report, Bengalis were referred to as ‘rebels’ and 
‘miscreants’.593 It was only in 2011 when the word ‘miscreant’ was properly defined in 
                                                          
588 Ibid. 
589 Ibid. 
590 Ibid. 
591 Ibid.  
592 Laporte, R. Jr. (1972) “Pakistan in 1971: The Disintegration of a Nation”, Asian Survey, Vol. 12, No. 
2, pp. 97 – 108 
593 Hamoodur Rahman Commission Report, Dunya News, available at 
http://img.dunyanews.tv/images/docss/hamoodur_rahman_commission_report.pdf last accessed 30 May 
2018 
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Pakistan, which included the word ‘terrorist’.594 Consequently, Pakistan did not consider 
the Bengali insurrection as terrorism. Qadir refers to the insurrection as ‘unfortunate 
events of 1971’ rather than calling it terrorism.595 Furthermore, Aziz et al. stated that the 
cycle of terrorism in the country began in 1977, without substantiating the Bengali 
insurrection as terrorism.596 This is a very different context than the aftermath of the 9/11 
attack, which changed the global paradigm of security and also shifted the outlook of 
Hali, who regards the insurrection as terrorism.597 
The word ‘terrorist’ was used for the first time in the history of Pakistan in the 
Suppression of Terrorist Activities (Special Courts) Ordinance 1974.598 This Ordinance 
then became an Act of Parliament in 1975. A detailed discussion on the development of 
the anti­terrorism laws in Pakistan will be given in Part II of this chapter.  
Even though many people had died during the Civil War, Pakistan never declared 
it an act of terrorism. When the Civil War had escalated to an unbearable situation, it was 
Mr. Bhutto who campaigned against the dictatorship of General Yahya in West Pakistan 
for not transferring power to civilians after the 1970 elections.599 Therefore, Mr. Bhutto 
indirectly came in support of the Bengalis by putting pressure on General Yahya to step 
down rather than declaring the Bengalis as terrorists. Consequently, this research will 
consider 1974 as the advent of terrorism in Pakistan because neither the country’s 
                                                          
594 Actions (in Aid of Civil Power) Regulation 2011, section 2 (L) ““miscreants” means any person who 
may or may not be a citizen of Pakistan and who is intending to commit or has committed any offence 
under this Regulation and includes a terrorist, a foreigner, a non­state actor or a group of such persons by 
what so ever names called.” 
595 Qadir, S. (2001) “The Concept of International Terrorism: An Interim Study of South Asia”, The 
Round Table, 90:360, pp. 333 – 343.  
596 Aziz, J. et al (2013) “The Case for Change: A Review of Pakistan’s Anti­Terrorism Act of 1997”, 
Research Society of International Law, Pakistan, p. 11. 
597 Hali, S.M. (2016) “Mukti Bahini: Terrorists or Freedom Fighters”, Pakistan Observer, available at 
https://pakobserver.net/mukti­bahini­terrorists­or­freedom­fighters/ last accessed 30 May 2018. 
598 Aziz, J. et al (2013) “The Case for Change: A Review of Pakistan’s Anti­Terrorism Act of 1997”, 
Research Society of International Law, Pakistan. 
599 Laporte, R. Jr. (1972) “Pakistan in 1971: The Disintegration of a Nation”, Asian Survey, Vol. 12, No. 
2, pp. 97 – 108 
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leadership nor the public in general in the West regarded the Bengali insurrection as 
terrorism.  
There are two reasons why Pakistan did not regard the Bengali insurrection as 
terrorism. First, Pakistan was aware that there is a fundamental difference between 
terrorism and a struggle for freedom. Second, terrorism was still a new concept at that 
time, which is the reason why Pakistan had no anti­terrorism laws to be implemented 
during the Civil War of 1971. 
 With reference to the first assumption, there is a need to understand the legal 
definition of terrorism to understand the difference between terrorism as an ideology and 
a struggle towards the right to self­determination. A legitimate definition of terrorism 
encompasses three important elements.600 First, terrorism has collective dimension (i.e. 
the involvement of organisation as opposed to a lone perpetrator). Second, terrorism has 
communication dimension to create fear among public (i.e. mass intimidation). Lastly, it 
has a programmatic dimension (i.e. to disrupt the constitutional order of a country).601 A 
good legal definition of terrorism differentiates terrorism from ordinary crimes, crimes 
against humanity, war crimes and most importantly a struggle against an authoritative 
government for the right of self­determination.602 This study further builds on the 
assumption that Pakistan was aware of this distinction and, therefore, the Bengali 
insurrection was not labelled as terrorism. Another main reason could be Pakistan’s 
support for the freedom fighting movements of the Kashmiris and Palestinians since 
                                                          
600 Melia, M.C. and Petzsche, A. (2013) Terrorism as a Criminal Offence, in Counter­Terrorism, Human 
Rights and the Rule of Law, edited by Masferrer, A. and Walker, C. Glasgow: Edward Elgar Publishing, 
p. 96 – 105. 
601 Laporte, R. Jr. (1972) “Pakistan in 1971: The Disintegration of a Nation”, Asian Survey, Vol. 12, No. 
2, pp. 97 – 108 
602 Roach, K. (2015) The Migration and Derivation of Counter­terrorism in Routledge Handbook of Law 
and Terrorism, first published 2015, edited by Genevieve Lennon and Clive Walker, Oxon, New York: 
Routledge. See also, Walker, C. (2009) Blackstone’s Guide to the Anti­Terrorism Legislation, 2nd 
Edition, Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, pp. 1 – 13. Gorostiza, J.M.L. (2013) Terrorism and 
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upon Spanish Domestic Law in Counter­Terrorism, Human Rights and the Rule of Law, edited by 
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1948.603 However, this explanation might not stand. Had Pakistan been aware of the 
difference between terrorism and a struggle towards independence and its strict adherence 
to the causes of Kashmir and Palestine, then it would not have declared the movements 
of the Balochis and Pashtuns in the north as terrorism in 1975.604 Consequently, this study 
considers that the non­labelling of the Bengali insurrection as terrorism was not because 
Pakistan wanted to differentiate between terrorism and a struggle for autonomy or 
independence but because terrorism was still a new concept for the country. There were 
no anti­terrorism laws in Pakistan at the time of the civil unrest in 1971, which is why the 
first anti­terrorism laws were drafted as an ordinance only two years of the cessation of 
Bengal. If Pakistan did not consider the insurrection as terrorism, then why would this 
study consider it so? In summary, this research has correctly presumed the inception of 
terrorism in Pakistan since 1974.   
As stated previously, this scholarship will focus on the current cycle of terrorism 
in Pakistan in the aftermath of the ‘War on Terror’, in which more than 60,000 people 
have died. A chronological account of the major terror incidents in the country follows. 
The first serious incident of terrorism since 2003 took place in Dargai.605 On 8 
November 2006, a suicide bomber detonated explosives just as young recruits from the 
Pakistan Army were going through their morning exercises.606 The attack left some 45 
troops dead and 20 injured.  
In October 2007, Benazir Bhutto, former Pakistani Prime Minister, arrived in 
Karachi to participate in the upcoming parliamentary elections.607 She had returned to the 
                                                          
603 The News International (12 December 2017) “General Bajwa says Pakistan views Palestine issue at 
par with Kashmir issue”, available at https://www.thenews.com.pk/latest/255234­gen­bajwa­says­
pakistan­views­palestine­issue­at­par­with­kashmir­issue last accessed 31 May 2018. 
604 Aziz, J. et al (2013) “The Case for Change: A Review of Pakistan’s Anti­Terrorism Act of 1997”, 
Research Society of International Law, Pakistan. 
605Alvi, H. (2012) Police and Counterterrorism in Khyber Pukhtunkhwa in Stabilizing Pakistan through 
Police Reforms, Asia Society Report by the Independent Commission on Pakistan Police Reforms at 105. 
606Ibid. 
607 Wilkinson, I. (2007) “Twin bombs strike at Benazir Bhutto's parade”, The Telegraph, available at 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/1566627/Twin­bombs­strike­at­Benazir­Bhuttos­
parade.html, last accessed 12 August 2014. 
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country after eight years in self­imposed exile. She was warmly welcomed by thousands 
of supporters.608 As she was parading through the crowd, two consecutive bombs 
exploded, killing at least 120 people and injuring more than 150.609 Bhutto survived the 
attacks. The Pakistani establishment was blamed for the attacks; however, the Pakistani 
Taliban had also warned that they would attack Benazir Bhutto prior to her visit, mostly 
because of her secular agenda and intentions to start military operations against the 
militants after coming into power.610 Nevertheless, Bhutto continued her election 
campaign. She was assassinated on 27 December 2007, outside a large gathering of her 
supporters.611 A suicide bomber detonated his jacket full of explosives among the crowd, 
killing at least 22 people.612 A police report was registered against Baitullah Mehsud, the 
then Taliban commander in Pakistan, who was later killed in a drone attack in Pakistan.613 
However, Bhutto’s party blamed the Pakistani establishment for her death. So, the 
government, then led by President Pervaiz Musharraf, requested the United Nations to 
investigate her assassination. The commission reported that there was no ‘proof of 
culpability’ against President Musharraf—and so he avoided the blame. The commission 
also suggested that it would be upon the country’s authorities to determine whether he 
was criminally responsible in some other way.614 Later, Musharraf was formally charged 
for Bhutto’s murder in August 2013.615 Musharraf did not appear in any of the court 
                                                          
608 Ibid. 
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611 “Assassination” (2007) Benazir Bhutto, available at 
http://www.benazirbhutto.com/assassinatination.html, last accessed 12 August 2014. 
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613 CNN (2007) “Benazir Bhutto assassinated”, available at 
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proceedings and so has been declared an absconder.616 So far, a total of 13 suspects have 
been charged with the murder of Bhutto, including Musharraf. Only two persons have 
been given 17 year each imprisonment while five have been acquitted.617  
August 2008 witnessed one of the deadliest attacks, which struck one of 
Pakistan’s military installation. The Taliban attacked the Wah ammunition factory and 
depot with twin suicide bomb explosions.618 At least 63 people died and dozens were 
wounded.619 The first explosion took place outside the main gate of the factory as staff 
members were leaving work during a shift change. Seconds later, another blast took place 
at another gate of the factory. According to eyewitnesses, there was smoke, blood, dead 
bodies and human body parts scattered all around.620 
In September 2008, a large bomb blast tore through the Marriot Hotel in 
Islamabad. At least 40 people died, including foreign nationals.621 A big truck filled with 
explosives struck with the hotel reception. The hotel caught fire in seconds, killing the 
people inside and destroying the property.622  
A suicide bomber attempted to assassinate Asfandyar Wali Khan, leader of the 
Awami National Party, in October 2008.623 The Awami National Party is a secular 
political party representing ethnic Pashtuns in the northwest of Pakistan, who have largely 
been targeted by the Taliban for their secular agenda.624 Khan was present among the 
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guests at his house to celebrate one of their religious festivals when the bomber detonated 
a suicide jacket full of explosives.625 Luckily, Khan survived the attack; however, it killed 
four people and left six others injured.626  
The Sri Lankan cricket team was the main target of terrorism in March 2009.627 
The team was on an official visit to play cricket against Pakistan when their bus was 
attacked by 12 assailants. At least six security staff and a bus driver were killed. Seven 
players and their coach were injured. Police recovered grenades and rocket launchers 
from the scene.   
In October 2009, the Pakistani main army quarter in Rawalpindi was attacked. Six 
soldiers, including two senior officers, were killed in the attack.628 Another terrorist attack 
was launched on the International Islamic University in Islamabad. Twin suicide blasts 
were carried out in which three females and two male students were killed instantly and 
more than 35 were injured.629   
On 5 April 2010, the Taliban launched an organised attack on the US consulate in 
Peshawar.630 They were almost 15 in number, and they were armed with guns and hand 
grenades. The consulate was heavily guarded at that time. The attackers were contained 
after a gun battle 20 yards away from the consulate. One of the attackers blew himself up 
with a suicide vest full of explosives, killing one policeman and a pedestrian. The police 
made arrests and recovered unexploded grenades from the scene.631   
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In the same year, the Taliban launched another attack in Peshawar, this time at a 
funeral.632 A young suicide bomber detonated his explosive vest while the general public 
was attending the funeral of a local tribal leader, killing at least 37 and injured many. The 
Taliban claimed that this was retaliation against the leaders of local militia (also known 
as ‘aman lashkar’)633. ‘Aman lashkar’ is depicted very well by Shah as:  
A group of armed men who get together to defend themselves or take revenge for 
wrongs done to them by the TTP. A lashkar consists of young men carrying 
whatever arms they can lay their hands on and guided by motives of self-help and 
revenge. A lashkar is usually led by tribal leaders or other community figures.634  
 
In May 2011, the Karachi naval base was attacked. At least 12 people were killed 
and a US­made spy plane was destroyed.635  
The Pakistan military had a particularly tragic day on 27 June 2012 when 17 
captured soldiers were beheaded by the Taliban.636 Their heads were shown in a shocking 
video for which the Taliban claimed responsibility.637 The soldiers had been captured few 
days before in a skirmish at a checkpoint in a district bordering Pakistan and 
Afghanistan.638 The Taliban were inept during the military operation against them, so the 
brutality of the killings was an act of revenge.639  
On 16 August 2012, the Taliban launched an audacious attack on Minhas Airbase 
in Kamra, some 75 kilometres north west of Islamabad, the capital.640 The fight continued 
for hours. The security claimed that all nine attackers were killed during the gun battle, 
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while one security guard died.641 The Taliban spokesman claimed that 12 security guards 
were killed.642 A plane at the airbase was also damaged during the attack.643  
Malala Yousafzai, a popular child activist in Pakistan, and her two classmates, 
who sitting in a school van, were shot by the Taliban in Swat Valley when they were 
going home after school in October 2012.644 Malala received severe injuries to her head, 
neck and shoulder.645 She was taken by air ambulance to Peshawar646 to save her life. She 
was later evacuated to the UK for further treatment. A Taliban spokesman said that she 
had been shot because of her support of Western education and because she promoted 
Western culture in the country. This tragic incident was nationally criticised, creating 
revulsion among the nation and leading many to take a stand against extremism and the 
militants.647 The incident was also strongly criticised by important world leaders.648 
Malala has been awarded many prizes and has also received the honour of being 
nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize.649 She was shortly awarded the Nobel Peace Prize 
in October 2014.650 Ten of the suspects in her shooting were arrested in Pakistan and they 
were all jailed for life.651   
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On 16 December 2012, the Taliban launched a brazen attack on Peshawar 
airport.652 Of the five attackers, three were suicide bombers. The attackers used a vehicle 
full of explosives to break through the airport’s wall.653 All of the attackers entered the 
airport and had a gun battle with the security for more than half an hour.654 They used 
heavy firearms and explosives. In the attack, nine people, including the five attackers, 
were killed and 40 others were wounded. Peshawar airport is used for private and military 
traffic. A Taliban spokesman claimed that the intended targets were military jet fighter 
planes and gunship helicopters.655    
In the same year, the Awami National Party was once again targeted by the 
Taliban. Bashir Bilour, a prominent leader of the party, was assassinated in a suicide 
bomb in the city of Peshawar on 22 December 2012.656 Bilour was chairing a party 
meeting for the upcoming election when the bomber detonated his explosives, killing 
eight others and injured 17 people.657 Bilour’s death was declared as a major loss for the 
country by various national political leaders. The dead included civilians and police staff 
members.658 
In March 2013 Peshawar was hit once again by another terror incident. This time, 
Taliban suicide bombers targeted a judicial complex.659 They posed as court clerks to 
deceive the guards and enter the building. The guards doubted their story and wanted to 
conduct a body search. The bombers refused the body search and thus entered the building 
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by force.660 One attacker threw a hand grenade and the second started firing at members 
of the public. The security arrived quickly and after a gun battle, the building was cleared. 
At least four people died and 29 were injured.661 The same courts had been attacked in 
2009, in which at least ten died and 50 were injured.662  
Tourism in Pakistan was once again affected after the attacks on the Marriott Hotel 
and Sri Lankan cricket team, as discussed above. This time, 10 foreign climbers were 
‘forced to kneel and were shot in the head’ at Nanga Parbat base camp, north of Pakistan, 
on 24 June 2013.663 The climbers were identified as American, Chinese, Ukrainian, 
Slovakian, Lithuanian, Nepali and one Pakistani.664 The Taliban’s intention was to send 
a violent message to the international community.665   
In September 2013, there was a horrific attack on a Christian minority in the city 
of Peshawar, killing at least 85 and injuring more than 100.666  
The judiciary was again struck by terrorism when twin suicide bombers killed 
themselves in Islamabad courts on 4 March 2014.667 They had loaded guns and hand 
grenades and they started firing indiscriminately, killing 11 people and injuring more than 
36.668 Among the dead were locals, lawyers, a judge and members of the police.669 
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Initially, the Taliban denied the attack but later on one of its splinter groups accepted 
responsibility for the attack.670   
On 9 September 2014, a Pakistan naval dockyard in Karachi was attacked.671 In 
the skirmish, one security guard was killed and seven others were injured while two 
attackers were killed in the crossfire—four other attackers were captured alive.672 The 
attempted attack was successfully thwarted by the navy security personnel.673  
One of the most horrible attacks was launched against schoolchildren at the Army 
Public School in Peshawar on 16 December 2014. This attack was termed a ‘national 
tragedy’, akin to the 9/11 attacks as far as the savagery and brutality of the terrorists is 
concerned. A total of 141 people died, including 132 young children.674  
Pakistan experienced many terror attacks in 2015 and 2016. Recently, coordinated 
terror attacks were carried out in Parachinar and Quetta, killing dozens of innocent 
civilians and maiming more than a hundred just before the Eid celebrations.675  
Over the course of the last decade, Pakistan has experienced many terrorist 
attacks. This situation necessitates anti­terrorism legislation to combat the threat. This 
engenders a need to know the country’s legal response to terrorism. Consequently, the 
next part will examine and evaluate the provisions contained in Pakistan’s anti­terrorism 
laws and its practices governing the treatment of terror detainees during pre­charge 
detention.  
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Part II 
5.2.0 Pre-charge Terror Detention in Pakistan: Law, Practice and Assessment 
This part will identify, analyse and assess the law related to the treatment of terror 
detainees during pre­charge detention in Pakistan. The country’s laws and practices are 
also assessed to find if there are any gaps between the two. The human rights law 
assessment will prepare a pioneering case­study of the treatment of terror detainees during 
pre­charge detention in Pakistan, thus contributing new knowledge in the realm of human 
rights law and terrorism. 
The schema of Part II is to identify what is the law on the treatment of terror 
suspects during pre­charge detention in Pakistan, followed by what the law ought to be 
in this regard. The identification of the law and its human rights law assessment will 
appear in Section A of this part, related to the following six categories/themes: period of 
pre­charge detention, police interrogation, police records, internal police review 
mechanisms, rights of a terror suspect to contact the outside world, and detention 
conditions in which terror suspects are kept. Similarly, an assessment of the practices will 
appear in section B related to these six categories/themes. 
 
5.2.1.A. The Period of Pre-charge Detention: Law and Assessment 
The National Internal Security of Pakistan (hereafter, NISP) envisages the need 
for anti­terrorism legislation to combat the threat from terrorism because more than 
60,000 people have died in Pakistan since 2003. The NISP looks at terrorism, militancy 
and extremism as ‘non­traditional threats’ to the country’s national security.676 It is 
viewed as an existential threat following the conservative understanding of threat from 
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terrorism. Consequently, Pakistan is currently “faced with the complexity of the situation, 
use of chemical and biological substances by terrorists… networks lurk in shadows and 
thrive on a strategy of invisibility and ambiguity.”677 This situation surely demands that 
there should be anti­terror laws in the country to cope with the threat. However, the 
existing security apparatus of Pakistan is inadequate and ‘enormously strained to tackle 
these threats’.678 This is alarming if the country bears in mind Posner’s pragmatism, 
Ackerman’s emergency constitution, and Gross’s extra­legal measures to fight against 
terrorism. Therefore, it seems imperative for the country to enact stringent anti­terror laws 
to contain the threat. Hence, it is important to provide an overview of the development of 
anti­terror legislation governing the treatment of terror suspects in Pakistan and to find 
out what is the ‘total period of pre­charge detention’ in the country; how ‘prompt a terror 
detainee is produced’ before a court and for how long the detainee ‘is remanded in police 
custody at one time’.    
Arguably, the first terrorism cycle started in Pakistan in 1974, which led to the 
enactment of the first anti­terrorism legislation in the country. The president of Pakistan 
promulgated the Suppression of the Terrorist Activities (Special Courts) Ordinance 1974 
(hereafter, STAO 1974), which aimed to counter terrorist activities in the country.679 
Later, STAO 1974 was approved by parliament and it became the Suppression of 
Terrorist Activities (Special Courts) Act 1975 (hereafter, STAA 1975).680 STAA 1975 
did two important things. It was the first time in Pakistan’s history when it created ‘special 
laws’ different from ordinary criminal laws.681 The special laws created ‘special courts’ 
working without adjournments to provide speedy justice under Section 3.682 Before 
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STAA 1975, ordinary law, such as Section 144 of the Criminal Procedure Code, which 
was created by the British in 1898 (hereafter, CrPC 1898), was used to regulate pre­charge 
detention to prevent “danger to human life… or disturbance of the public tranquillity, or 
a riot.”683 Second, STAA 1975 denied certain rights of the suspect. In particular, it 
negated the universally accepted principle that an accused is innocent until proven guilty. 
Section 8 had presupposed the commission of an offence if any ‘article’ or ‘thing’ was 
recovered from the suspect. The burden of proof, contrary to normal practice, was shifted 
to the accused to prove that he/she was not guilty of the offence. Amnesty International 
has raised this issue many times with the successive governments of Pakistan.684 
However, the country’s first anti­terror legislation was silent about the detention and 
questioning of the terror suspects because it was regulated by the ordinary law Section 
144 of CrPC.  
Although STAA 1975 remained in force for the first and second cycles of 
terrorism, it was later realised that the Act could not cope with the third cycle of linguistic 
and sectarian terrorism in Pakistan.685 So, in August 1997, parliament, led by Nawaz 
Sharif, then Prime Minister of Pakistan, presented the Anti­Terrorism Act 1997 
(hereafter, ATA 1997) and got it passed.686 This Act expressly repealed and replaced 
STAA 1975.687 For the first time, ATA 1997 legally defined terrorism for the purpose of 
detention. According to Section 6 (1) terrorism means: 
Any ‘terrorist act’ mentioned in Section 6(2): ‘to coerce and intimidate or 
overawe the Government or the public or a section of the public or community or 
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sect; or create a sense of fear or insecurity in society; or the use or threat is made 
for the purpose of advancing a religious, sectarian or ethnic cause.688 
 
The actions mentioned in Section 6 (2) include offences against the person (death, hurt), 
property (extortion, damage to infrastructure), places of worships, hijacking, public order, 
public servants, and so on. However, the terrorism definition under ATA 1997 is so broad 
that it has nearly brought ‘any act of violence under the umbrella of terrorism’.689 It also 
provides for the establishment of special courts.690 The government appoints judges and 
their tenure of office is not specified or fixed, as would have been in case for their 
appointment in regular judicial system.691 Any aggrieved party can appeal against the 
decision to the special anti­terrorism tribunal that was created by the government, whose 
decision is considered to be final.692 The special courts can hear cases in the absence of 
the accused.693 The ATA 1997 introduced the first provisions regulating the period of pre­
charge detention. The Act has been amended from time to time. At present, it has gone 
through 22 amendments, not all of them related to the treatment of terror detainees.694 
Apart from the amended ATA 1997, there are several other laws regulating the treatment 
of the terror detainees, namely: the Protection of Pakistan Act 2014 (hereafter, POPA 
2014), the Investigation for Fair Trial Act 2013 (hereafter, IFTA 2013), and the Actions 
(in Aid of Civil Power) Regulation 2011 (hereafter, AACPR 2011).695 All these anti­terror 
laws will be examined in detail to find out what is the ‘total period of pre­charge 
detention’ in the country to make a decision to charge or release a terror detainee; how 
‘prompt a terror detainee is produced’ before a court soon after his/her arrest; and for how 
long the detainee ‘is remanded in police custody at one time’. 
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As mentioned in the introductory chapter, there are five different types of 
detention: indefinite, pre­charge, pre­trial, detention at seaports or airports, and detention 
during police stop and search. A historical development of each type, in the context of 
Pakistan, is touched upon below, with a focus on pre­charge detention in the country. 
Indefinite detention, in cases of terrorism, is legal in Pakistan. The law expressly 
governing indefinite detention in Pakistan is AACPR.696 The President of Pakistan is 
empowered through Article 245 (4) of the 1973 Constitution to promulgate laws asking 
its armed forces to combat any threat to its sovereignty or constitution.697 These laws have 
been promulgated through the AACPR. For example, according to Section 11 of AACPR, 
armed forces can detain terror suspects, until the continuation of action in aid of civil 
power’. In other words, a suspect remains in detention until the military operation is over 
in a specified area and the order of aid of civil power is officially withdrawn. This law 
has retrospective and overriding effects over other laws for the time being.698 It is 
applicable to people detained since 1 February 2008, even though it was passed in 2011. 
There are, however, two important safeguards: the prohibition of torture699 and creation 
of an ‘Oversight Board’700 to protect the human rights of the detainees. Currently, there 
are over 700 people in the country suspected of terrorism who have been detained since 
2008 and they will remain in detention until the order is withdrawn under AACPR 
2011.701   
The AACPR is applicable to the Federally Administrative Tribal Areas (hereafter, 
FATA) of Pakistan. Apart from FATA, indefinite detention in other parts of Pakistan can 
also be promulgated through ATA 1997. This law states that the federal government can 
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pass an order to deploy armed forces for ‘action in aid of civil power’, combating 
terrorism, in any of its provinces at the request of the provincial government.702 If the 
situation so warrants, indefinite detention can be introduced easily by extending AAPRC 
2011 to any parts of Pakistan under the ATA 1997. 
Another form of detention, which is a focus of this scholarship, is pre­charge 
detention. Pakistani anti­terrorism legislation recognises pre­charge detention; that is, 
keeping an accused person in police custody for investigation. Section 21E of the ATA 
1997 contains provisions governing pre­charge detention. The total period of the pre­
charge detention shall not exceed 30 days in total.703 Where a person is arrested on 
‘reasonable suspicion’704 of terrorism, then he/she shall be produced before the ‘special 
court’ within 24 hours of the arrest.705 If the accused cannot be produced, then a temporary 
order from the nearest magistrate can be obtained to authorise police custody for another 
24 hours,706 after which an investigating officer will apply a warrant for further detention 
in police custody. The period of pre­charge detention shall not exceed 15 days 
uninterrupted at one time.707 A further warrant may be allowed if the court is satisfied 
that more evidence is obtainable and that no bodily harm has been caused to the accused 
during any previous police custody.708  
The period of the pre­charge detention was increased through an ordinance called 
the Protection of Pakistan Ordinance 2013 (hereafter, POPO 2013).709 This ordinance was 
promulgated “to provide for protection against waging of war against Pakistan and the 
prevention of acts threatening the security of Pakistan.” According to Section 5(4), the 
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total period of the pre­charge detention shall not exceed 90 days.710 The ordinance 
remained in force for 120 days, as authorised by the Constitution of Pakistan and it was 
renewed once by the parliament for another 120 days.711 Therefore, the 90­day pre­charge 
detention period and its management were made part of the ATA 1997 in 2013. 
Consequently, the total pre­charge detention was increased to 90 days in ATA 1997, for 
which each warrant of further detention in police custody allowed is not less than 15 days 
and not more than 30 days at one time.712 
In July 2014, because POPO 2013 could not be extended for a third time due to 
the constitutional limitation on the powers of president of renewing ordinance for a third 
time, the Protection of Pakistan Act 2014 (hereafter, POPA 2014) was introduced.713 
However, the period of pre­charge detention was reduced from 90 to 60 days due to 
vehement criticisms from the opposition714 and certain human rights organisations.715 The 
laws governing pre­charge detention can be found in Sections 21E and 5(4) of ATA 1997 
and the POPA 2014, respectively. Section 21E of the ATA 1997 provides for the period 
not exceeding 90 days while Section 5(4) of POPA 2014 stipulates 60 days’ maximum 
period of such detention. POPA 2014 was used as an emergency measure with sunset 
duration of two years, which expired in July 2016,716 while the ATA 1997 remains in 
force. A fundamental difference between ATA 1997 and POPA 2014 is that the former 
covers terrorism against government or society while the latter covers terrorism if 
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committed against the State of Pakistan. In summary, the total period of pre­charge 
detention under the anti­terrorism legislation of Pakistan, at present, is 90 days which 
shall not be less than 15 days and shall not be more than 30 days at a time. Although the 
total period of pre­charge detention is 90 days, a terror investigation must be completed 
within 30 days after arrest.717  
The normal criminal laws of Pakistan governing pre­charge detention provide that 
an accused person shall be produced before a magistrate within 24 hours of his/her 
arrest.718 If the police have not completed their investigation, then an investigating officer 
can apply for further detention not exceeding 15 days719 in total, as compared to 90 days 
in cases of terrorism. 
Another form of detention is pre­trial detention. Although the anti­terrorism 
legislation of Pakistan does not specifically provide period for the pre­trial detention, 
Section 19 of ATA sheds some light on it. Any terrorist investigation must be completed 
within seven working days.720 The report is then submitted to the anti­terrorism court.721 
The court is required to decide the case within seven working days.722 So, literally, the 
total period of pre­trial detention is just seven working days. However, in practice, there 
are more than a thousand cases where suspects have been detained for years.723 For 
example, the suspects arrested in December 2003 on suspicion of attempting suicide 
attacks on General Musharraf, the then president of Pakistan, are still awaiting a decision 
on their cases.724 The provision governing period of the pre­trial detention looks very 
good but in practice there are many pending cases before various anti­terrorism courts. 
                                                          
717 Anti­Terrorism Act 1997, Section 19 (1); available at 
http://www.molaw.gov.pk/gop/index.php?q=aHR0cDovLzE5Mi4xNjguNzAuMTM2L21vbGF3L3VzZX
JmaWxlczEvZmlsZS9BbnRpLVRlcnJvcmlzbSUyMEFjdC5wZGY%3D  
718 Criminal Procedure Code of Pakistan (1898) at Section 61, available at 
http://www.oecd.org/site/adboecdanti­corruptioninitiative/39849781.pdf, last accessed 16 August 2014. 
719 Ibid., Section 167. 
720 The Anti-Terrorism Act 1997 of Pakistan at Section 19(1). 
721 Ibid. 
722 Ibid. at Section 19(7). 
723 Bokhari, S.W. (2013) “Pakistan’s Challenges in Anti­terror Legislation” at 37­38. 
724 Ibid. 
Page 177 of 272 
 
Although the pre­trial detention is only supposed to be a maximum of seven working 
days, in hundreds of cases the detainees have waited for a court decision for more than 
seven years.725  
The remaining forms of detention are at seaports or airports, and detentions during 
stop and search. The anti­terrorism legislation (ATA 1997) does not specifically provide 
for detention at either seaport or airports. All it says is that if any person is arrested, then 
they must be brought before the court within 24 hours.726 However, any person can be 
stopped, searched, and arrested without warrant under ATA 1997, and if taken into arrest, 
then the 24 hours limitation is also applicable.727  
To conclude, in Pakistan’s anti­terrorism laws governing the forms and period of 
detention, there are only three major forms of detention. The first is indefinite detention; 
the law specifically provides for this and it has been practised since 2008. The second is 
pre­charge detention, where a terror suspect can be kept in detention for 30 days, at one 
time, not exceeding 90 days in total. Also, for one warrant of detention at a time, there is 
an obligatory minimum benchmark of 15 days. So, if a terror suspect is detained, then he 
or she shall not be detained for less than 15 days and more than 30 days at a time. A terror 
detainee is produced before a court within 24 hours of his/her arrest. The last is pre­trial 
detention, which provides for a total period of seven working days; however, it is 
considerably longer in practice. This research project will focus solely on pre­charge 
detention. The continuation of indefinite detention under the anti­terrorism legislation 
could be one of the major concerns and threats to human liberty but its examination, 
analysis and assessment would require further research and is, therefore, outside of the 
purview of this project; however, reference will be made to it. On pre­trial detention, the 
                                                          
725 Ibid. 
726 The Anti-Terrorism Act 1997 of Pakistan, at Section 21(E), available at http://www.fia.gov.pk/ata.htm, 
last accessed on 17 August 2014. 
727 Ibid. at Section 5(2)(i). 
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wide gap between law and practice also provides an interesting research problem for 
another project. 
Pakistan’s domestic and international human rights obligation on the period of 
pre­charge detention will be used as yardstick to assess the anti­terror laws of Pakistan 
on the period of pre­charge terror detention. Chapter Three has shown that there is nothing 
expressly present in the constitution of Pakistan for the period of pre­charge detention. 
Article 9 simply prohibits the government from depriving anyone of his/her liberty except 
in accordance with the law. Articles 10(1) and 10(2) relate to the constitutional safeguards 
against arbitrary arrest and detention in cases of pre­charge detention. Certain substantive 
and procedural safeguards are guaranteed thereunder. The safeguards mentioned in 
Article 10 (2) are directly related to the period of pre­charge detention period. In 
particular, Article 10 (2) states: 
Every person who is arrested and detained in custody shall be produced before a 
magistrate within a period of 24 hours of such arrest, excluding the time necessary 
for the journey from the place of arrest to the court of the nearest magistrate, and 
no such person shall be detained in custody beyond the said period without the 
authority of a magistrate.728 
 
This Article expressly recognises the principle of promptness or habeas corpus, which is 
to produce the arrested person before court within 24 hours. It also puts a procedural 
prohibition on the law enforcement agencies not to authorise, on their own, the period of 
pre­charge detention beyond 24 hours. It is under ‘the authority of a magistrate’ to 
authorise a warrant for further detention beyond that period. However, there is nothing 
expressly describing how long a magistrate can extend the duration of the detention.   
The rest of Article 10 relates to preventive detention. It expressly mentions the 
period of preventive detention, which is a minimum of three months and a maximum of 
12 months.729 The main purpose of preventive detention is to prevent a suspect from 
                                                          
728 Constitution of Pakistan, Article 10 (2), available at 
http://www.pakistani.org/pakistan/constitution/part2.ch1.html last accessed on 27 February 2016 
729 Constitution of Pakistan, Article 10 (3 ­ 9), available at 
http://www.pakistani.org/pakistan/constitution/part2.ch1.html last accessed on 27 February 2016 
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committing an imminent terrorist act as opposed to pre­charge detention contemplating 
criminal charge.730 The detention is authorised not by the judiciary, as in the case of pre­
charge detention, but by an executive order.731 Chapter One has explained the various 
forms of detention. However, preventive detention is not the focus of this research project, 
which focuses on the treatment of terror suspects during pre­charge detention. The period 
of pre­charge detention is not expressly given in the constitution of Pakistan (i.e. far how 
long the period of pre­charge detention ought to be). How many days will suffice then for 
the total period of pre­charge detention in the country in the context of its domestic human 
rights law obligations—two, seven, 15, 30, 60, 90 or even more? Pakistan ratified the 
ICCPR on 23 June 2010 and it is internationally bound to treat terror suspects with 
humanity and fairness.732 The ICCPR imposes a higher standard than Pakistan’s domestic 
human rights law. The main reason for this is the express procedural safeguards, on arrest 
and detention that are entrenched in Article 9. These safeguards are to inform, during 
arrest of a suspected terrorist, the reasons of his arrest;733 to inform the person ‘promptly’ 
of any charges against him or her;734 to bring the person ‘promptly’ before a judge;735 to 
arrange his or her trial within a ‘reasonable time’;736 to challenge the lawfulness of his or 
her detention;737 and to pay compensation for his or her unlawful arrest or detention.738  
Pakistan’s pre­charge detention duration (90 days at present) will be assessed in 
light of the two time­related descriptors mentioned in Article 9: ‘promptly’ and 
‘reasonable time’. The Human Rights Committee, while elaborating the meaning of the 
                                                          
730 Macken, C. (2011) Counter­terrorism and the Detention of Suspected Terrorists: Preventive Detention 
and international Human Rights Law, New York: Routledge pp. 5 – 7. 
731 Ibid. 
732 United Nations Treaty Collection Databases, available at 
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV­4&chapter=4&lang=en, last 
accessed 13 March 2016. 
733 ICCPR, Article 9 (2) 
734 Ibid. 
735 ICCPR, Article 9 (3) 
736 Ibid. 
737 ICCPR, Article 9 (4) 
738 ICCPR, Article 9 (5) 
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word ‘promptly’ in Article 9, suggests that “delays should not exceed a few days from 
the time of arrest.”739 The Committee further comments that any delays beyond 48 hours 
must “remain absolutely exceptional and be justified under the circumstances.”740 The 
Committee also comments on bringing a suspected terrorist to trial within a ‘reasonable 
time’. The reasonable time is applicable to both pre­charge and pre­trial detentions.741 In 
the case of pre­charge detention, a criminal charge should be brought against a suspected 
terrorist within a reasonable time, which should not exceed ‘a few days’. Its main reason, 
in the eyes of the Committee, is that a longer detention in police custody increases the 
risk of ill­treatment.742 
The Human Rights Committee is authorised, under Article 2 of the First Optional 
Protocol to the ICCPR, to hear complaints from individuals on the violation of their 
human rights. The communications that take place among the Human Rights Committee, 
individual complainants and any state party form a body of law that is called the ‘case 
law of the Human Rights Committee’.743  The Committee has decided a case in this regard 
for Albert W. Mukong, a journalist, scholar and a strong opponent of the one­party system 
in Cameroon, who was arrested, without warrant, in June 1988 after the BBC aired an 
interview in which he had criticised the country’s political system.744 He was charged two 
months after his arrest with what the government called ‘intoxication of national and 
international public opinion’, which is a security crime.745 He alleged a violation of 
Article 9, paragraph 3 because the charges were not brought against him within 
                                                          
739 General Comment No. 35, para 33, available at 
http://docstore.ohchr.org/SelfServices/FilesHandler.ashx?enc=6QkG1d%2fPPRiCAqhKb7yhsrdB0H1l59
79OVGGB%2bWPAXjdnG1mwFFfPYGIlNfb%2f6T%2fqwtc77%2fKU9JkoeDcTWWPIpCoePGBcMs
RmFtoMu58pgnmzjyiyRGkPQekcPKtaaTG last accessed 13 March 2016 
740 Ibid. 
741 Ibid., para 27 in conjunction with para 40 stating that the right is available to a person detained under 
terror laws. 
742 Ibid., para 33 
743 Macken, C. (2011) Counter­terrorism and the Detention of Suspected Terrorists: Preventive Detention 
and international Human Rights Law, New York: Routledge p. 166 
744 Albert W. Mukong v Cameroon, 10 August 1994 CCPR/C/51/D/458/1991 para 2.1 and 2.2 
745 Ibid., para 2.6 and 3.2 
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‘reasonable time’.746 The state party presented evidence to show that Mukong was 
informed of the reasons of his arrest and, thus, they had charged him in accordance with 
the law of the land. The Committee found that the evidence produced before it showed 
that the two­month delay in giving reasons for his arrest and bringing charges against him 
were in violation of Article 9.747  
In another case that was brought before the Human Rights Committee, Mr Otabek 
Akhadov was arrested in Kyrgyzstan on account of terror charges.748 He was produced 
before a judge two weeks after his arrest, where he was given the reasons of his detention. 
He was formally charged after a few months. He complained to the Human Rights 
Committee, alleging a violation of Article 9. The state party argued that Akhadov was 
dealt in accordance with the anti­terror laws of the land. However, the Committee held 
that keeping a detainee for two weeks in police custody and charging him after a few 
months clearly violated Article 9 in this case.749 This suggests that the detainee was not 
promptly brought before a judge within a reasonable time.   
How then can Pakistan justify the 90­day detention if the standard, in the eyes of 
the Human Rights Committee, is just a few days? A suspected terrorist in Pakistan, at one 
time, could lawfully remain in police custody for the first 30 days of his arrest.750 If the 
authorities cannot find any credible evidence to bring terror charges against a suspected 
terrorist within that period, then the time period can further be extended for another 30 
days, not exceeding 90 days in total. As mentioned previously, a terror investigation must 
be completed within 30 days.751 If the anti­terror laws of Pakistan expressly provide to 
                                                          
746 Ibid., para 3.2 
747 Ibid., para 9.8 and 9.9 
748 Otabek Akhadov v Krygyzstan, 29 April 2011 CCPR/C/101/D/1503/2006 para 2.1 and 2.2 
749 Ibid., para 7.4 
750 Anti­Terrorism Act 1997, Section 21E, available at 
http://www.molaw.gov.pk/gop/index.php?q=aHR0cDovLzE5Mi4xNjguNzAuMTM2L21vbGF3L3VzZX
JmaWxlczEvZmlsZS9BbnRpLVRlcnJvcmlzbSUyMEFjdC5wZGY%3D last accessed on 02 March 2016. 
751 Anti­Terrorism Act 1997, Section 19 (1); available at 
http://www.molaw.gov.pk/gop/index.php?q=aHR0cDovLzE5Mi4xNjguNzAuMTM2L21vbGF3L3VzZX
JmaWxlczEvZmlsZS9BbnRpLVRlcnJvcmlzbSUyMEFjdC5wZGY%3D  
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complete the investigation in 30 days then the total period of 90 days does not make any 
sense. This means the total period of 90 days is unreasonable. In addition, scholars such 
as Greer, Dickson and Walker also think that 90 days total period of pre­charge detention 
is violative of Article 9 of the ICCPR. Greer is very confident in saying that 28­days’ pre­
charge detention is in violation of international human rights laws.752 Dickson has tried 
very hard to defend 28­days’ period, which in his opinion will not breach international 
human rights law; however, he clearly admits that a 90­day period in reference to Article 
9 ICCPR is the violation of liberty rights.753 Similarly, Walker strongly believes that a 
90­day period will be in contravention of the safeguards mentioned in Article 9 of the 
ICCPR.754 Although these writers evaluate the detention powers in the research settings 
of the UK. They do so in light of Article 9 of the ICCPR, to which Pakistan is also a state 
party. Due to the universal nature of human rights, the number of pre­charge detention 
days should be the same for all states, if not at the very least similar. Therefore, the 90­
day pre­charge detention period is contrary to accepted international human rights law 
and principles.  
Pakistan has submitted its initial reports with the Human Rights Committee, 
wherein the country assures the Committee about its firm resolve to the protection and 
promotion of human rights as enshrined in the ICCPR.755 It also specifically refers to the 
safeguards in Article 9 of the ICCPR and reaffirms that the country’s constitution prevents 
‘the exercise of state/governmental power to infringe upon the liberty of not only citizens 
but also anyone else lawfully present within Pakistan.’756 The country also mentions the 
                                                          
752 Greer, S. (2008) “Human Rights and the Struggle Against Terrorism in the United Kingdom”, 
European Human Rights Law Review, EHRLR 163 – 172. 
753 Dickson, B. (2009) “Article 5 of the ECHR and 28­day Pre­charge Detention of Terrorist Suspects”, 
Queen’s University Belfast. NILQ 60(2): 231­244. 
754 Walker, C. (2009) Blackstone’s Guide to the Anti­Terrorism Legislation 2nd ed. New York: Oxford 
University Press. p. 163 
755 Initial Report of Pakistan (November 2015), para 5, available at https://documents­dds­
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G15/267/96/PDF/G1526796.pdf?OpenElement last accessed 14 March 
2016. 
756 Ibid., para 96 
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pre­charge detention in its Anti­Terrorism Act 1997 in its reports; however, it does not 
say anything about the detention total period thereunder.757 It will be interesting to see 
the ‘general observations’ of the Committee on Pakistan’s pre­charge detention period 
and the country’s response thereof. It is arguable that the country will not be able to 
defend the 90­day pre­charge detention. What should be reasonable for Pakistan in this 
regard and what safeguards should the country put in place so long as a suspected terrorist 
remains in police custody will form part of the last chapter of this research project. But 
for now, the assessment of the 90­day pre­charge detention period in Pakistan suggests 
that it is not in accordance with the human rights law and principles. Longer detention 
periods, as mentioned before, are favoured in more conservative approaches to security 
and the 90­day period in Pakistan is a strong evidence that the country follows the same 
approach in its legal response to terrorism. In this case, the 90­day pre­charge detention 
period definitely violates individual human rights. The 90­day period is based on 
Pakistan’s apprehension and fears, the application of which will ultimately spread fears 
among citizens (i.e., Zedner’s security cost).   
Some followers of conservative approaches to security in Pakistan will argue that 
90­days is compatible with Article 10(2) of the Pakistan constitution because there is no 
express constitutional time limit on the pre­charge detention period. The followers will 
further support this owing to the terrorist threats in the country. So far, more than 60 
thousand people have died in various terrorist attacks in Pakistan.758 The toll is high and, 
therefore, the conservative support to retain the current 90­day detention period 
apparently seems just. 
The first argument (support for the compatibility of 90 days in the absence of 
express constitutional time limit) is based on the ‘principle of legality’. According to this 
                                                          
757 Ibid., para 99 
758 South Asia Terrorism Portal. March, 2017. Fatalities in terrorist violence in Pakistan, 2003­2017. 
Available at http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/database/casualties.htm , last accessed on 
08 March 2017. 
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principle, “unless the parliament makes unmistakably clear its intention to abrogate or 
suspend a fundamental freedom, the courts will not construe a statute having that 
operation.”759 In cases of arrest and detention, a country must comply with its laws.760 In 
the eyes of the Human Rights Committee, the principle of legality ‘is violated if an 
individual is arrested or detained on grounds which are not clearly established in domestic 
legislation.’761 In other words, if a state law, governing the arrest and detention of 
suspected terrorists, is fulfilling the requirements of its constitution, then it does not 
violate the principle of legality. This principle also puts a restriction on states, including 
Pakistan, not to make any law which is expressly against the fundamental rights 
mentioned in its constitution.762 There are two important safeguards in Article 10(2): first, 
to produce a detained person within 24 hours before a magistrate and, second, to request 
a warrant of further detention through court. Both of these safeguards are expressly 
guaranteed in the anti­terror laws of Pakistan.763 Given that there is no constitutional limit 
fixed in the country for the total period of the detention, Pakistan does not violate the 
principle of legality by keeping the current detention period as long as it recognises the 
two constitutional safeguards in its anti­terrorism laws. Here a full advantage can be taken 
by fixing the pre­charge detention period as high as 90 days in total. In other words, if a 
person is arrested in Pakistan on account of terror charges, then they can be kept in police 
custody for 90 days in total without being formally charged.   
                                                          
759 Meagher, D. (2013) “The Common Law Principle of Legality”, Alternative Law Journal 38:4 p. 209 
760 Macken, C. (2011) Counter­terrorism and the Detention of Suspected Terrorists: Preventive Detention 
and international Human Rights Law, New York: Routledge pp. 39 & 42. 
761 UN Document: Human Rights in the Administration of Justice: A Manual on Human Rights for 
Judges, Prosecutors and Lawyers, Chapter 5: Human Rights and Arrest, Pre­trial Detention and 
Administrative Detention, available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/training9chapter5en.pdf p. 165 
762 The Constitution of Pakistan, Article 8 available at 
http://www.pakistani.org/pakistan/constitution/part2.ch1.html  
763 The Anti­Terrorism Act 1997 of Pakistan, Section 21 E (1). Available at 
http://www.molaw.gov.pk/gop/index.php?q=aHR0cDovLzE5Mi4xNjguNzAuMTM2L21vbGF3L3VzZX
JmaWxlczEvZmlsZS9BbnRpLVRlcnJvcmlzbSUyMEFjdC5wZGY%3D  last accessed on 15 March 2014 
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One has to counter­argue and ask if it is reasonable to fix the detention period as 
high as one can as long as constitutional requirements are fulfilled? In other words, is it 
just to keep someone in police custody without charge for 90 days? The principle of 
legality seems narrow, even though it is a liberal concept. Perhaps, the liberal critique of 
the conservative approaches to security reflecting human rights norms persuades us to be 
more liberal when civil liberties are threatened and asks us to be more reasonable. Thus, 
should the ‘reasonable’ period for the pre­charge detention be fixed? The principle of 
justice or reasonableness is broader than the principle of legality and it imposes a higher 
standard.764 Reasonableness is a more liberal value that is used “as an antidote to coercive 
decisions and an important guarantee of liberty and equality.”765 Its function is to increase 
legal certainty.766 Zorzetto explains ‘reasonableness’ by describing its corresponding 
negative meaning; that is, ‘unreasonableness’. Anything is unreasonable if it is senseless, 
based on unfairness, or lacks sympathy.767  
The principle of legality is satisfied when any procedural safeguards are fulfilled; 
however, this is not the case with the principle of justice or reasonableness. The principle 
of reasonableness goes into the substantive part of any legal provision in question and 
takes its objective assessment.768 It is an inner feature of law and it is an important part 
of the concept of law.769 The principle is also read and applied in ‘context’, extending not 
only in vertical but also in horizontal dimensions.770 In other words, the principle of 
reasonableness, in this particular case, simply questions what the purpose of the pre­
                                                          
764 Macken, C. (2011) Counter­terrorism and the Detention of Suspected Terrorists: Preventive Detention 
and international Human Rights Law, New York: Routledge pp. 40 & 41. 
765 Zorzetto, S. (2015) “Reasonableness”, The Italian Law Journal, Vol. 1 No. 1 pp. 113 and 114 
766 Ibid., p. 130 
767 Ibid., p. 114 
768 Macken, C. (2011) Counter­terrorism and the Detention of Suspected Terrorists: Preventive Detention 
and international Human Rights Law, New York: Routledge pp. 40 & 41. 
769 Zorzetto, S. (2015) “Reasonableness”, The Italian Law Journal, Vol. 1 No. 1 pp. 124 
770 Hickman, T.R. (2004) “The Reasonableness Principle: Reassessing Its Place in the Public Sphere”, 
Cambridge Law Journal 63 (1) p. 198. 
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charge detention is.771 The purpose of pre­charge detention is to determine either to bring 
a criminal charge or to set free any person arrested on reasonable suspicion of committing 
an offence. As mentioned in Chapter One, there is no third outcome in pre­charge terror 
detention. In fact, detention aims to ‘freeze time’ to facilitate investigation to decide how 
weak or strong that reasonable suspicion is.772 In case the reasonable suspicion fails to 
turn into a ‘concrete suspicion’, the arrested person is released; otherwise, a charge is 
framed against him or her.773  
The principle of reasonableness is deep rooted774 in constitutional systems.775 The 
constitution of Pakistan categorically recognises the principle of reasonableness, justice 
and fairness. For example, Article 10A clearly recognises the right to fair trial and due 
process.776 The principle of reasonableness has been recognised in its various articles 
pertaining to freedom of movement, freedom of assembly, freedom of association, 
freedom of speech, freedom to acquire property and right to information.777 It will be apt 
to apply the principle of reasonableness as part of a liberal approach to security to assess 
the 90­day pre­charge detention period in Pakistan’s anti­terror laws. In particular, why 
should one not do this when the period of pre­charge detention impacts on the right to fair 
trial and due process?  
Next, Pakistan’s ordinary criminal law on the total period of pre­charge detention 
the principle of reasonableness therein will be analysed. According to the ordinary 
criminal law of Pakistan, the total period of pre­charge detention shall not exceed 15 
days.778 Once a person is arrested, he/she should be brought before a court without 
                                                          
771 Macken, C. (2011) Counter­terrorism and the Detention of Suspected Terrorists: Preventive Detention 
and international Human Rights Law, New York: Routledge pp. 40 & 41. 
772 Ibid., p. 138 ­ 140 
773 Ibid. 
774 Hickman, T.R. (2004) “The Reasonableness Principle: Reassessing Its Place in the Public Sphere”, 
Cambridge Law Journal 63 (1) p. 198. 
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776 The Constitution of Pakistan, available at 
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unnecessary delay.779 Such person must be produced within 24 hours of his/her arrest.780 
If an investigation cannot be completed in 24 hours, a magistrate can keep an accused 
person in police custody for the shortest possible period at a time but not exceeding 15 
days as a whole.781 An investigating officer must submit his/her report, without 
unnecessary delay, within 14 days of the arrest.782 A total of 15 days’ total period of pre­
charge detention in ordinary crimes seems high and unreasonable. However, it is worth 
mentioning that the said provision came into force in 1898.783 It was perhaps reasonable 
at that time to give an accused in police custody for that long to complete an investigation. 
In earlier times, transport and communication were slow, causing delays in investigation. 
There were no computers and the whole investigation was manually documented. 
However, in the modern world, due to advances in science and technology, 15 days’ 
period for pre­charge detention, especially in ordinary offences, seems high. This is an 
interesting question for new research, which could assess the pre­charge detention 
duration in the light of the right to liberty in Pakistan. What was reasonable at the time 
that the law was passed is reflected in the then ordinary criminal law, although the 15 
days’ period has been in force and unaltered since 1898. The ordinary criminal laws of 
Pakistan emphasise avoiding unnecessary delays and keeping the split period of pre­
charge detention to the minimum, thus recognising the principle of reasonableness. 
It is apt to say that the total period of the pre­charge terror detention must be 
reasonable to complete a terrorism investigation. Law enforcement agencies, following 
conservative approaches to security, often claim longer periods for detention due to 
difficulties in terrorism investigations.784 There is also the possibility to get even more 
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evidence during a longer detention period but, following this logic, the period of pre­
charge detention should be unlimited! The purpose of pre­charge detention is to bring 
criminal charges or to set free an arrested person for which we ‘freeze time’. The period 
must make sense and be fair. Previous research has found that a terrorism investigation 
can be completed within 14 days.785 Consequently, any time period beyond 14 days is 
unreasonable because we cannot freeze time for months. If this is the case, then the 90­
day period is undesirably arbitrary: “This means that a law that turns out to be 
unreasonable is invalid and cannot be binding.”786 This is the reason why Hussain 
declared the 60­day pre­charge detention period in the Protection of Pakistan Act 2014 as 
ultra vires of the Pakistani constitution.787 Having said that, how then can a 90­day 
detention period in the Anti­Terrorism Act 1997 of Pakistan be compatible with the right 
to liberty and safeguards as entrenched in Articles 9 and 10 of the country’s constitution? 
In short, Pakistan will not be able to pass the test of reasonableness on the 90­day period 
of the pre­charge detention in terrorism cases. The UN Committee Against Torture has 
recently objected the 90­day period of Pakistan’s pre­charge detention.788 However, if 
Pakistan still persists in keeping the same period of detention, then the this will be in clear 
violation of her domestic as well as international human rights obligations, undermining 
the individual human rights of its own citizens.  
The second argument—support for 90 days’ total pre­charge detention period in 
Pakistan because more than 60 thousand people have died in the country in various 
terrorist attacks—relates to the principle of proportionality. This principle has three 
essentials: 
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1. It identifies a logical template of questions to be addressed. 
2. It provides for an intensive review by the courts as to the way in which those 
questions are to be asked and answered. 
3. It involves placing upon the public authority an important onus, of satisfying 
itself and the court that there are proper answers.789 
 
The principle of proportionality in the eyes of the UN Human Rights Committee means 
a law or action which is appropriate, less intrusive and, ‘proportionate to the interest to 
be protected.’790 The test of proportionality applies to the two opposing needs of society—
security and liberty.791 The test focuses on four questions in this regard:792 first, whether 
or not a terrorist threat is clear and present for intervention; second, whether or not 
security laws are fit to deal with the threat; third, whether or not there are sufficient 
safeguards protecting civil rights; and finally, whether or not the laws will strike a proper 
balance between the level of the threat and liberty.793 Now, if we apply the test in the 
context of Pakistan, more than 60 thousands people have died so far and more will die in 
the future because the tide of terrorism has not yet subsided in the country. Hussain, like 
Posner, Ignatieff, Ackerman and Gross, acknowledges that Pakistan is faced with 
‘existential threat’ from terrorism.794 Gross says that terrorism is an existential threat and 
that he who brings in the issues of human rights violations are ‘hypocrites’.795 Pakistan’s 
counter­terrorism policy perceives terrorist threats as serious and detrimental to its 
national security. The need for greater security is reiterated in the preambles of the 
                                                          
789 Fordham, M. and Mare, T. (2001) ‘Identifying the Principles of Proportionality’, in Understanding 
Human Rights Principles edited by Jowell, J. and Cooper, J. Oxford and Oregon: Hart Publishing. P 27 ­ 
29 
790 The Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 27, para 14 and 15 available at 
http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/treatybodyexternal/TBSearch.aspx?Lang=en&TreatyID=8&DocTypeI
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University Press Pp. 77 and 78, See also Fenwick, H. (1994) Civil Liberties and Human Rights, 4th 
edition New York: Routledge­Cavendish pp. 286 
791 Walker, C. (2011) Terrorism and the law, 1st edition, New York: Oxford University Press. p. 21 
792 Ibid. 
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794 Hussain, F. (2014) “Testing the Vires of Protection of Pakistan Act (PPA), 2014 on the Touchstone of 
Constitution.” In Pakistan Journal of Criminology, Vol. 6 No. 2 pp. 161 – 170, see page 162 available at 
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March 2016 
795 Gross, O. (2003) “Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crisis Always be Constitutional”, 
The Yale Law Journal, vol. 112:1011 p. 1044 ­ 1045 
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Protection of Pakistan Act 2014,796 the Pakistan Army (Amendment) Act 2015,797 and in 
the Constitution (21st Amendment) 2015 Act798 of the country. Therefore, Pakistan 
potentially fears for national security by allowing 90 days of total time for the pre­charge 
detention in her criminal justice system. The fear level is such that the country does not 
even tolerate a shorter possible period (a safeguard) of the detention by setting 15 days as 
the minimum benchmark time period.799 All these justifications can be presented through 
an opposing principle to the principle of proportionality called ‘margin of 
appreciation’.800 Margin of appreciation is also known as ‘room for manoeuvre’, 
‘breathing space’, or ‘elbow room’.801 It allows some freedom to states to justify their 
national laws or domestic actions questioned under the principle of proportionality. Thus, 
Pakistan can potentially put forward these justifications in support of the 90­day pre­
charge detention period.    
There is no doubt that terrorism has killed many people in Pakistan. The country 
has responded in multiple ways to defeat terrorism. Owing to the threat of terrorism and, 
as explained before, Pakistan allows indefinite detention of terrorist suspects, following 
the executive paradigm of terrorism. The country’s executive power is also empowered 
to give preventive detention to those posing real threats to the state. In the presence of 
stringent measures, such as indefinite and preventive detention for two years,802 the power 
                                                          
796 Protection of Pakistan Act 2014, available at 
http://www.na.gov.pk/uploads/documents/1409034186_281.pdf last accessed 02 March 2016. 
797 Pakistan Army (Amendment) Act 2015, available at 
http://www.molaw.gov.pk/gop/index.php?q=aHR0cDovLzE5Mi4xNjguNzAuMTM2L21vbGF3L3VzZX
JmaWxlczEvZmlsZS9QYWtpc3RhbiUyMEFybXklMjAoQW1lbmRtZW50KSUyMEFjdCwlMjAyMDE
1LnBkZg%3D%3D  last accessed 02 March 2016 
798 Constitution (21st Amendment) Act 2015, available at 
http://www.pakistani.org/pakistan/constitution/amendments/21amendment.html last accessed on 02 
March 2016 
799 Anti­Terrorism Act 1997, Section 21E, available at 
http://www.molaw.gov.pk/gop/index.php?q=aHR0cDovLzE5Mi4xNjguNzAuMTM2L21vbGF3L3VzZX
JmaWxlczEvZmlsZS9BbnRpLVRlcnJvcmlzbSUyMEFjdC5wZGY%3D last accessed on 02 March 2016. 
800 Fordham, M. and Mare, T. (2001) ‘Identifying the Principles of Proportionality’, in Understanding 
Human Rights Principles edited by Jowell, J. and Cooper, J. Oxford and Oregon: Hart Publishing. P 27 ­ 
29 
801 Stacy, H. M. (2009) Human Rights for the 21st Century, California: Stanford University Press. Pp. 134 
­ 138 
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to detain terror suspects for 90 days during the pre­charge detention does not seem 
convincing or proportionate. This is a response to terrorism through the country’s 
criminal justice system and which must be differentiated from the war and executive 
conception of terrorism. If the 90­day period of the pre­charge detention is supported on 
the pretext to avert any imminent terrorist threat, then why not to use indefinite or 
preventive detentions for this purpose? The purpose of pre­charge detention is either to 
bring criminal charge or set free a suspected terrorist. There is no third outcome in the 
legal nature of pre­charge detention. Owing to the principle of proportionality, too much 
leverage goes in favour of security, undermining the right to liberty that is entrenched and 
safeguarded in Articles 9 and 10 of Pakistan’s constitution. The onus is on Pakistan to 
prove that its response is proportionate to the threat of terrorism. However, it is highly 
likely that the test of proportionality in the case of Pakistan will fail if indefinite and 
preventive detentions continue to make part of the country’s anti­terrorism laws—which 
is a disproportionate response. It is ‘certain’ that the test of proportionality will fail if the 
90­day pre­charge detention period continues to remain in force—which is a second 
disproportionate measure. Not only this but fixing the upper and lower limits of the 
detention periods (90 and 15 days, respectively) also acts as a vacuum to suffocate the 
right to liberty of a suspected terrorist in Pakistan—which is a third disproportionate 
measure. 
There can be a third argument in support of the 90­days pre­charge detention in 
the context of Pakistan which might say that Pakistan’s fear of terrorism is genuine and 
that the country needs to keep the period of detention that long. Fear or anxiety is a useful 
element because it alerts governmental machinery for timely actions to ‘do something’ 
about an imminent and present danger from terrorism.803 Therefore, a wise to approach 
                                                          
803 Posner, E. and Vermuele, A. (2007) Terror in the Balance: Security, Liberty and the Courts. New 
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Page 192 of 272 
 
to the threat of terrorism is to introduce laws providing longer pre­charge detention 
period. Posner and Vermeule express the argument in these words: 
First, fear enhance the senses: the person who feels fear is attuned to the threat 
and alert to every nuance of the environment. Second, fear provides motivation. 
Where a fully rational person spends time deliberating, the fearful person acts 
quickly. Both of these factors suggest that fear can play a constructive role during 
emergencies.804 
 
This argument can be rebutted. There are many criticisms against this from several 
liberals. Luban says that governments, when acting under the influence of fear from 
terrorism, do not deliberate properly on the information that they receive.805 Londras says 
that fear­influenced decisions are highly likely to put at risk many individual rights during 
emergencies.806 Cole says that history shows a pattern in terrorism­related matters, as 
governments often act on their assumed fears. They often expand their powers through 
policies, laws and counter­terroristic operations resulting in disproportionate violations 
of human rights.807 Lindner says, ‘Intense fear causes “tunnel vision”, reducing the range 
of one’s perceptions, thoughts and choices, putting us in danger of making suboptimal 
decisions.’808   
The 90­day pre­charge detention period in Pakistan should also be assessed owing 
to its utility or productivity. Utilitarianism suggests that rights have utilities and that any 
laws putting any restrictions on rights should have greater utility.809 A utilitarian 
approach, in its simplest form, refers to the average success of any law or action.810 
Perhaps, Pakistan thinks that longer detention would make a conviction of suspected 
                                                          
804 Ibid. 
805 Luban, D. (2005) Eight Fallacies about Liberty and Security in Human Rights in the ‘War on Terror’ 
edited by Wilson, R.A. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
806 Londras, de F. (2011) Detention in the ‘War on Terror’: Can Human Rights Fight Back? Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. p. 32 
807 Cole, D. (2003) “The New McCarthyism: Repeating History in the War on Terrorism”, 38 Harvard 
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Oxford University Press. pp. 153 ­ 167 
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terrorist more certain by extracting more credible evidence? It is argued that a longer 
detention period is required for police to collect and analyse intercept evidence, translate 
messages from various languages turning a reasonable suspicion into a concrete one for 
onward successful prosecution.811 However, this is not the case in Pakistan: “The overall 
conviction rate in Pakistan in terrorism cases stood at 5%.”812 Hussain refers to the 
conviction rates in Pakistan as ‘abysmally low’.813 According to a more recent survey, 
the conviction rate in Pakistan in terrorism cases is less than 10%.814 A utilitarian 
approach of Pakistan to curb the liberty of terror suspects for 90 days does not reflect a 
greater utility—a rate of successful prosecution. If this is the case, then how can the 90­
day detention period in Pakistan be justified with such a low conviction rate?   
It would have been very useful to have had access to the terror detainees’ data in 
Pakistan and to have critically analysed the utility of the country’s adherence to the 90­
day pre­charge detention. The data could perhaps reveal the percentage figures of those 
terror detainees who had been charged in a week, two weeks, three weeks, a month, two 
months, or three months. The Pakistan Bureau of Statistics maintains data on all important 
heads, including data on crimes in the country since 1950.815 The crime data spreads over 
all provinces and different offence heads, however, there is nothing in the data related to 
the terror detainees to reveal when they are arrested and when charges are brought against 
                                                          
811 Walker, C. (2009) Blackstone’s Guide to the Anti­Terrorism Legislation 2nd ed. New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
812 Fasihuddin (2012) “Terrorism Investigation in Pakistan: Perceptions and Realities of Frontline Police”, 
Pakistan Journal of Criminology, Vol. 3, No. 3 pp. 51 – 78. Note, Pakistan Bureau of Statistics and Police 
department do not publish official conviction rates in terrorism cases, 
http://www.pbs.gov.pk/sites/default/files//tables/Crimes%20%28website%29.pdf ; 
http://kppolice.gov.pk/crime/year2015.php  
813 Hussain, F. (2014) Testing the Vires of Protection of Pakistan Act (PPA), 2014 on the Touchstone of 
Constitution. In Pakistan Journal of Criminology, Vol. 6 No. 2 pp. 161 – 170, see page 162 available at 
http://www.pakistansocietyofcriminology.com/publications/2015_03_28_3310.pdf last accessed 01 
March 2016 
814 Shah, S. (12 March 2016) “Poor Prosecution Plays Havoc With Judicial System”, The News 
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judicial­system last accessed 13 March 2016 
815 Pakistan Bureau of Statistics, Government of Pakistan, available at 
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them.816 Likewise, there is National Counter­terrorism Authority (hereafter, NACTA) in 
the country, functional since 2013, to receive and collect terrorism­related data for 
analysis and policy making to combat terrorism and extremism.817 The NACTA’s general 
data showing a decline in terrorism in the country together with a comparative analysis 
of the terror incidents in the world is placed on their website.818 NACTA also maintains 
a National Counter­terrorism Database on the terror detainees and convicted terrorists; 
however, the data is only shared among the relevant government departments through a 
virtual private network.819 Even police in the country do not display any data on terror 
detainees to have shown when are the detainees arrested and charged with a terror 
offence.820 However, they do maintain data on ordinary crimes (i.e. how many are arrested 
and convicted in various offence heads).821 Similarly, there is a Federal Judicial Academy 
of Pakistan; however, the academy does not provide data related to the detention of terror 
suspects or to their treatment.822 In addition, there is a Pakistan Society of Criminology, 
researching ordinary and special crimes; however, there is no data on the terror detainees 
on their website.823 Furthermore, the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (hereafter, 
HRCP) maintains their statistics on the prison conditions in the country, although the 
statistics are silent about giving any information on the dates of arrest and charge of the 
terror detainees, which could have helped in assessing the productivity of the 90­day 
terror detention in Pakistan.824 Finally, there is another research society in the country 
                                                          
816 Ibid., http://www.pbs.gov.pk/sites/default/files//tables/19.3.pdf last accessed 04 June 2018. 
817 National Counter Terrorism Authority Pakistan (NACTA), available at https://nacta.gov.pk/mandate/ 
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called  Research Society of International Law which publishes very informative articles 
and reports, which have also been cited several times inside this research at variations.825 
The society refers to terror incidents in the country, showing a decline in the trend; 
however, there is nothing on the statistics related to the arrest and charge of the terror 
detainees.826 In the absence of any such data showing the date and time of arrest and 
charge of the terror detainees in Pakistan, this research will make several 
recommendations in the last chapter to help in analysing the productivity of the 90­day 
pre­charge terror detention in Pakistan. 
The next possible utility for Pakistan to support its current period of pre­charge 
detention is to use the period for ‘sorting out’ terror detainees. Pakistan classifies terror 
detainees into three different categories—white, grey and black.827 The country, 
therefore, needs more time to sort them out to assign them, after rigorous scrutiny, into 
their respective statuses.828 Terror detainees classified as ‘white’ pose ‘little or no threat’ 
to the security of Pakistan.829 They are either immediately released or charged with a 
‘minor’ terror offence.830 The ‘grey’ terror detainees are ‘strongly suspected of posing a 
threat’ to the national security of Pakistan.831 They perform different roles, such as, 
showing active sympathy for known terrorists, working in their subordination, carry out 
terrorist activities as foot soldiers, or facilitating in various ways terrorist groups.832 They 
are thoroughly interrogated to further determine their status or to charge them with the 
offence of terrorism and thus transfer them to the criminal justice system of the country.833 
The last category, black terror detainees, are leaders or active members of a wide terrorist 
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network often having ties with other international terrorist groups. They are the ‘real 
threat’ to the security of Pakistan and, therefore, they are kept under the Pakistani military 
supervision for indefinite period.834 Is there any space or third outcome in the legal nature 
of the pre­charge detention to allow the sorting out of terror detainees during the period? 
Chapter One clearly enumerated that the legal nature of pre­charge detention will always 
lead into two different outcomes—release or charge the detainee. There is no third 
outcome. If Pakistan uses the 90­day pre­charge detention to sort terror detainees out in 
the period is trying to introduce a third outcome of the pre­charge detention. The act is 
contrary ab initio to the legal nature of the pre­charge terror detention. In addition, there 
hardly seems any greater utility of the sorting out of terror detainees, particularly during 
pre­charge terror detention. The ‘white’ category of terror suspects are potentially 
innocent and their liberty is at stake. They are the ones who pay the total security cost. 
Even if the suspects in the ‘white’ category are not innocent, the probability that the ‘grey’ 
category—being the subject of the criminal justice system—comes to ‘one­third’ only, 
which does not satisfy the ‘greater utility’ argument of the utilitarian approach for the 
successful prosecution of terrorists in Pakistan. For the country to satisfy the greater 
utility argument, the probability that the suspects in the grey category would successfully 
be charged and prosecuted should be two­thirds or greater. 
Lastly, on the productivity of the 90­day pre­charge terror detention in Pakistan, 
the prolonged period increases the number of detainees leading to the problem of 
overcrowded detention centres in the country. The overcrowded detention centres in 
Pakistan will be further elaborated upon in the last section of this part. There are more 
than 50,000 terror detainees in various detention centres in the country.835 The increase 
in number has a direct relationship with the 90­day pre­charge detention. Apart from the 
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detention centre being overcrowded, the country will find it hard to provide housing and 
other facilities, which might incur huge costs. It would have been very interesting to have 
found out the annual total cost of all the terror detainees in the country. Unfortunately, 
there is hardly any evidence on the management and housing of the terror detainees in the 
country.  
To conclude on the assessment of Pakistan’s pre­charge detention, the 90­day time 
frame surely fails all three tests—reasonableness, proportionality and productivity. The 
period fails to seem reasonable in light of the country’s fundamental rights and 
international human rights obligations. It is neither proportionate nor productive in 
combating terrorist threats or successfully prosecuting terror suspects owing to the 
country’s domestic and international human rights obligations. Pakistan fulfils its human 
rights obligations on the prompt production of a terror detainee before a court within 24 
hours. However, the country seemingly fails by allowing to remand a terror suspect, at a 
time, in police custody for 30 days.  
 
5.2.1.B. The Period of Pre-charge Detention in Practice 
The Human Rights Commission of Pakistan strongly believes that the 90­day pre­
charge detention period clearly violates the human rights standards in Pakistan.836 It also 
reports that suspects are arrested on the basis of mere suspicion and they are kept in police 
custody ‘for varying lengths and longer detention’ periods than what is permitted by the 
law.837 As explained previously, there is difference between mere suspicion and 
reasonable suspicion. The former is a blind guess to make an arrest while the later 
                                                          
836 Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, State of Human Rights in 2015, Chapter II Enforcement of 
Law, p. 6 & 12, available at http://hrcp­web.org/hrcpweb/hrcp­annual­report­2015/  
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violated the principles of human rights.”   
837 Ibid. 
Page 198 of 272 
 
presupposes certain facts and information gathered from intelligence to make an objective 
judgement and then proceed with the arrest. Reasonable suspicion is an important liberal 
safeguard against arbitrary detention. Pakistani anti­terror laws here overlook this liberal 
attribute and adopt extreme conservative security attitudes. David Cole criticises and 
terms such detention as ‘suspicionless detention’. The Commission is also worried about 
the lack of transparency in the number of suspects arrested, detained or released.838 The 
law authorising 90­day pre­charge detention, as assessed before in the context of Pakistan, 
fails the test of reasonableness. Police excesses in this regard prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the 90­day pre­charge detention period is not only unreasonable in law but also 
in action. The police misuse their authority and further prolong the unreasonable period 
of 90 days permitted in law.  
Police excesses have also been reported where suspects are not produced before 
any court in accordance with the law. The Anti­Terrorism Act 1997 in Pakistan clearly 
recognises the principle of promptness and it states that an arrested person must be 
produced before a court within 24 hours. Although the prompt production of a terror 
suspect within 24 hours in law before a court is one of the most fascinating provisions of 
all in the anti­terror laws of Pakistan, it is not so in action or practice. The Human Rights 
Commission of Pakistan interviewed 63 children in police custody under ordinary crimes 
and reported that the principle of promptness was not followed in any of these cases. 
Nearly all of the interviewees not only complained of custodial torture but also disclosed 
that they were kept in police custody for more than 24 hours after the arrest.839 The reason 
why these detainees were not usually produced promptly before a court was that the police 
had tortured them and they were waiting for the torture marks to disappear before they 
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could be produced before a court.840 The situation in terror­related arrests will, of course, 
be worse than this because it is a question of national security. Unfortunately, access to 
terror detainees has remained one of the vital impediments in empirical research on 
terrorism around the world. 
The Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) in all of its annual reports 
(2009–2015) condemns instances of ‘arbitrary detention’ in the country. It seems as if 
arbitrary detention is endemic in Pakistan. This may be due to what the law does in 
practice. The Commission reports that:  
HRCP noted with deep concern credible reports of a large number of people in 
custody of the security forces … who had not been produced in court. Many such 
detainees were relatives of suspected militants, who had apparently been taken 
into custody to force the militants to surrender.841   
 
The Human Rights Committee strongly thinks of such detention as an example of 
‘egregious arbitrary detention’.842 
Human Rights Watch strongly believes that there is ‘public fear of the police’ in 
Pakistan.843 This organisation has recently interviewed more than 30 police officers in the 
country on police abuses and excesses:  
People fear the police because a lot of police officers are badly behaved …many 
[police officers] believe that if we don’t frighten or overpower people they will 
not accept our authority or respect us. The police are also convinced of this.844  
 
The public fear of the police, which is a wider translation of fear in action, is a response 
to the badly failed police complaint system in Pakistan.845 In this situation, civil liberties 
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should be protected when people are afraid of or hesitant to approach to or complain 
against police excesses. This is how people lose faith in their institutions.  
To conclude, Pakistan adopts a dominant conservative security attitude on the 
period of pre­charge detention in law and practice. The country translates Ackerman’s 
emergency constitution in its laws and actions, which provides lengthy detentions. 
Pakistan acts on Posner’s suggestion that the constitution is not a suicide pact and it is 
more important to save people from terrorism. In addition, it is lawful to treat terror 
detainees as unlawful combatants and keep them in long detention to get information from 
and thwart future terror attacks. Pakistan seems to fail its domestic and international 
human rights obligations because its period of pre­charge detention is 90 days, which is 
unreasonable in the eyes of human rights law. Consequently, this thesis first argues that, 
in the absence of an in­depth evaluation on the treatment of terror detainees during pre­
charge detention, Pakistan continues to cross boundaries of its legal response to terrorism 
by reflecting in its anti­terror laws the war or executive paradigm of terrorism.   
 
5.2.2.A. Police Interrogation and Questioning: Law and Assessment 
The questioning of terror suspects in Pakistan is governed by the ATA 1997. An 
investigation is conducted by the Joint Investigation Team.846 There are five officers in 
the team—one from the police and four from the military.847 The Joint Investigation Team 
have 30 days to complete their investigation before making a decision to either release or 
charge the suspects.848 Terrorist investigations can also be made by any police officer 
under ATA 1997.849 As to the methods and procedures of questioning the accused, there 
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are no provisions governing the duration of questioning in any of the anti­terror legislation 
of Pakistan. So, how does Pakistan regulate police interrogations in terrorism cases? 
 According to the ordinary criminal laws of Pakistan, a police investigation refers 
to the collection of evidence by a police officer.850 An investigation under the anti­terror 
laws of the country means a ‘terrorist investigation’ conducted in acts of terrorism.851 
Pakistan’s anti­terror laws and its ordinary criminal laws are silent about how a suspected 
terrorist is questioned and for what duration he/she is kept under interrogation to collect 
evidence. Although the anti­terror laws refer to a time period, they ignore the duration of 
questioning or interrogation of a suspected terrorist. According to the Anti­Terrorism Act 
1997, a terrorist investigation must be completed within 30 days of the arrest. If such 
investigation cannot be completed within the period, then within three days an interim 
police report must be submitted to the court.852 The Act does mention investigation and 
it does not shed any light on the duration of the questioning; rather, it lays down other 
police powers, such as cordoning the area, entering and searching any area, restricting 
individuals and vehicles in the area, taking possession of property recovered from the 
area, and so on.853 Similarly, the Protection of Pakistan Act 2014, which is no longer in 
force, mentioned the total period of pre­charge detention but it did not lay down any 
provision regulating the duration of a suspected terrorist interrogation.854 Likewise, 
although the Investigation for Fair Trial Act 2013 was enacted ‘to prevent the law 
enforcement and intelligence agencies from using their powers arbitrarily’,855 the Act is 
silent about the duration. 
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What then about the duration of questioning an ordinary suspect to get an 
estimation of the duration for questioning a suspected terrorist? The Anti­Terrorism Act 
1997 also expressly authorises the police to use its ordinary criminal law powers to 
investigate terrorism cases.856 Pakistan also confirms this in its initial reports submitted 
to the Human Rights Committee.857 So, according to the ordinary criminal procedural 
laws, a police officer must write the time at which he or she commences and closes his or 
her investigation on a daily basis.858 The law does not state how long a suspect can be 
interrogated and leaves the matter at the discretion of the investigating officer. However, 
the police laws of Pakistan expressly stipulate to draft a code of conduct regulating police 
powers in the country in relation to ‘detention, treatment and questioning of persons by 
police officers.’859 The Code of Conduct embarks upon police honesty and integrity, 
fairness and impartiality, politeness and tolerance, use of force and confidentiality, and 
so on. However, it does not regulate the duration of police interrogation or questioning.860 
Although there is a whole chapter on investigation in the Police Rules of Pakistan, the 
duration of interrogation or questioning of a suspect is not mentioned.861  
In the absence of any legal provisions regulating the duration of police 
interrogation in Pakistan, one has to ask if the police can interrogate a terror suspect for 
an unlimited time? Obviously, this is not the case because it would be neither just or fair. 
                                                          
856 Anti­Terrorism Act 1997, Section 11 EEEE (4); available at 
http://www.molaw.gov.pk/gop/index.php?q=aHR0cDovLzE5Mi4xNjguNzAuMTM2L21vbGF3L3VzZX
JmaWxlczEvZmlsZS9BbnRpLVRlcnJvcmlzbSUyMEFjdC5wZGY%3D last accessed on 02 March 2016. 
857 Initial Report of Pakistan (November 2015), para 99, “There are special and specialized Federal and 
Provincial statutes such as Accountability laws and Anti-Terrorist laws which establish criminal offences 
in addition to the ones given in PPC. The provisions of the CRPC {Criminal Procedure Code of Pakistan) 
applicable to all criminal proceedings apply generally to these statutes as well.” Available at 
https://documents­dds­ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G15/267/96/PDF/G1526796.pdf?OpenElement last 
accessed 14 March 2016. 
858 The Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 with commentary, Lahore: PLD  Section 172, p. 254 
859 Police Order 2002, para 114 (c), available at http://punjabpolice.gov.pk/system/files/police­order­
2002­updated­version.pdf last accessed 15 March 2016 
860 Pakistan Police Code of Conduct 2002, available at http://punjabpolice.gov.pk/system/files/Code­of­
Conduct­for­Punjab­Police­Officers.pdf last accessed 15 March 2016 
861 Police Rules of Pakistan, Chapter Investigation, available at 
http://www.pakistansocietyofcriminology.com/laws/PoliceRulesVolume3.pdf last accessed 15 March 
2016 
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How then can the unlimited powers to interrogate qualify the test of reasonableness in the 
country’s constitution? How can one reconcile the unlimited powers with the verdict of 
Pakistan’s Supreme Court that a detained person enjoys all rights available to a free 
person except freedom of movement? The complete absence of the duration from the anti­
terror laws on the treatment of terror suspects needs a human rights assessment in the 
context of Pakistan to find if the country’s current position is in conformity with its human 
rights obligations in this regard.  
The Pakistani constitution embodies the right to liberty and guarantees its 
protection against any unlawful arrest and detention. Similarly, Pakistan’s Supreme Court 
believes that ‘limited liberty’ of an arrested person is ‘valuable’. The court further states 
that the government is under a ‘strict liability’ to ensure that an arrested person enjoys 
some limited liberty. In addition, the court strongly believes that when a person is 
arrested, he or she enjoys all these rights available to a free person except freedom of 
movement. Similarly, the constitution of Pakistan and the International Bill of Human 
Rights prohibit torture, cruel, inhumane and degrading treatment. This means that 
unlimited powers to question or interrogate, torture or mistreat a terror suspect would be 
in violation of Pakistan’s domestic and international human rights obligations.  
Perhaps, conservative security attitudes and support for the ticking­bomb scenario 
have affected the anti­terror laws of Pakistan and have led them not to regulate the 
duration of questioning or interrogation of a suspected terrorist. Arguably there is a 
complete absence of a case­study of the treatment of terror detainees during pre­charge 
detention in Pakistan, therefore, the country reflects a war or executive conception of 
terrorism in its legal response to terrorism by not specifically stipulating the duration of 
police interrogation session. Instead, this matter has been left to the discretion of police 
authority. Normally, a longer duration of police interrogation should result in a higher 
rate of conviction; however, this is not the case in Pakistan. As mentioned previously, the 
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terrorist conviction rate in Pakistan is recorded at less than 10%. It seems pretty evident 
that the lack of any legal provision in Pakistan’s anti­terror laws regulating the duration 
of police interrogation will fail the tests of reasonableness, proportionality and 
productivity. 
Will these tests of the lack of police interrogation duration be qualified in the 
context of international human rights obligations of the country when they impose a 
higher standard than the domestic obligations? International human rights law does not 
lay down specific durations for police interrogations. The ICCPR places a prohibition on 
arbitrary arrest and detention. All of the important human rights covenants (UDHR, 
ICCPR and UNCAT) also prohibit torture, inhumane and degrading treatment. In 
addition, states shall enact interrogation rules, instructions, methods and practices to 
avoid torture and other inhumane treatment of detainees.862 The United Nations General 
Assembly emphasises that the duration of police interrogations shall be recorded.863 
Therefore, will Pakistan be exonerated from its international human rights obligations by 
not keeping any duration for police interrogations?  
Terrorist interrogations are usually coercive and they create ‘parallel zones of 
state violence.’864 The Human Rights Committee is convinced that the risk of being 
subjected to inhumane treatment increases with the increased length of time that a suspect 
spends in detention. The risk of inhumane treatment will show increase if the 
interrogation is coercive and is conducted for an unlimited time period. On the principle 
of legality, because there is no fixed duration for police interrogations in international 
                                                          
862 United Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, available at http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CAT.aspx , article 11, last 
accessed on 15 March 2016. 
863 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 43/173 of 9 December 1988, Principle 23: Available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/ProfessionalInterest/bodyprinciples.pdf last accessed 15 March 2016. 
See also ICRC International Rules and Standards for Police, available at 
https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/icrc­002­0809.pdf last accessed on 15 March 2016. 
864 Brysk, A. (2007) “Human Rights and National Insecurity” In National Insecurity and Human Rights: 
Democracies Debate Counterterrorism, edited by Brysk, A. and Shafir, G. London: University of 
California Press, Ltd.  
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human rights law, Pakistan can perhaps avoid its international obligations. The principle 
of reasonableness suggests that one cannot interrogate a suspected terrorist for an 
unlimited period of time. Arguably, this is why the infamous interrogation techniques that 
were used at Guantanamo Bay, which permitted detainees to be interrogated for 20 hours, 
amounted to torture.865  
Pakistan might invoke the principles of necessity and proportionality to support 
its lack of rules regulating the duration of interrogation of terror suspects. Pakistan has 
been badly hit by terrorist attacks and, therefore, it might use unlimited powers to 
interrogate a terror suspect as a justification to prevent any ticking­bomb terrorist threat 
in real life. This means that Pakistan follows the war or executive paradigm of terrorism 
in its legal response to terrorism. If the duration is not expressly regulated, then this 
creates a legal lacuna, which endorses Posner’s concept of coercive interrogation and 
denies certain human rights obligations. This state of affairs supports the main research 
argument that in the absence of a case­study on the treatment of terror suspect in Pakistan, 
the country follows the war or executive models of terrorism in its justice or crime model 
to terrorism. It will be interesting to see the impact of this legal lacuna in practice or 
action.  
 
5.2.2.B. Police Interrogation and Questioning in Practice 
There are hardly any reports about the duration of police interrogation session in 
terrorism cases in Pakistan. However, many NGOs and governmental organisations have 
credible reports that suspects, particularly terror detainees, are subjected to ill­treatment, 
torture and even death during custody in Pakistan. If that is the case, then police 
interrogations might be very lengthy because torture and death during police 
                                                          
865 Nowak, M. (2006) “What Practices Constitute Torture? US and UN Standards”, Human Rights 
Quarterly, Vol. 28 No. 4 pp. 809 ­ 841 
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interrogations do require more time.866 Although torture is prohibited by the country’s 
constitution and anti­terror laws, the HRCP reports that, “Custodial torture remained one 
of the gravest and most pressing human rights issues in Pakistan.”867 In the HRCP’s 
reports between 2009 and 2015, there are many instances of custodial torture in the 
country. The Justice Project Pakistan interviewed hundreds of detainees and reports their 
custodial torture:  
The pervasiveness of police brutality and torture in Pakistan is no secret…. This 
report offers evidence, unprecedented in Pakistan in its scale and reliability…. 
The Pakistani government has failed to take effective measures to prevent police 
brutality and torture and to punish perpetrators.868  
 
Another report by the Justice Project Pakistan and Reprieve narrates a terror suspect who 
recalled his experience of torture in Pakistan: “Police tortured me to try and make me 
confess. I was hung by my hands, beaten repeatedly with batons, punched, slapped and 
kicked. They held a gun to my head and said they would kill me if I did not confess.”869 
The Asian Human Rights Commission reports that in Pakistan, confessions are 
recorded heavily on the basis of torture, which causes a miscarriage of justice. Similarly, 
Human Rights Watch reports in detail on custodial torture in the country:  
Torture and other ill-treatment of suspects in police custody is a widespread 
problem in Pakistan. Human Rights Watch discovered that such practices include 
custodial beatings, by hand or with batons and littars (strips of leather), the 
stretching and crushing of detainees’ legs with roola (metal rods), sexual 
violence, prolonged sleep deprivation, and mental torture, including forcing 
detainees to witness the torture of others.870 
 
                                                          
866 Luban, D. (2008) “Unthinking the Ticking Bomb”, Working Papers George Town University Law 
Centre. 
867 Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, State of Human Rights in 2015, Chapter II Enforcement of 
Law, p. 5 available at http://hrcp­web.org/hrcpweb/hrcp­annual­report­2015/ 
868 Justice Project Pakistan (2014) “Police as Torture”, p. 28 available at 
http://venturerepublic.net/testingserver/jpp/wp­content/uploads/2015/10/JPP­Launch­Report_031914­use­
this­to­print­JPP­version­2.pdf last accessed on 27 September 2016 
869 Justice Project Pakistan and Reprieve (2014) “Terror on Death Row”, p. 17 available at 
http://www.reprieve.org.uk/wp­content/uploads/2014/12/2014_12_18_PUB­Pakistan­Terror­Courts­
Report­JPP­and­Reprieve.pdf  
870 Human Rights Watch (2016) “This Crooked System”: Police Abuse and Reform in Pakistan, p. 4 
available at https://www.hrw.org/report/2016/09/25/crooked­system/police­abuse­and­reform­pakistan 
last accessed 27 September 2016 
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Amnesty International reports on the treatment of terror detainees in Pakistan and 
concludes that torture and other ill­treatment of terror suspects are ‘endemic’ in the 
country. Amnesty International, like many others, strongly believes that confessions are 
extracted solely through torture because the police do not know any other methods of 
investigation.871 The organisation describes the following story of a terror suspect and 
depicts how fear is translated in action during interrogations: 
Benyam Mohamed al-Habashi, an Ethiopian arrested in April 2002 at Karachi 
airport and held until mid-July in Karachi, reported that he was hung up by his 
wrists, allowed to go to the toilet only twice a day, given food only every other 
day, beaten with a leather strap and subjected to a mock execution by a guard 
holding a loaded gun to his chest. He said in his testimony, ‘I knew I was going 
to die … I looked into his eyes and saw my own fear reflected there.’872 
 
The US State Department reports that in 2015 there were more than 6,000 cases that 
involved torture in Pakistan.873 Similarly, the UK Home Office, citing various human 
rights reports, concludes that custodial torture is very common in Pakistan.874 This has 
led Reprieve to launch a project to curb the culture of torture in police stations across 
Pakistan.875  
The UN Committee Against Torture has recently expressed deep concern over the 
‘widespread’ torture in Pakistan and its criminalisation.876 The Committee also regrets 
the inadequate complaint system against police officers involved in torture.877 The 
                                                          
871 Amnesty International (2006) “Pakistan: Human rights ignored in the ‘war on terror’”, available at 
https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/asa33/036/2006/en/  
872 Ibid. 
873 US Department of State (2016) “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2015: Pakistan”, 
available at http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/#wrapper last accessed on 27 
September 2016 
874 Home Office (2016) Prison Conditions in Pakistan, available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/528401/PAK_Prison_cond
itions.pdf ; see also The Guardian (08 October 2010) “Stop the Torture in Pakistan’s Prisons”, available at 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/libertycentral/2010/oct/08/pakistan­torture­prison last 
accessed on 27 September 2016 
875 Reprieve (2010) “Reprieve launches investigation into systematic torture of British citizens by 
Pakistani police in Pakistan Police Torture Project”, available at 
http://www.reprieve.org.uk/press/2010_07_02_pakistan_police_torture_project/ 
876 The UN Committee Against Torture (1 June 2017) “Concluding observation on the initial report of 
Pakistan”, CAT/C/PAK/CO/1 
877 Ibid. 
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Committee also notes that there is no redress or compensation mechanism in the country 
for the torture victims.878   
The treatment during police interrogations clearly translates fear in action. The 
fear particularly spreads when custodial torture is perpetrated in the presence of other 
detainees. Most detainees have families and friends all over the country, and Pakistan is 
a very closely­knit society. So, it would not take long to spread the news of witnessed 
torture. These instances in police actions endorse Zedner’s, Luban’s and Waldron’s point 
that even though the purpose of anti­terror laws is to reassure, they instead spread fear. 
Torture is perhaps ‘endemic’ and ‘widespread’ in Pakistan because there is no law to 
regulate the duration of interrogation of suspected terrorist. 
There are reports that terror suspects are ruthlessly maimed or shot in the Half-
Fry or Full-Fry Practice.879 Those suspects who do not pose an imminent and major 
threat to the country’s security are shot in their limbs, which is usually referred to as ‘half­
fry’. Those who pose a real threat to the security of Pakistan, in the eyes of those officers 
following extreme conservative security attitudes, are subjected to fake police encounters. 
This practice is referred to as ‘full­fry’.880 One of the country’s highest­ranking police 
officers strongly advises the full­fry or extra­judicial killing of terrorists over their 
arrest.881  
Benyam Mohamed describes how police behaviour and treatment of terror 
suspects further the cause of terrorism by reflecting fear. If every year more than 6,000 
people are subjected to torture and other ill­treatment at the hands of the police in 
Pakistan, then soon fear will prevail over the entire country. The police are convinced that 
                                                          
878 Ibid. 
879 Asian Human Rights (2015) “Pakistan: From the Frying Pan, to the Fire”, available at  
http://www.humanrights.asia/resources/hrreport/hr­reports/ahrc­spr­002­2015.pdf last accessed 29 
September 2016 
880 Ibid. 
881 Hussain, S.E. “Impact of Terrorist Arrests on Terrorism: Defiance, Deterrence, or Irrelevance”, 
Pakistan Society of Criminology, available at 
http://pakistansocietyofcriminology.com/articles/ImpactofTerroristArrestsonTerrorism.pdf  p. 42 – 43 last 
accessed 29 September 2016 
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the anti­terror laws, which are meant to be for prosecuting terror suspects, reflects the war 
or executive conception of terrorism, and that any action taken in furtherance of the laws 
should be more on the war or executive model of terrorism. The police also know that 
anything done in furtherance of the purpose will not be investigated. The UN Committee 
Against Torture has raised this point in its recent Concluding Observation on Pakistan. 
Pakistan’s anti­terror laws may purposively not provide for the duration of interrogation 
sessions of suspects, licensing the police to continue with the culture of torture. In short, 
there does not exist an in­depth evaluation on the treatment of terror detainees during pre­
charge detention in Pakistan, and so the country’s legal battle against terrorism is 
modelled in a way to accommodate the war or executive model of terrorism.  
 
5.2.3.A. Internal Police Review Mechanisms: Law and Assessment 
In the internal police review mechanisms in Pakistan, there is an absolute absence 
in the anti­terror laws of the country to review the work of an investigating and a custody 
officer. The only safeguard in place is that the anti­terrorism court can refuse further 
detention if it is found that any bodily harm has been done to the accused during any 
previous interrogation.882 However, this safeguard does not come under the purview of 
an internal mechanism but is instead an external review mechanism.  
In Pakistan, there is no reviewing officer to review the powers of an investigation 
and custody officers. The Anti­Terrorism Act 1997 authorises the arrest of any suspected 
terrorism to be made in accordance with the ordinary criminal law of the country.883 A 
police officer when making an arrest ‘shall actually touch or confine’ a suspect of 
committing any acts of terrorism.884 The suspect is then produced in court within 24 hours 
                                                          
882 The Anti­Terrorism Act 1997, Section 21E (2). 
883 Anti­Terrorism Act 1997, Section 19 (A); available at 
http://www.molaw.gov.pk/gop/index.php?q=aHR0cDovLzE5Mi4xNjguNzAuMTM2L21vbGF3L3VzZX
JmaWxlczEvZmlsZS9BbnRpLVRlcnJvcmlzbSUyMEFjdC5wZGY%3D last accessed on 16 March 2016. 
884 Section 46, The Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 with commentary, Lahore: PLD p. 47 
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of the arrest (first safeguard) or within 48 hours if he or she cannot so be produced 
provided that the court is satisfied that further evidence may be available (second 
safeguard) and that no ‘bodily harm has been or will be caused to the accused’ (third 
safeguard).885 The suspected terrorist ‘shall’ then remain in police custody for up to 15 
days.886 He/she shall not remain in police custody for more than 30 days at one time and 
the total period of the custody shall not exceed 90 days as a whole.887 The suspect, from 
time to time, remains under the authority of two officials—the investigation and custody 
officers.888 There is no provision in either the anti­terror laws or in the ordinary criminal 
laws of Pakistan to review the work of the investigation and custody officers. One has to 
ask again if it is reasonable to grant special powers upon law enforcement agencies 
without providing corresponding special safeguards to review their work? 
It is important to understand the omission of police review mechanisms in 
Pakistan’s anti­terror laws. The laws, apart from indefinite and preventive detentions, 
sanction 90 days of pre­charge detention with unlimited powers to investigate a suspected 
terrorist, which is arguably intrusive upon individual human rights. There are several 
reasons why Pakistan’s lack of a review mechanism will fail the test of reasonableness. 
First, the constitution of Pakistan mentions safeguards against unlawful arrest and 
detention. If the powers are increased, then it is only reasonable to also increase 
safeguards. Second, the Supreme Court of Pakistan thinks that a detainee is ‘vulnerable’ 
but a terror detainee is the most vulnerable, so it is incumbent upon the state to put in 
place proper safeguards to protect the most vulnerable detainees. The vulnerability of the 
detained terrorist increases when the police want more information to prevent future 
                                                          
885 Anti­Terrorism Act 1997, Section 21 (E),  available at 
http://www.molaw.gov.pk/gop/index.php?q=aHR0cDovLzE5Mi4xNjguNzAuMTM2L21vbGF3L3VzZX
JmaWxlczEvZmlsZS9BbnRpLVRlcnJvcmlzbSUyMEFjdC5wZGY%3D  
886 Ibid. 
887 Ibid. 
888  Section 156, The Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 with commentary, Lahore: PLD p. 204 – 205; see 
also Pakistan Police Rules 2002, vol. 2, Rules 12.7 and  22.5 available at 
http://www.pakistansocietyofcriminology.com/laws/PoliceRulesVolume2.pdf p. 180 ­ 182 last accessed 
15 March 2016. 
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terrorist attacks or to procure confessions for successful prosecutions. Consequently, it is 
reasonable to carry out a domestic and international human rights law assessment of the 
absence of internal police review mechanisms in Pakistan. 
The constitution of Pakistan does not expressly mention the guarantee of ‘police 
review mechanism’ as a safeguard for its citizens. However, there is an express provision 
regarding a ‘Review Board’, but only in cases of preventive detention.889 Even the 
ordinary criminal law of the country does not contain any provision specifying police 
periodic review, from arrest to the all other stages of the proceedings. Does the absence 
of a review, under the domestic human rights obligations of Pakistan, absolve the country 
from her international human rights obligations in this regard? International human rights 
law expressly provides for the systematic review of any arrest, detention, and 
interrogation.890 This obligation is applicable to all member states, including Pakistan. 
Therefore, the lack of the police review mechanism can neither be justified by the rule of 
proportionality nor by the rule of necessity because the review has no relevancy to the 
rules. The courts, while determining the lawfulness of any terror detention, will infer from 
the review record as to how the detainee has been treated, suggesting judicial review is 
dependent on police review.891 The police review mechanisms seem very significant and 
will, no doubt, help the administration of criminal justice.892 Pakistan has recently 
submitted its initial reports to the UN Human Rights Committee and it will be interesting 
to see if the Committee comments on the lack of a review mechanism in Pakistan’s anti­
terror laws. It seems highly probable that Pakistan will fail to justify the lack of police 
review mechanism in its anti­terror laws when fighting against terrorism through its 
                                                          
889 Constitution of Pakistan, Article 10 (4), available at 
http://www.pakistani.org/pakistan/constitution/part2.ch1.html  
890 United Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, available at http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CAT.aspx , article 11, last 
accessed on 15 March 2016. 
891 Walker, C. (2009) Blackstone’s Guide to the Anti­Terrorism Legislation 2nd ed. New York: Oxford 
University Press. p. 142 ­ 143 
892 Ibid. 
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criminal justice system. The country not only has made harsh anti­terror laws, which 
allow for a very lengthy period for pre­charge detention and which lack provisions 
governing the duration of interrogation session, but it has also allowed the police to 
operate without any internal review mechanism of its own. If such harsh laws are enforced 
by a policing agency in a country without internal review mechanism, then this would 
definitely violate the human rights of terror detainees.  
 
5.2.3.B. Internal Police Review Mechanisms in Practice 
The absence of an internal police review mechanism is one of the biggest 
challenges in Pakistan’s anti­terror laws. This means tying a terror suspect absolutely to 
the police authority. Whatever is written down by an investigating officer is produced in 
court. How the suspected terrorist is treated throughout his or her detention period is not 
reviewed by a distinct reviewing officer. Thus, any such record produced in the court 
raises many questions of its being genuine and accurate, and reflecting the humane 
treatment of the detainee during police custody. So far, many references have been made 
to various NGOs and governmental reports but unfortunately none of the reports directly 
critiques the absence of police review mechanisms in the anti­terror laws of Pakistan. 
However, many of the reports speak about the general accountability of the police.893 The 
accountability of the police can only be ensured when there are automatic, periodic and 
neutral internal police reviews of the treatment of terror suspects. 
The lack of internal police review mechanism perhaps encourages the police to 
exceed their authority. Suspected terrorists are tortured to extract confessions or 
information, which is neither accounted for nor reviewed. This, seemingly, is a major 
shortcoming in the law which casts a huge and frightening picture in action in the form 
                                                          
893 Human Rights Watch (2016) “This Crooked System”: Police Abuse and Reform in Pakistan, p. 79 – 
85 available at https://www.hrw.org/report/2016/09/25/crooked­system/police­abuse­and­reform­pakistan 
last accessed 27 September 2016; See also the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan reports.  
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of torture and other ill­treatment during detention. This inaction in Pakistan’s anti­terror 
laws ensures the translation of fear in action or practice. Terror laws in Pakistan might be 
aimed to reassure the public but in practice they do the opposite—they spread fear—, 
which is one of the six security costs of Zedner. Perhaps terror suspects are considered 
unlawful combatants for whom there is no need to extend the safeguard of internal police 
review mechanism. The absence of a review divides society into ‘We’ and ‘They’. Terror 
suspects are at the mercy of the executive where the judiciary, even if it wants to, cannot 
play an important role to save the suspect from torture or any other ill­treatment because 
of the absence of an internal review mechanism. In other words, when no review record 
is available, then however strong the courts may be, they cannot protect a terror suspect 
from the tyranny of the police. Consequently, Pakistan’s legal response to terrorism is 
streamlined more to the pattern of war or executive model of terrorism. Arguably, it is so 
because there is no an in­depth evaluation or case­study on the treatment of terror 
detainees in Pakistan and the country continues to cross the legal boundaries of the justice 
model for the war or executive paradigm of terrorism.   
 
5.2.4.A. Police Records: Law and Assessment 
The law related to police records in Pakistan can be found in the Anti­Terrorism 
Act 1997. Although statements, evidence or confessions made during police questioning 
are admissible in the court,894certain conditions need to be fulfilled.895 The police officer 
taking any evidence or confession must record it.896 He/she must make it clear to the 
accused that the said evidence or confession will be used against him/her. The officer 
must make sure that the evidence or confession is given voluntarily.897 According to the 
                                                          
894 Anti­Terrorism Act 1997, Section 21H. 
895 Ibid. 
896 Ibid. 
897 Ibid. 
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ordinary laws of evidence in Pakistan, any statement or confession made before a police 
officer is not admissible.898 All such statements or confession must be made before court 
in ordinary cases. Here, the anti­terrorism law is in contradiction with the ordinary law. 
The Investigation for Fair Trial Act 2013 provides for police surveillance and any 
evidence recorded thereunder to be admissible in court in all terrorism cases.899 There is 
nothing in the law to electronically (audio or video recording) record questioning or 
interviews with the suspects.  
The constitution of Pakistan recognises the principle of reasonableness and 
fairness. All fundamental rights are justiciable. This means that the courts need accurate 
records of the treatment of terror suspect during pre­charge detention in order to 
administer justice. Therefore, it is of paramount importance to have police records 
available to courts: “The keeping of full and accurate records of the treatment of a 
detainee is a vital element of ensuring propriety and humanity.”900 The courts rely on 
police records to determine the lawfulness of any detention, frame a charge, and conduct 
a fair trial. Almost all democratic states and core international human rights instruments 
give these rights to any suspect, including a suspected terrorist. However, the anti­terror 
laws of Pakistan do not provide a special procedure to record police investigation, except 
recording confessions.901 The laws authorise the use of ordinary criminal law procedure 
to record police investigations.902 The ordinary procedural law prescribes that all 
investigation officers shall write, on a daily basis, in police investigation diary details 
regarding the time when the information reached them, the time at which they began and 
                                                          
898 Qanun-E-Shahadat Order (Evidence Act of Pakistan) (1984) at Section 38 and 39, available at 
http://punjabpolice.gov.pk/system/files/qanun­e­shahadat­order­1984.pdf, last accessed 18 August 2014. 
899 The Investigation for Fair Trial Act, 2013, Schedule 1 and Chapter 5, available at 
http://nacta.gov.pk/Download_s/Rules/Investigation_for_Fair_Trial_Act_I_of_2013.pdf, last accessed 18 
August 2014. 
900 Ibid., p. 151 
901 Anti­Terrorism Act 1997, Section 21 (H),  available at 
http://www.molaw.gov.pk/gop/index.php?q=aHR0cDovLzE5Mi4xNjguNzAuMTM2L21vbGF3L3VzZX
JmaWxlczEvZmlsZS9BbnRpLVRlcnJvcmlzbSUyMEFjdC5wZGY%3D  
902Ibid., Sections 19 (1) and 28 (5) 
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closed their investigation, the places visited by them, and the circumstances ascertained 
through their investigations.903 The law does not provide for audio or video recording of 
police interrogation. The terrorists’ confessional statements are recorded under the anti­
terror laws of Pakistan, but even thereunder, there is no mention of audio or video 
recording of the proceedings. In addition, any such record is not presented to, or signed 
by the detainee. How then will this record pass the test of reasonableness and fairness? 
Police records are the evidence on the basis of which courts not only determine the 
lawfulness of detention but also frame charge, conduct trial, and issues orders of acquittal 
or conviction.  
Special laws require special safeguards and procedures to balance special powers 
thereunder not to be intrusive upon individual human rights. Consequently, the ordinary 
criminal law procedure is insufficient to balance the anti­terror special powers of 
Pakistan’s police. Special laws must provide special procedures or special safeguards to 
what Walker calls ‘augmented safeguards’ thereunder. Macken also recommends 
‘enhanced human rights protections’904 during police interrogation sessions in terrorism 
cases. The audio or video recording of interrogation sessions can, to some extent, balance 
the arbitrary powers of the police. The recording of audio or video interrogation sessions 
is not new to the country. The police have been given the powers to use audio or video 
recording for surveillance purposes and their production is admissible in court.905 
However, such recording has not been given any place in police interrogations of 
terrorism cases. The principle of reasonableness or fairness excludes any evidence that is 
improperly or unfairly obtained.906 If Pakistan continues to conduct terrorist interrogation 
                                                          
903 Section 172, The Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 with commentary, Lahore: PLD p. 254 – 255 
904 Macken, C. (2011) Counter­terrorism and the Detention of Suspected Terrorists: Preventive Detention 
and international Human Rights Law, New York: Routledge p. 154 – 155. 
905 Investigation for Fair Trial Act 2013, Section 3 (p), available at 
http://www.na.gov.pk/uploads/documents/1361943916_947.pdf  last accessed 16 March 2016. 
906 Macken, C. (2011) Counter­terrorism and the Detention of Suspected Terrorists: Preventive Detention 
and international Human Rights Law, New York: Routledge p. 154 – 155. 
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without audio or video recording, then it will arguably violate its domestic and 
international human rights obligations by producing the evidence in court for prosecuting 
suspected terrorists. This state of affairs further strengthens the thesis main argument that 
in the absence of an in­depth assessment of the topic in Pakistan, the country adopts the 
war or executive model of terrorism in its legal response to terrorism.  
 
5.2.4.B. Police Records in Practice 
The conservative security attitudes in Pakistan are evident from its orthodox 
police record keeping. A police record is manually maintained from the first information 
report to the actual release of a detainee.907 This hampers a quick response to deal with 
terrorism cases and prosecution. Many have suggested modern computerised and 
centralised police record keeping to tackle the menace of terrorism.908   
In Pakistan, the record is neither accurate nor credible for prosecution purposes. 
The resultant outcome is a low conviction rate ranging from 5% to 10% in terrorism 
cases.909 This low terrorist conviction rate spreads fear among the public. Many people 
who have witnessed terrorism offences do not appear in courts to record their evidence to 
                                                          
907 Perito, R. and Parvez, T. (2014) “A Counterterrorism Role for Pakistan’s Police Station”, p. 11 
available at https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR351­A­Counterrerrorism­Role­for­
Pakistan%E2%80%99s­Police­Stations.pdf last accessed 28 September 2016 
908 Perito, R. and Parvez, T. (2014) “A Counterterrorism Role for Pakistan’s Police Station”, p. 11 
available at https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR351­A­Counterrerrorism­Role­for­
Pakistan%E2%80%99s­Police­Stations.pdf last accessed 28 September 2016; See also Human Rights 
Watch (2016) “This Crooked System”: Police Abuse and Reform in Pakistan, p. 60 & 61 available at 
https://www.hrw.org/report/2016/09/25/crooked­system/police­abuse­and­reform­pakistan ; see also 
Abbas, H. (2011) “Reforming Pakistan’s Police and Law Enforcement Infrastructure”, available at 
http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR266­
Reforming_Pakistan%E2%80%98s_Police_and_Law_Enforcement_Infrastructure.pdf  
909 Bhandari, V. (2014) “Pretrial Detention in South Asia: Examining the Situation in India, Pakistan and 
Bangladesh”, p. 58 available at 
http://www.pensamientopenal.com.ar/system/files/2014/12/doctrina39811.pdf last accessed 28 September 
2016; See also Shah, S. (12 March 2016) “Poor Prosecution Plays Havoc With Judicial System”, The 
News International, available at http://www.thenews.com.pk/print/104661­Poor­prosecution­plays­havoc­
with­judicial­system last accessed 28 September 2016 
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avoid reprisals from terrorist groups.910 Such fear holds further sway when there is little 
protection for the witness in law, as is the case in Pakistan.911 
As to the inaccuracy of police record, how can one judge the treatment of terror 
detainees in light of the human rights standards? For example, a bailiff discovered that 
the police in Pakistan write daily entries into the station daily diary in lead pencil, this 
enables them to change these entries at their convenience.912  
Muhammad Akhtar, who had received three death sentences from various courts 
in Pakistan, including an anti­terrorism court, lodged an appeal to the Supreme Court of 
Pakistan alleging police torture and misconduct. The Court found some ‘clear signs of 
police misconduct’ in the investigation record. Some 89 witnesses had appeared in favour 
of the accused before the investigating officer but there was no such record on police files. 
The Court acquitted him on ‘utterly unreliable’ evidence.913 In this situation, how can a 
judge be sure that a terror suspect has been told the reasons for his or her arrest and 
detention? That he or she has been promptly produced before a court? And, that he or she 
has been charged or released promptly? Perhaps, there is no case­study on the treatment 
                                                          
910 Perito, R. and Parvez, T. (2014) “A Counterterrorism Role for Pakistan’s Police Station”, p. 12 
available at https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR351­A­Counterrerrorism­Role­for­
Pakistan%E2%80%99s­Police­Stations.pdf ,“The witness protection system in Pakistan is almost 
nonexistent. Consequently, those who testify 
against powerful criminals and militants in courts receive no security. In dozens of cases, police officers 
investigating militants have been gunned down.” 
911 Ibid. 
912 Justice Project Pakistan, World Organization Against Torture, and Reprieve (2016) “Pakistan: 
Alternative Report to the Human Rights Committee”, p. 25 available at 
http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CCPR/Shared%20Documents/PAK/INT_CCPR_ICO_PAK_24479_E.
pdf “Ali Raza was arrested and detained by police officers on 3 January 2016. Following his arrest, he 
was kept in custody for three days without being produced before a magistrate. Upon the filing of a 
habeas corpus petition by members of his family, a bailiff was dispatched by the court to the police 
station where he was detained. The bailiff discovered that the police officers were recording entries into 
the station diary in lead pencil to enable them to be changed at will. He also discovered that Mr. Raza had 
been subjected to heinous torture by the police whilst in custody. Despite these findings, the magistrate 
continued to extend the physical remand for further investigation.” 
913 Justice Project Pakistan and Reprieve (2014) Case study of Muhammad Akhtar published in “Terror 
on Death Row: The Abuse and Overuse of Pakistan’s Anti­terrorism Legislation” at p. 15 and 16, 
available at  
http://www.jpp.org.pk/upload/Terror%20on%20Death%20Row/2014_12_15_PUB%20WEP%20Terroris
m%20Report.pdf last accessed 01 May 2016 
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of terror detainees during pre­charge detention and this is the reason why the importance 
of police records in terrorism cases is overlooked in Pakistan.  
 
5.2.5.A. Rights of a Terror Suspect to Contact the Outside World: Law and 
Assessment 
There is nothing in either ATA 1997 or in POPA 2014 to prohibit terror detainees 
contacting their relatives. However, the anti­terror laws of Pakistan expressly recognise 
a narrow version of the right to contact the outside world. A terror suspect has the right 
to contact a ‘legal practitioner of his choice’.914 The law also recognises that a medical 
officer will examine a suspected terrorist before and after police custody.915 Nevertheless, 
the law does not say anything about further categories in the right to contact the outside 
world, such as family members, or political or spiritual representatives. This may also be 
governed by the ordinary criminal law of the country. 
In terrorism cases, the government of Pakistan will determine the place of custody, 
investigation and trial.916 The government is privileged to withhold information about any 
detention centre or the whereabouts of any suspected terrorist.917 The government is also 
privileged not to disclose any grounds for detention ‘in the interest of the security of 
Pakistan’.918 Therefore, the place of custody and whereabouts of terror detainees can be 
kept secret, in which case access to relatives will be refused. In certain cases, the public 
can also be excluded from certain terror trials.919 If it is found that any evidence given 
                                                          
914 Anti­Terrorism Act 1997, Section 19 (11A),  available at 
http://www.molaw.gov.pk/gop/index.php?q=aHR0cDovLzE5Mi4xNjguNzAuMTM2L21vbGF3L3VzZX
JmaWxlczEvZmlsZS9BbnRpLVRlcnJvcmlzbSUyMEFjdC5wZGY%3D  
915 Anti­Terrorism Act 1997, Sections 11EEEE (5) and  21 (E)(2),  available at 
http://www.molaw.gov.pk/gop/index.php?q=aHR0cDovLzE5Mi4xNjguNzAuMTM2L21vbGF3L3VzZX
JmaWxlczEvZmlsZS9BbnRpLVRlcnJvcmlzbSUyMEFjdC5wZGY%3D 
916 Protection of Pakistan Act (2014) at Section 9(1), available at 
http://nacta.gov.pk/Download_s/Rules/POPO_2014.pdf, last accessed 18 August 2014.  
917 Ibid., Section 9(2)(a). 
918 Ibid. at Section 9(2)(b). 
919 Protection of Pakistan Act (2014) at Section 10, available at 
http://nacta.gov.pk/Download_s/Rules/POPO_2014.pdf, last accessed 18 August 2014. 
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during any terror trial would prejudice public safety, then the anti­terrorism court can 
exclude the public from it.920  
As explained in Chapter Three, Pakistan has domestic as well as international 
human rights obligations to allow a terror suspect to contact the outside world. People in 
the outside world include family members, friends, lawyers, interpreters, doctors, 
religious leaders, members of parliament, and so on. The entire purpose of this right is to 
help the detained person to prepare his/her defence.921 Doing so facilitates the 
administration of justice. As explained in Chapter Three, the prohibition of 
incommunicado detention and the permission to access the outside world is a liberal 
concept.  
On assessment, Pakistan is perhaps performing better here than in its other human 
rights obligations. Pakistan at least expressly provides for the right of terror suspects to 
contact the outside world, though narrowing its scope, but it is still apt to recognise the 
suspected terrorist’s right to contact a legal counsel to prepare his/her defence. Here, the 
country seems highly likely to fulfil its domestic and international human rights 
obligations on contacting a lawyer but unfortunately not in other categories under the 
outside world, such as family, friends and so on. However, in practice, terror detainees 
have been given opportunities to meet their relatives but sadly the law was misused by 
the authorities taking bribes from the relatives of suspected terrorists for each contact.922 
It will be interesting to assess the gap between law and its operation in practice in this 
regard. 
 
 
                                                          
920 Ibid. 
921 Greer, S. (2009) “The Detention of Suspected Terrorists in Northern Ireland and Great Britain”, 
University of Richmond Law Review, 43 at 929–930. 
922 Ahmed, S. (2012) “Police reform in Balochistan”, published in Stabilizing Pakistan through Police 
Reforms, Asia Society Report by the Independent Commission on Pakistan Police Reforms at 114. 
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5.2.5.B. Rights of a Terror Suspect to Contact the Outside World in Practice 
In the past, terror detainees had rights to contact their relatives but they were 
misused by the authorities, who collected bribes from the relatives for each contact.923 
So, there are credible reports that in practice detainees are usually deprived of this right 
or some hardships are placed in the way to get access to the outside world. The UK Home 
Office stated on their website that in Pakistan “some police and security forces reportedly 
held [detainees] incommunicado and refused to disclose their location.”924 Human Rights 
Watch reports that police and security forces in Pakistan continuously deny terror 
detainees access to their lawyers, relatives, independent monitors and humanitarian 
agencies.925 On a number of occasions, Asian Human Rights have reported that access to 
terror suspects has been a perpetual problem in Pakistan and that this has led to the illegal 
practice of enforced disappearance in the country.926 It has also been reported that police 
in Pakistan extract bribes from the relatives of the arrested person for access to see their 
loved ones in detention.927 The UN Committee Against Torture has also raised the issue 
of incommunicado detention in the context of Pakistan.928  
If access to the outside world is denied in practice, then how can a terror suspect 
prepare his/her defence? This triggers the violations of other rights, such as the right to a 
fair trial. The UN Human Rights Committee in two of its General Comments also finds 
that incommunicado detention amounts to torture.929 This happens when conservative 
                                                          
923Ahmed, S. (2012) “Police Reform in Balochistan”, in Stabilizing Pakistan through Police Reforms, 
Asia Society Report by the Independent Commission on Pakistan Police Reforms at 114. 
924 Home Office (2016) “Pakistan: Prison Conditions”, para 5.3.3 available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/528401/PAK_Prison_cond
itions.pdf last accessed 28 September 2016 
925 Human Rights Watch (2014) World Report 2014, available at https://www.hrw.org/world­
report/2014/country­chapters/pakistan  
926 Asian Human Rights Report (2013) “Pakistan: Country has turned into a killing field”, available at 
http://www.humanrights.asia/resources/hrreport/2013/AHRC­SPR­005­2013.pdf/view last accessed 28 
September 2016 
927 Ahmed, S. (2012) “Police Reform in Balochistan”, published in Stabilizing Pakistan through Police 
Reforms, Asia Society Report by the Independent Commission on Pakistan Police Reforms at 114 
928 The UN Committee Against Torture (1 June 2017) “Concluding observation on the initial report of 
Pakistan”, CAT/C/PAK/CO/1 
929 Human Rights Committee General Comment No. 35 and 20 
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attitudes are dominantly reflected in the anti­terror laws—the law enforcement agencies 
further circumvent them and resort to enforce the law more harshly in action. The 
outcome is the destruction of civil rights and the legalisation of torture. In practice, 
Pakistan follows Posner’s approach to keep a terror detainee incommunicado to extract 
evidence, money, or more information from him. This evaluation of the rights of a terror 
suspect to contact the outside world suggest that Pakistan does not take its legal response 
to terrorism very seriously. Perhaps, the country relies on other fights—war or 
executive—in its legal response to terrorism, the purpose of which is to prosecute terror 
suspects.  
 
5.2.6.A. Detention Conditions: Law and Assessment 
Like the earlier sections, this section will first identify and then assess the law 
related to the detention conditions in Pakistan in light of the country’s domestic and 
international human rights obligations.   
What then is the law regulating detention conditions during pre­charge detention 
in Pakistan? There is no provision either in ATA 1997 or in POPA 2014 governing food, 
water, clothing, bed, space or medical examination of the persons detained. The Acts do 
not even mention the extension of the Pakistan Prison Act 1894930 (hereafter, PPA 1894) 
or the Pakistan Prison Rules 1978 (hereafter, PPR 1978), which govern the treatment of 
the accused detained under the ordinary criminal laws of Pakistan. Therefore, the anti­
terror laws of Pakistan do not regulate the detention conditions in the country. These are 
left to the ordinary criminal law as is evident from Pakistan’s initial reports submitted to 
the Human Rights Committee.931 Police Rules of Pakistan provide detailed information 
                                                          
930 Pakistan Prison Act (1894), available at http://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl­
nat.nsf/6fa4d35e5e3025394125673e00508143/2b59eb02419269eec12576fd00331bd5/$FILE/Pakistan%2
0The%20Prisons%20Act%201894.pdf  
931 Report of The Human Rights Committee, General Assembly forty sixth session, 40(A/46/40) p. 244, 
available at https://documents­dds­
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on the detainees’ food during breakfast, lunch and dinner.932 The detainee is also entitled 
to a bed and a blanket, they can attend the toilet and pray during prayer time as long as 
he/she remains in police custody.933 As mentioned previously, terror suspects are 
subjected to special powers. They are the subject of national security. There is, therefore, 
a greater likelihood that their breaks (food, sleep, personal hygiene, prayer, etc.) might be 
interrupted. Why would this not be in the case of Pakistan when the country authorises a 
90­day detention period and unlimited police interrogation periods, which are not even 
reviewed? The detainees are also kept in incommunicado detention. The ordinary laws 
regulating the food, sleep, personal hygiene, prayer or recreational facilities of terror 
suspects in the country would, therefore, not be able to cope with the situation. 
So, what are Pakistan’s domestic and international human rights obligations 
related to the detention conditions. As explained in Chapter Three, Pakistan is under 
domestic and international human rights obligations to treat terror detainees humanely 
and with fairness.934 They shall be provided with enough food and sleep. They have the 
right to take short and long breaks. They shall be given access to attend to personal 
hygiene, exercise in fresh air, read books or magazines, and be allowed to perform prayer.  
The UN Human Rights Committee concludes that it is violation of Article 10 
ICCPR to provide a detainee with ‘insufficient food, of very low nutritional value, no 
access whatsoever to recreational or sporting facilities… or even basic hygienic facilities, 
medical or dental care, or any type of educational services’.935 The UN Human Rights 
                                                          
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N91/291/64/PDF/N9129164.pdf?OpenElement last accessed 20 March 
2016; see also General Comment No. 21 
 
932 Pakistan Police Rules 2002, Vol. 3 Appendix 32.22 (3), available at 
http://www.pakistansocietyofcriminology.com/laws/PoliceRulesVolume3.pdf p. 372 ­ 375 
933 Ibid., Rule 32.19 
934 ICCPR, Article 10; See also University of Minnesota, “Right to Humane Treatment and Terrorism”, 
available at https://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/iachr/humanetreatment.html last accessed 20 March 2016 
935 Report of The Human Rights Committee, General Assembly forty sixth session, 40(A/46/40) p. 244, 
available at https://documents­dds­
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N91/291/64/PDF/N9129164.pdf?OpenElement last accessed 20 March 
2016; see also General Comment No. 21 
Page 223 of 272 
 
Committee has also decided a case, related to prison conditions, between Maria S. 
Arredondo, a Peruvian citizen and the state party, Peru, in 2000. Arredondo was arrested 
on account of several terrorist offences in the state of Peru and she was detained there in 
a high security prison for women. She describes the prison conditions in which she was 
kept as follows: 
She claims that prison conditions are appalling, and that the inmates are allowed 
out of their 3 x 3 metre cells only for half an hour each day. They are allowed no 
writing materials…radio or television. The quality of the food is poor. Many 
inmates suffer from psychiatric problems or contagious diseases. All inmates are 
housed together and there are no facilities for the sick. When inmates are taken 
to hospital, they are handcuffed and fettered. Inmates are allowed only one visit 
a month from their closest relatives.936 
 
The Human Rights Committee found these prison conditions ‘excessively restrictive’ 
and,937 thus, in violation of Article 10, paragraph 1(humane treatment) of the ICCPR. 
Given that the special anti­terror laws of Pakistan do not govern the detention conditions 
in terrorism cases, this is left to the ordinary law of the country to cope with. 
Consequently, there seems to be a great likelihood that the application of ordinary in cases 
of terrorism would either be circumvented or overlooked in Pakistan because the terror 
detention conditions needs special laws to be governed and not ordinary laws. So, what 
are the detention conditions in practice in which terror suspects are kept in Pakistan? It 
will be interesting to see the impacts in action of the treatment of terror suspects who are 
not protected through special laws providing special or augmented safeguards.  
 
5.2.6.B. Detention Conditions in Practice 
There are many credible reports to rely on for the assessment in practice of the 
law related to the detention conditions in Pakistan. According to these reports, the terror 
                                                          
936 Maria S. Arredondo v Peru, 14 July 2000, CCPR/C/69/D/688/1996, para 3.1 
937 Maria S. Arredondo v Peru, 14 July 2000, CCPR/C/69/D/688/1996, para 10.4 
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detainees are usually kept in miserable detention conditions. The HRCP reports on the 
conditions of prison and detention centres in the country, as follows: 
The condition of prisoners [including terror detainees] in Pakistan remained 
dismal. Chronic issues such as overcrowding, lack of proper healthcare system, 
inferior quality food, corruption and rampant torture continued in the year under 
review…HRCP’s fact-finding missions in 13 prisons all over Pakistan in 2013 
and 2014 failed to see improvement in food quality.938 
 
The Commission reiterates the status quo in these words in its next annual report, “The 
harsh conditions of detention in Pakistani prisons remained unchanged in 2015 and a 
failure to consider alternatives to custodial detention remained the biggest challenges.”939  
The US State Department reports that many chronic health issues have erupted in 
the detention centres of Pakistan due to inadequate food, malnutrition, and bad 
sanitation.940 Similarly, the International Commission of Jurists reported, “Overcrowded 
prisons, torture and other ill­treatment, and inadequate health and hygiene facilities 
generally plague detention and prison facilities for all crimes.”941 Freedom House reports: 
Prison conditions are appalling [in Pakistan]. Many prisons have been associated 
with gross human rights violations and feature chronic malnutrition, extremely 
tight shackles leading to gangrene and amputation, endemic physical abuse 
(including rape), and the routine use of torture.942 
 
Likewise, Amnesty International has raised ‘serious concerns’ over the transparency and 
the treatment of terror suspects arrested in Pakistan.943 Owing to these concerns, the UN 
Committee Against Torture has also asked Pakistan to provide information on steps taken 
                                                          
938 Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, State of Human Rights in 2014, available at http://hrcp­
web.org/hrcpweb/data/ar14c/2­2%20jails%20and%20prisoners%20­%202014.pdf 
939 Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, State of Human Rights in 2015, available at Human Rights 
Commission of Pakistan, State of Human Rights in 2014, available at http://hrcp­
web.org/hrcpweb/data/ar14c/2­2%20jails%20and%20prisoners%20­%202014.pdf  
940 US Department of State (2016) “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2015: Pakistan”, 
available at http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/#wrapper  
941 International Commission of Jurists (2015) “On Trial: The Implementation of Pakistan’s Blasphemy 
Laws”, available at http://icj.wpengine.netdna­cdn.com/wp­content/uploads/2015/12/Pakistan­On­Trial­
Blasphemy­Laws­Publications­Thematic­Reports­2015­ENG.pdf last accessed 29 September 2016 
942 Freedom House (2011) “Countries at the Crossroads”, available at 
https://freedomhouse.org/report/countries­crossroads/2011/pakistan last accessed on 29 September 2016 
943 Amnesty International, Pakistan 2015/2016 available at https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/asia­
and­the­pacific/pakistan/report­pakistan/ last accessed on 29 September 2016 
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to improve its detention conditions.944 There seems little doubt that the conditions in 
which terror suspects in Pakistani detention centres are kept will be awful.  
Stringent anti­terror laws lead to stringent actions and, as mentioned before, the 
Pakistani police are convinced of this. So, in practice, they keep in mind the dominant 
conservative security attitudes keeping dire conditions of detention for the detainees to 
confess or teach them a lesson. In summary, Pakistan does not seem to fulfil its human 
rights obligations when it comes to the detention conditions during pre­charge detention 
in terrorism cases. This state of affairs reaffirms the main argument of this thesis: in the 
absence of an in­depth evaluation on the treatment of terror suspects during pre­charge 
detention in Pakistan, the legal response of the country is modelled on the pattern of the 
war or executive model of terrorism.  
 
PART III 
5.3.0 Conclusion 
Terrorism poses a unique threat to the security of Pakistan and its people. The 
country has been hit hard during the recent terrorism cycle, which has led to the deaths of 
more than 60,000 people, including members from various law enforcement agencies and 
civilians.945 Its political leadership has also been targeted, including the killings of 
prominent political figures such as Benazir Bhutto and Bashir Bilour. The country’s 
airports, air defences, and naval defence capabilities have also been targeted. Even 
beyond the killings and attacks on political and military leaderships, the country’s tourist 
industry has also suffered a tremendous number of losses due to attacks on them. 
                                                          
944 The UN Committee Against Torture (1 June 2017) “Concluding observation on the initial report of 
Pakistan”, CAT/C/PAK/CO/1 
 
945 South Asia Terrorism Portal (19 November 2017) ‘Pakistan’, available at 
http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/database/casualties.htm last accessed 19 November 
2017. 
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Meanwhile, schools and school going children have not been spared. Consequently, it is 
apt for the country to have its own anti­terrorism laws to guard against terrorism. 
This chapter has answered the third research question: what is the law on the 
treatment of terror detainees during pre­charge detention in Pakistan? To what degree the 
country complies with its human rights obligations in this regard? And, is there any gap 
between the Pakistan’s law and practice when treating terror detainees? This chapter 
examined and evaluated the laws related to the treatment of terror detainees during the 
pre­charge detention in Pakistan. It says that if a suspect is arrested, then he/she can be 
held in detention for a total of 90 days. The total period is split into single durations which, 
at one time, shall not be more than 30 days. There is an obligatory minimum period of 15 
days (e.g. an arrested terror suspect shall not spend in detention less than 15 days). An 
arrested person must be produced within 24 hours of his or her arrest. There is no 
provision regulating the duration of police interrogation and there are no legal provisions 
allowing internal police review mechanisms during that 90 days detention. The accuracy 
of police records and conditions of detention are regulated through the ordinary criminal 
procedural laws, which are insufficient to safeguard terror detainees from police abuses. 
A terror suspect has a right to contact his legal practitioner but no other closely related 
categories, such as family and friends. 
Owing to the close examination and assessment of these laws, Pakistan seems to 
be in violation of its domestic, as well as international, human rights obligations. There 
are also many gaps between the country laws and actions. Many NGOs and other human 
rights bodies have gathered evidence of torture, maltreatment of terror suspects and 
Pakistan’s major domestic and international human rights obligations when treating terror 
detainees during pre­charge detention. The main reason for this is that there is hardly any 
case­study on the treatment of terror detainees in the country. Therefore, Pakistan seems 
unable to differentiate its legal response to terrorism from its war or executive response. 
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Pakistan gives more importance to its national security over individual human 
rights. Therefore, it neglects its major domestic and international human rights 
obligations for several reasons. First, the 90 days pre­charge detention period is excessive. 
The period seems a failure due to very low conviction rates of less than 10%. Similarly, 
a major part of the period (i.e. 60 days) is unnecessary because the anti­terror laws of the 
country obligates the police to submit a full police report within 30 days of the arrest. 
This clearly reflects the war or executive model by keeping terror detainees for 60 days 
under unnecessary and arbitrary detention. The 90 days pre­charge detention period is, 
therefore, unnecessary and unreasonable specially when the country allows, 
simultaneously, indefinite and preventive detentions. Second, there is no specified length 
for the duration of police interrogation sessions of terror suspects. The country can, 
therefore, interrogate the suspect for an unlimited time period, for 90 days in total; thus, 
significantly sacrificing individual human rights in favour of its national security. Third, 
a police review mechanism that would serve as a check on the abusive powers of the 
police is absent in the law. Furthermore, interrogation sessions are not electronically 
(audio or video) recorded to minimise police arbitrary powers and assist courts in the 
administration of justice. In addition, apart from the suspected terrorist’s right to contact 
the outside world, his or her food, sleep, breaks, attending to personal hygiene or 
recreational facilities and so on are all regulated by the ordinary criminal law. The 
ordinary criminal law regulation of the food, sleep, personal hygiene, prayer or 
recreational facilities of terror suspects in the country seems to be weak in the presence 
of special powers, such as to detain a suspect for 90 days and interrogate him or her for 
unlimited time period. The anti­terror laws of Pakistan provide special powers but no 
special safeguards.  
In conclusion, this evaluation clearly suggests that Pakistan follows Posner’s 
pragmatism—declaring terror suspects as unlawful combatants, supporting coercive 
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interrogation sessions and techniques, and advocating incommunicado detention, in its 
legal response to terrorism. Pakistan also reflects Ackerman’s emergency constitution 
where the executive is empowered to defeat terrorism at all costs without any 
accountability. The country seems to be in line with the ‘Extra­legal Measure’ model of 
Oren Gross, permitting prolonged pre­charge detention when the country at the same time 
also allows for indefinite detention and continues not to provide any internal police review 
mechanism. It is arguably obvious now that Pakistan crosses certain legal boundaries in 
its legal response to terrorism. The country arguably reflects the war or the executive 
conception of terrorism in its anti­terrorism laws. This evaluation of the treatment of 
terror detainees during pre­charge detention in Pakistan arguably introduces new 
knowledge in the realm of human rights law and terrorism. A case­study of the powers of 
pre­charge terror detention in Pakistan will arguably add more credibility when UK is 
used as a comparator to the main case. As was mentioned in Chapter Two, there is a 
complete absence of a case­study of Pakistan’s treatment of terror detainees during pre­
charge detention because none of the scholars has used UK acting as comparator for 
Pakistan; therefore, an in­depth study of the two countries in this regard is very important 
for introducing new knowledge in the field. Doing this will provide a good opportunity 
for the two countries, particularly for Pakistan, to learn each other’s experience on the 
topic. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
CONCLUSION 
 
6.0 Introduction 
This chapter will answer the last research question—What can Pakistan learn from 
the UK’s treatment of terror detainees during pre­charge detention, and vice versa? And, 
what can these two countries learn from the human rights law in this regard? This is a 
concluding chapter on the treatment of terror detainees in Pakistan and the UK. Pakistan 
is the main case­study while UK acts as a comparator to the main case. The study will 
compare and contrast in greater depth, the treatments in the two countries so that these 
two countries will be able to learn how to treat terror detainees in a criminal justice system 
during pre­charge detention. The scholarship will also compare and contrast the practices 
of both countries on the topic.   
Chapter Five arguably filled the niche—the absence of an evaluation on the 
treatment of terror detainees during pre­charge detention in Pakistan because there was 
none before this on the topic. This chapter will further support the evaluation in the 
context of Pakistan by comparing and contrasting the country with the UK’s experience 
on the topic for drawing some useful conclusions or lessons. 
Part I provides several recommendations on the treatment of terror detainees 
during pre­charge detention for Pakistan to learn from and amend its anti­terror laws 
accordingly. These recommendations are related to: an unnecessary lengthy pre­charge 
detention period in the country; unlimited interrogation powers; a lack of internal police 
review; an inaccurate police record; and, the rights of a terror suspect to contact the 
outside world and other detention conditions such as the quantity and quality of food and 
drink, sleep, breaks for prayer, attend to personal hygiene, exercise in fresh air, and so 
on. Chapter Five arguably filled the niche by assessing the treatment of terror detainees 
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because there was hardly any such evaluation related to the topic. This chapter will put 
forward useful suggestions to plug the shortcomings or violations of the human rights 
obligations, together with some useful findings that are more in compliance with the 
human rights law and principles in the topic. This will help Pakistan’s legal response to 
terrorism to distance itself from the war or executive response to terrorism.  
Part II covers the context of the UK. The UK can learn from Pakistan’s experience 
on the principle of promptness. There are other potential areas in which the UK can learn 
on the treatment of terror detainees during pre­charge detention in Chapter Four, 
particularly in relation to the lengthy period of the detention (14 days in total) and the 
limited internal police review during the first 48 hours.  
Part III identifies more gaps for further research closely connected with this 
research project. It also provides implications for other similar jurisdictions to benefit 
from the findings and recommendations of this research project.  
 
Part I 
6.1.0 Lessons for Pakistan 
Chapter Five arrives at several useful research findings in the context of Pakistan 
on the topic. First, the total period of 90­days pre­charge detention in the country is 
unreasonable. Pakistan’s police also detain terror suspects for longer than the permitted 
period in practice. They can detain a terror suspect for a maximum period of 30­days at a 
time, which shall not be less than 15­days. Pakistan fully complies with the prompt 
production of terror detainees to produce them before a court within 24 hours of the arrest; 
however, such production is often delayed in practice. Second, there is no express law 
governing the duration of police interrogation in the country. Third, there is no law to 
regulate police records in terrorism cases. This chapter also finds that police records are 
often misused in practice. Next, the assessment also finds that there are no internal review 
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mechanisms in the country’s police to remain a check on the coercive powers of an 
investigation or custody officer. In addition, there is a limited right available to a terror 
suspect to contact the outside world and even that is also misused in practice. Finally, the 
detention conditions in which terror detainees are kept during the 90­days are not in 
accordance with the human rights law and principles.  
These findings reveal that there is a grave need for Pakistan to reform its treatment 
of terror detainees during pre­charge detention. The human rights law and the UK 
experience in this regard can guide Pakistan to improve its treatment of terror detainees 
in law as well as in practice.   
 
6.1.1 The Period of Pre-charge Detention 
Chapter Five on the treatment of terror detainees in the context of Pakistan 
concludes that the country can detain a terror suspect in police custody for a total of 90­
days during pre­charge detention. The human rights law assessment of the period in this 
chapter also concludes that such period is unnecessary and arbitrary, and not only violates 
Article 9 of the ICCPR but also violates the rights to liberty, life and security of person 
as entrenched in the constitution of Pakistan. In other words, the total 90­days pre­charge 
‘ought not to be like what it ‘is’. This chapter also carried out an assessment of the period 
in practice and found out that the it is further extended during the operation of the law. 
The human rights assessment says that the period is unnecessary and arbitrary while the 
assessment of the law in practice makes it more unnecessary and arbitrary in what it does 
in practice. Therefore, it is very important that Pakistan should consider reducing its total 
period of the pre­charge detention.  
The human rights law in Chapter Three and the assessment of the treatment of 
terror detainees in light thereof can offer certain guiding principles that can help Pakistan 
to reform its pre­charge detention. The country should learn that the purpose of detention 
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is not penalising or teaching a lesson to a detainee but to gather information for a 
successful prosecution or release of the suspect.946 As stated in the previous chapter, there 
is no third outcome in pre­charge terror detention. The country should also know that 
there is a marked difference between a legal response to terrorism and the war or 
executive response to terrorism. A legal response to terrorism, which is different from the 
war or executive responses to terrorism, seeks to prosecute successfully terror suspects. 
The 90 days of pre­charge detention, as we saw in Chapter Five, is unnecessary and 
unreasonable, and it deprives someone of her/his liberty.  
Pakistan follows Bruce Ackerman’s emergency constitution, providing 60 days 
detention extendable to another three months.947 As Macken said, the purpose of pre­
charge detention is to ‘freeze time’.948 Liberal approaches to security do not tolerate a 
perpetual freezing of time. As David Luban said, emergencies are temporary departures 
and they are not a perpetual phenomenon.949 Pakistan cannot freeze time to detain a terror 
suspect for 90­days as a whole in a criminal justice model. If it does so, then the country 
clearly violates Article 9 of the ICCPR and its own constitution protecting fundamental 
rights. Many have objected to the 90­day period of the pre­charge detention.950 So, the 
country should consider reducing its total period of the pre­charge detention. Also, is 
noted in Chapter Two, human rights law states there should be a reasonable period for the 
pre­charge detention.  
                                                          
946 Macken, C (2011) Counter­terrorism and the Detention of Suspected Terrorists: Preventive Detention 
and international Human Rights Law, New York: Routledge. 
947 Ackerman, B. (2004) “The Emergency Constitution”, Yale Law School 
948 Macken, C (2011) Counter­terrorism and the Detention of Suspected Terrorists: Preventive Detention 
and international Human Rights Law, New York: Routledge. 
949 Luban, D. (2005) Eight Fallacies about Liberty and Security in Human Rights in the ‘War on Terror’ 
edited by Wilson, R.A. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
950 Walker, C. (2009) Blackstone’s Guide to the Anti­Terrorism Legislation, 2nd ed. Oxford University 
Press: New York. See also, Dickson, B. (2009) “Article 5 of the ECHR and 28­day Pre­charge Detention 
of Terrorist Suspects”, Queen’s University Belfast. NILQ 60(2): 231­244. Awan, I. (2011) “The Erosion 
of Civil Liberties: Pre­charge Detention and Counter­terror Laws”, The Police Journal 84. Greer, S. 
(2008) “Human rights and the Struggle Against Terrorism in the United Kingdom”, European Human 
Rights Law Review 2. 
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What will suffice as a reasonable period in the context of Pakistan then? If we 
look at this from a liberal interpretation of the UN Human Rights Committee, then the 
total period of the pre­charge detention should not be more than a ‘few days’.951 In other 
words, there should be a small number of days to detain a terror suspect and gather 
information from them to help change a reasonable suspicion into a concrete suspicion. 
In other words, a terror suspect should be charged or released within a few days. This 
period, in the eyes of the UN Human Rights Committee, is less intrusive on liberty and 
is, therefore, reasonable. This reasonable period is a peculiar feature of a legal response 
to terrorism which differentiates it from a war or executive response to terrorism 
providing indefinite and lengthy detentions respectively.    
Seven days should, perhaps, suffice the ‘few days’ requirement of the UN Human 
Rights Committee. But how can Pakistan suddenly reduce the periods of its current pre­
charge from 90­day to seven days? This apparently seems an uphill task for the country 
for two reasons. First, reducing the 90­days to seven days would overburden the police to 
carry out that efficient investigation in that comparatively shorter period to gather 
sufficient evidence in making the decision to either charge or release the detainee. The 
seven days reduction of the pre­charge detention would require Pakistan to altogether 
revamp its criminal justice system; particularly the investigation and prosecution 
departments, which would require more time. Second, as was noted in Chapter Five, in 
ordinary cases a suspect can be kept in police custody for a total of 15­days. It is 
understandable from the conservative approaches to security and their stance on the 
treatment of terror detainees in Chapter Two that terrorism cases require more time to be 
investigated due to the unique threat that it poses to the national security. Consequently, 
                                                          
951 The Human Rights Committee (2014), General Comment No. 35, CCPR/C/GC/R.35/Rev.3, para 33, 
available at 
http://docstore.ohchr.org/SelfServices/FilesHandler.ashx?enc=6QkG1d%2fPPRiCAqhKb7yhsrdB0H1l59
79OVGGB%2bWPAXjdnG1mwFFfPYGIlNfb%2f6T%2fqwtc77%2fKU9JkoeDcTWWPIpCoePGBcMs
RmFtoMu58pgnmzjyiyRGkPQekcPKtaaTG  
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in the case of Pakistan, the total period of the pre­charge detention in terrorism cases 
cannot be less than the total period of the detention in ordinary cases—this is illogical.   
Owing to the two main issues associated with the reduction of the total period of 
pre­charge detention in Pakistan to seven days, how then can the country achieve this 
aim? It is suggested to achieve the target slowly by learning from the UK’s experience. 
There was a time when the UK’s pre­charge detention period was 28 days.952 At that time, 
there were two opinions—conservative and liberal—the former wanted to extend the 
period further while the latter wanted to reduce it.953 Conservative proponents in the UK 
made two attempts to increase the period. Gordon Brown, the then Labour PM but who 
supported conservative attitudes, decided to elevate the length of pre­charge detention to 
42 days while David Cameron, the Conservative PM after Gordon Brown, was in favour 
of elevating it to 90 days.954 However, none of these attempts succeeded. Eventually, the 
28 days detention was reduced to a total of 14 days.955 Therefore, keeping in view the UK 
parliament’s resistance to increasing the period—instead, it reduced it—Pakistan should 
immediately start thinking to reduce its total period of the pre­charge detention. What 
Pakistan is recommended to do is to start thinking reducing the total period of pre­charge 
terror detention. Pakistan should bear in mind its obligations to fight against terrorism 
and its parallel obligations to respect individual human rights.  
In contrast to the UK’s experience and liberal values to reduce the total period of 
the pre­charge detention, Pakistan’s own anti­terror laws state that a terror investigation 
                                                          
952 Walker, C. (2009) Blackstone’s Guide to the Anti­Terrorism Legislation, 2nd ed. Oxford University 
Press: New York. See also, Dickson, B. (2009) “Article 5 of the ECHR and 28­day Pre­charge Detention 
of Terrorist Suspects”, Queen’s University Belfast. NILQ 60(2): 231­244. Awan, I. (2011) “The Erosion 
of Civil Liberties: Pre­charge Detention and Counter­terror Laws”, The Police Journal 84. Greer, S. 
(2008) “Human Rights and the Struggle Against Terrorism in the United Kingdom”, European Human 
Rights Law Review 2. 
953 Ibid. 
954 Ibid. 
955 Blackbourn, J. (2014) “Evaluating the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation”, Parliamentary 
Affairs 67, The University of New South Wales, Australia 
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must be completed within 30 days after arrest.956 This is an obligation in the country to 
respond to terrorism through its criminal justice system. This is a positive obligation to 
gather information within 30 days either to charge or release the terror suspect. Therefore, 
the 90­day pre­charge detention is a clear contradiction to the positive obligation of 
Pakistan to complete a terrorism investigation within 30 days. While the country’s 90­
day period is so high, it should first consider reducing the total to 30 days, which is a 
mandatory period within which a completed police file must be submitted with the court. 
In that 30­days, Pakistan should decide whether to charge or release the detainee.  
After some time, perhaps within couple of years, Pakistan could further reduce 
the new 30 days period of the detention to 15 days. The country’s commitment and 
perpetual adherence to the reduction practice should continue until the total period is cut 
down to what is reasonable in the eyes of the human rights law; that is, a few or seven 
days. This will bring Pakistan into compliance with the UN Human Rights Committee’s 
‘few days’ pre­charge detention. However, one can counter­argue by pointing out that the 
ordinary laws of the country allow for 15 days pre­charge detention.957 This is a genuine 
hurdle. This research, therefore, exposes another gap in the knowledge, which is that the 
15 days pre­charge detention in ordinary cases is too high. It is even higher than the UK’s 
current total period of pre­charge detention (14 days in total) in terrorism cases. It is 
suggested to carry out future research in this area to assess the total period of pre­charge 
detention of Pakistan related to ordinary criminal cases only within similar jurisdictions. 
The 15­day pre­charge detention period in ordinary criminal laws of Pakistan can be 
traced back to British rule in India. It was introduced in 1898 and still has not been 
critically evaluated in light of the UDHR and the ICCPR. If Pakistan is to ever achieve a 
seven days total period of pre­charge detention in terrorism cases, then it must reduce first 
                                                          
956 Anti-Terrorism Act 1997, Section 19 (1); available at 
http://www.molaw.gov.pk/gop/index.php?q=aHR0cDovLzE5Mi4xNjguNzAuMTM2L21vbGF3L3VzZX
JmaWxlczEvZmlsZS9BbnRpLVRlcnJvcmlzbSUyMEFjdC5wZGY%3D  
957 The Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 with commentary, Lahore: PLD Section 167 (2) p. 246 
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the detention period of ordinary offences to save the argument. No doubt, Pakistan needs 
to adhere to its human rights obligations and learn from its comparator (the UK) to make 
it a reality. 
What then can Pakistan learn from the human rights law and the UK’s experience 
on the police custody, at a time, of a terror suspect? Chapter Five found that Pakistan can 
keep a terror detainee in police custody for a maximum of 30­days at a time. Chapter 
Three noted that a terror suspect should not be detained for more than two days at a time 
in police custody, as per the body of human rights law. It was also noted in Chapter Four 
that, currently, UK police can keep a terror suspect in custody for a maximum of six days 
at a time. Consequently, Pakistan seems far from fulfilling this human rights obligation 
because there is a big difference between 30­days and two days police remand at a time. 
However, although the UK’s six days is in compliance with the human rights law, which 
ideally requires two days, it does not seem to be as far away from the requirements of 
human rights law as Pakistan’s 30­days.  
If Pakistan has to comply with the human rights law, which requires two days 
police custody, then per its current 90­days total period of pre­charge detention would 
require issuing a total number of 45 further warrants of detention in police custody. 
However, if Pakistan reduces its current total period of 90­days of pre­charge detention 
to the suggested 30­days, then it would issue a total number of 15 further warrants of 
detention—that is, two days police custody at a time spread over the total period of the 
suggested 30­days pre­charge detention. However, if Pakistan follows the UK’s six days 
further detention at a time in police custody, then it would require a total of 15 further 
detention warrants spreading over a total period of 90­days pre­charge detention. In this 
case, if Pakistan reduces the total period of 90­days pre­charge detention to a new 
suggested total period of 30­days and the country follows the UK’s period of police 
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custody (i.e. six days at a time), then Pakistan would have to issue a total of five further 
warrants of detention spread over a total period of 30­days.  
The assessment of the treatment of terror detainees in Pakistan in Chapter Five 
identified another dominant conservative attitude in the pre­charge detention regime of 
Pakistan—which is the country’s mandatory minimum period of detention in police 
custody of 15 days. This minimum benchmark period is even greater than the total period 
of the pre­charge detention in the UK. The 15­days obligatory minimum period of one 
remand in police custody is unreasonable, as concluded in Chapter Five, and Pakistan 
ought to repeal it if the country is to fulfil its human rights obligation. How can Pakistan 
repeal the minimum 15 days obligatory period in police custody? The country should look 
again at the UK’s pre­charge detention management. There is no such provision for 
obligatory minimum restriction in the UK’s law on the pre­charge detention period. The 
UK courts can give a terror suspect in police custody from one to six days at a time. If 
Pakistan lowers its total 90­day pre­charge detention period to 30 days and then sticks to 
the six days in police custody at a time, it will still surpass the 15 days mandatory 
minimum bench mark detention. 
As was noted in Chapter Four, there is no gap between the law and its enforcement 
on the period of pre­charge detention in the UK. However, Chapter Five reveals that in 
Pakistan terror detainees are kept in detention for more than the total permitted period 
(i.e. 90­days). Police excesses have also been reported when a terror detainee is not 
produced within 24 hours of their arrest produced before the court. As mentioned in 
Chapter Five, detainees are often produced late because the police in Pakistan torture 
them, which leave marks on the detainee’s body. Consequently, the police wait until the 
torture marks have disappeared before producing the detainees before the court. 
Therefore, Pakistan must make sure, just like the UK, that there is no gap between the 
country’s law and practice on the period and management of the pre­charge detention. 
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Chapter Five also found that the lengthy period of pre­charge terror detention (90 
days in total) does not prove to be useful. There is only 10% successful prosecution rate 
in the country. The chapter also noted that there is no data available on pre­charge terror 
detention for analysis. If there is any data in the country, then a research and development 
wing in police department should add information as to when a terror detainee is formally 
charged soon after his/her arrest. If a higher percentage of the arrested persons are 
charged, say for example, within a week, then the country must immediately reduce its 
total 90­day pre­charge detention to a week. 
In conclusion, although Pakistan already follows the human rights standard on the 
prompt production of a terror detainee (i.e., producing a terror suspect before a court 
within 24 hours), it should ensure that the principle is not violated in practice. All 
unexplained delays should be criminalised. The country should also reduce its 90­days 
period of the pre­charge detention to a new total period of 30­days spread over a total 
number of five further detention warrants, each warrant not more than six days at a time. 
This would allow Pakistan to fulfil all of its human rights obligations related to the 
management of the pre­charge detention in law and in practice. In addition, Pakistan 
should put in place a system of compensation for suspects who have been unlawfully 
detained. Once Pakistan has adopted all of these suggestions into its law and practice, 
then it would be able to confidently reply to the objections raised by the UN Human 
Rights Committee on the total period of the pre­charge detention in terrorism cases.958 
Pakistan will also be able to confidently say that it understands a clear difference between 
a legal response to terrorism and the war or executive response to terrorism.  
 
 
                                                          
958 The Human Rights Committee (15 November 2016) “List of Issues in Relation to the Initial Report of 
Pakistan”, CCPR/C/PAK/Q/1 
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6.1.2 Police Interrogation and Questioning 
Chapter Five in the context of Pakistan found that the country’s anti­terror laws 
do not provide the regulation of police interrogation sessions. There is a complete absence 
of the law on this topic. Perhaps, this has been left to the discretion of law enforcement 
agencies. This attitude supports Posner’s coercive interrogation.959 This is perhaps why 
the torture and mistreatment of terror suspects in the country is endemic, as concluded in 
Chapter Five. The human rights law and the experience of the UK provides a good 
example that Pakistan could learn from. 
First, there should be system of codes and schedules in Pakistan enlisting in detail 
how to carry out a terror investigation. These should also stipulate the length of the 
interview with the terror suspect. In the UK, a police officer cannot interrogate a terror 
suspect for more than two hours. This is a safeguard to protect a terror detainee in police 
custody. As noted previously, a terror suspect in Pakistan can remain in police custody 
for a total of 90­days. If this detainee is thoroughly interviewed, because currently there 
are no time limits to regulate police interrogation sessions in the country, then it will 
definitely amount to arbitrary treatment because it will be coercive. If Pakistan keeps its 
90­day total detention period then it should not leave the interrogation session duration 
to the discretion of police. This state of affairs maximises the chance for torture and other 
mistreatment at the hands of police. As mentioned by Luban, torture needs more time 
because a terror suspect is kept under a constant and prolonged fear of death, injuries to 
vital organs, or emotional torture.960 The law must provide a time frame for when to start 
and end such interrogations. It is suggested, in the presence of 90­days detention period, 
that Pakistan should interrogate a terror detainee for not more than 30 minutes at a time 
because the 90­day detention as a whole gives more time to police to carry out their 
                                                          
959 Posner, R. A. (2006) Not a Suicide Pact: The Constitution in a Time of National Emergency, Oxford 
University Press: Oxford and New York. 
960 Luban, D. (2008) “Unthinking the Ticking Bomb”, Working Papers George Town University Law 
Centre. 
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investigation more effectively. If we look at the ratio of the pre­charge detention total 
period to the length of police interrogation period in the UK, then we can see that it is a 
ratio of 14­days to two hours. If we extend the same ratio to Pakistan, it approximately 
comes to the ratio of 90­days to 30 minutes. The country should give a suspect a 15­
minute break between interrogation sessions. If the country lowers its detention period to 
30 days in total, then it could increase the interrogation sessions to one hour at a time. 
This mirrors the UK’s ratio of 14 days detention to two hours interrogation at a time.  
Pakistan must video record all police interrogations. There should be nothing off 
the record, as in the UK.961 No interrogation should be permitted during the night. The 
codes and schedules should also provide for the conditions of the place where police 
interrogations are carried out. These places must be lit and maintained to a comfortable 
temperature. A detainee, as in the UK, should not be compelled to either stand up during 
the interview or be required to maintain any other stress positions. It is hoped that all 
these safeguards will improve the treatment of terror suspects in Pakistan. The country 
should not only enact laws in this regard but it should also make sure that the laws are 
truly reflected in practice. There are many other important procedural safeguards that are 
lacking in the country’s anti­terror laws regulating the treatment of terror suspects, which 
will be discussed next.  
 
6.1.3 Internal Police Review Mechanisms 
Unfortunately, there is no internal police review mechanism during pre­charge 
detention in the anti­terror laws of Pakistan. As mentioned in Chapter Five, a terror 
suspect is handled by custody and investigating officers. There is no review officer to 
check the actions of the custody and investigating officers in the handling or treatment of 
                                                          
961 Walker, C. (2009) Blackstone’s Guide to the Anti­terrorism Legislation, 2nd ed. Oxford University 
Press: New York. 
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terror detainees in Pakistan. A police review mechanism is an important procedural 
safeguard, as mentioned in Chapters Four and Five. As described in Chapter Five, this 
saves a terror detainee from the cruelty and arbitrary acts of police. It is strongly suggested 
that Pakistan should provide a police review mechanism to save terror suspects from 
possible police torture and other excesses. The UN Human Rights Committee has asked 
in its List of Issues for Pakistan to provide the Committee with the criteria of placing a 
suspect in police custody.962 The Committee has also asked Pakistan to provide it with 
the information on the mechanisms in place to guarantee the protection and safety of 
terror suspects from the law enforcement officials.963 These come under the police review 
mechanism, which is currently absent in the anti­terror laws of Pakistan. It is suggested 
the country should learn from the human rights law and the UK’s practice on this. Just as 
any country has an obligation to fight terrorism, for which it makes arrests and allows 
detention, similarly there is a corresponding obligation on the country to safeguard the 
residual liberty and security of a terror suspect in police custody.  
Pakistan should incorporate a police review mechanism into its anti­terror laws. 
There is ample opportunity for the country to learn from the UK’s experience. Pakistan 
should create the office of a review officer by enacting the duties and powers of the review 
officer, who will not only keep an eye on police excesses, from time to time, but will also 
make important decisions pertaining to granting further detention of a terror suspect in 
police custody. In the UK, there is provision for police review but, unfortunately, it is 
limited to the first 48 hours in police custody. Pakistan should learn from the UK to 
provide for a police review mechanism but the country should also reflect more liberal 
attitudes and allow the review methods to cover the total period of the pre­charge 
detention. The first review should be in the first 12 hours of the arrest followed by 
                                                          
962 The Human Rights Committee (15 November 2016) “List of issues in relation to the initial report of 
Pakistan”, CCPR/C/PAK/Q/1 
963 Ibid. 
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subsequent reviews after every 48 hours. The review officer should also have the power 
to make a decision to release a terror suspect or forward his/her case for further detention 
to the court. If a review officer recommends a terror suspect for further detention, then he 
or she should inform the suspect about this decision. The review officer must be satisfied 
before releasing the suspect that there is no reasonable ground to charge him and that he 
is prima facie innocent. If the suspect is innocent, then he or she should be told that he 
has an enforceable right to compensation. The review officer must also be satisfied before 
a terror suspect is recommended for further detention that there are reasonable grounds 
on which to charge the suspect but further interrogations are needed for clarification and 
that the investigation is carried out ‘diligently and expediently’.964 The review officer 
should also remind detainees about the reasons for their arrest and of other rights, such as 
to contact their family members or friends. The review officer should make sure that the 
detainees are treated humanely at all times. The review officer should also make sure that 
any voluntary statement, disclosure of facts or confession made by the suspect is signed 
by the suspect. If the suspect refuses to do so, then the confession should be accompanied 
with a note by the investigating officer signed in the presence of the review officer. The 
incorporation of the police review mechanism in Pakistan’s anti­terror laws will improve 
the treatment of terror detainees during pre­charge detention. The country should also 
make sure that the review mechanism is professionally carried out in practice.  
 
6.1.4 Police Records 
Chapter Five assesses Pakistan’s police records and the way that it is maintained. 
Even in this modern technological era, according to the assessment, the country still 
adheres to manual record keeping. The study blames police records for keeping the pre­
                                                          
964 Walker, C. (2009) Blackstone’s Guide to the Anti­Terrorism Legislation, 2nd ed. Oxford University 
Press: New York. 
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charge detention period so lengthy, which renders it unnecessary. In addition, most of the 
time the record is found inaccurate, resulting in more acquittals.965 To overcome this, 
Pakistan must revamp its police record system. It will improve the rate of successful 
prosecutions, and it will also serve as a technological check on police mistreatment of 
terror suspects. It will keep account of the police actions that are in excess of their powers, 
in addition to keeping a record of the criminals’ histories. The detainee or his or her legal 
counsel should be given copies of the record, free of charge, from arrest to release. 
Pakistan should understand that the police record plays very important role in the 
administration of criminal justice. The country should not only legislate on police records 
but it should also ensure that the records are professionally maintained. This will not only 
improve the human rights image of the country but also will lead to increase in the 
successful rate of prosecution in terrorism cases, which at present is less than 10% (as 
mentioned in Chapter Five). Pakistan should also understand that the legal response to 
terrorism is a fight against terrorism, which relies on the successful prosecution of 
terrorism cases and which is different from the war or executive responses.  
 
6.1.5 Rights of a Terror Suspect to Contact the Outside World 
It was noted in Chapter Five that Pakistan’s anti­terror laws expressly recognise a 
terror suspect’s right to contact his lawyer and doctor. It also noticed that this right has 
been violated in practice in the past. Perhaps this happens because there are no expressly 
detailed provisions in the anti­terror laws of the country governing this right. What 
Pakistan should learn from its human rights law assessment in Chapter Five and the UK’s 
experience is that the country should amend the current law and incorporate into it the 
                                                          
965 Case study of Muhammad Akhtar published in “Terror on Death Row: The Abuse and Overuse of 
Pakistan’s Anti­terrorism Legislation” ( 2014) p. 15 and 16 Justice Project Pakistan and Reprieve, 
available at  
http://www.jpp.org.pk/upload/Terror%20on%20Death%20Row/2014_12_15_PUB%20WEP%20Terroris
m%20Report.pdf  
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full meaning and scope of this right to the human rights standards. For example, which 
outsiders can a terror detainee contact? There should be different categories, such as 
relatives, friends, colleagues, lawyers, medical officers, interpreters, religious scholars 
and visitors from governments and NGOs, and so on. The law should make it incumbent 
upon the police to inform outsiders on the part of the detainee. It should also be made 
clear how to inform outsiders: phone call or through a formal letter or informing them in 
person. The law should also make clear when to contact the outsiders. Such contact should 
not be unnecessarily delayed. There should be a detailed list of categories describing 
extraordinary situations in which such access may be denied.  All these should come 
under a consolidated code, such as the UK’s Code H. The code should mention the 
visitors’ time and duration of each visit, and so on. There should also be a complaint 
system for the terror detainees, which should show the full procedure of how to use it 
under the code if they are not given the right to contact the outside world. These will help 
prevent instances of enforced disappearance and other forms of incommunicado detention 
in Pakistan. This will change Pakistan’s current legal response to terrorism rather than 
reflecting the war or executive paradigm of terrorism in its criminal justice system. In 
addition, Pakistan’s human rights image will ipso facto improve.  
 
6.1.6 Detention Conditions  
Chapter Five found that there is no provision in the anti­terror laws of Pakistan 
that govern conditions (food, sleep, prayer, reading or exercising, etc.) of detention 
centres in which terror suspects are kept for 90­days. It was also noted that terror detainees 
are kept in awful conditions. Chapter Five concluded that Pakistan violates its human 
rights obligations by not making any special rules to regulate the quality and portions of 
food for terror detainees, allowing enough time for sleep, providing regular medical care, 
providing breaks for prayer and personal hygiene; providing reading or writing facilities, 
Page 245 of 272 
 
or allowing exercise in the fresh air and at their free will. The UN Human Rights 
Committee in its recent List of Issues has asked Pakistan to provide more information on 
the improvement of detention conditions in the country.966 It is time for the country to 
fulfil its human rights obligations on the topic and to treat terror suspects with humanity 
and dignity, at least during their pre­charge detention period. The country should also 
bear in mind that a terror suspect is innocent until proven guilty. 
In summary, Pakistan should learn not only from the human rights law on the 
treatment of terror detainees but also from the UK’s Code H, providing clearer rules 
governing the treatment of terror suspects in detention centres. Pakistan should make a 
similar code, keeping in mind its human rights obligations and monetary budget, to that 
of the Code H. Why should Pakistan not do so when it is its positive duty to save people, 
including terror suspects, on its soil from arbitrary arrest and detention? This will also 
allow society to not be divided into two or more ‘identifiable groups’ paying for the cost 
of security. Pakistan is also responsible for guaranteeing the right to life and security of 
person without discrimination. The proposed code should clearly define a single portion 
meal and list down all the ingredients and the quantity thereof for one person at one time. 
Similarly, it should list how many times a day, bearing in mind its human rights 
obligations and monetary strengths, meals should be provided to a detainee. Likewise, it 
should also detail how much tea and how many times in 24 hours a terror suspect can be 
provided with tea. In addition, breaks for personal hygiene, reading and writing books 
and so on, offering prayers and open­air exercise should also be prepared and displayed 
inside the premises. Finally, Pakistan should draft and display a complaint procedure to 
address the detainees’ grievances, if any. The country is not only duty bound to enact 
                                                          
966 The Human Rights Committee (15 November 2016) “List of Issues in Relation to the Initial Report of 
Pakistan”, CCPR/C/PAK/Q/1 
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these laws but it should also make sure that there is no gap between the law and its 
practice.  
 
Part II 
6.2.0 Lessons for the UK 
The evaluation in Chapter Four in the context of the UK found the country follows 
most of its human rights obligations when treating terror detainees during pre­charge 
detention. Hence, this chapter concludes the UK can be used as a suitable comparator to 
learn lessons from. However, the chapter also revealed a number of findings where there 
is a need for the country to further improve its treatment of terror detainees during pre­
charge detention. First, the 14­days total pre­charge detention period is not in compliance 
with the human rights law. Second, the country’s maximum allowed police custody of a 
terror detainee is six days at a time. Although this is not against the human rights law, the 
period can be further reduced to further improve the country’s law and practice. Third, 
on the prompt production of a terror detainee, although the country does not violate the 
standards set by the human rights law, there is still more room to produce a terror detainee 
before a court more promptly. Finally, the evaluation also finds that the country does not 
allow for the internal police review mechanism to run throughout the total 14­day period. 
The human rights law and Pakistan’s experience can offer the UK some examples to learn 
from and further improve its treatment of terror detainees during pre­charge detention. 
   
6.2.1 The Period of Pre-charge Detention 
It was noted in Chapter Four that the UK can detain a terror suspect in the 
administration of criminal justice system for a total period of 14­days. The UK’s current 
pre­charge detention period may not be the highest but it is definitely the highest in the 
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comparable jurisdiction, as noted from the assessment on the treatment of terror detainees 
in the UK in Chapter Four. The UN Human Rights Committee has raised its concern 
about the country’s longer pre­charge detention period.967 Liberty has also raised its 
concern over the 14­day pre­charge detention period.968 What the UK should learn from 
the human rights law is to consider a further reduction in the total detention period. The 
UK should take a bold step and amend its Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 to allow a 
seven­day total pre­charge detention period. In the UK, 92% of suspects are charged 
within a week.969 If this is the case, then why should there be a deprivation of liberty for 
an additional week? Therefore, the UK should seriously consider reducing its current total 
period of pre­charge detention, which is currently 14­days, to a total of seven days. It is 
highly likely that if the UK implements this revision, it would no longer receive objections 
from the UN Human Rights Committee on this point. The seven days total period seems 
just and reasonable, and there is also no big gap between the country’s total period of the 
pre­charge detention in terrorism and ordinary criminal law cases. The country’s ordinary 
criminal law allows a total pre­charge detention period not more than 96 hours (i.e. four 
days).970 The seven­day detention period in terror cases is not even double that of the 
ordinary detention period.   
The UK can legally keep a terror detainee in police custody for a maximum of six 
days as previously found out in Chapter Four. If the UK still commits to keep her total 
period of the pre­charge detention as 14­days, then it should minimise the period of each 
warrant of detention in police custody. If two days at a time is considered to be a 
                                                          
967 The Human Rights Committee Concluding Observation on the Seventh Periodical report of the UK, 
CCPR/C/SR.3168 and 3169. “The Committee is also concerned that the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 
maintains the 14­day limit on pre­charge detention in terrorism cases…The State Party should …consider 
reducing the maximum period of pre­charge detention in terrorism cases.” 
968 Liberty, “Extended Pre­charge Detention”, available at https://www.liberty­human­
rights.org.uk/human­rights/countering­terrorism/extended­pre­charge­detention last accessed 05 July 
2016 
969 Anderson, D (2013) “The Terrorism Acts in 2012” see para 8.10 on page 79 available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/243472/9780108512629.p
df  
970 PACE 1984 section 44 available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1984/60/section/44  
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reasonable period for one remand in police custody, then the UK should allow a total 
number of six warrants of further detention spreading over the country’s total period of 
14­days pre­charge detention. However, if the advised seven days period of the total pre­
charge detention is accepted, then there will be a total number of three further warrants 
of detention spreading over the total period of the newly suggested pre­charge detention 
which is seven days. This will function as an important safeguard to protect a terror 
suspect from ill­treatment and arbitrariness during police custody. 
Chapter Four assessed and concluded that the UK police fully comply with the 
standards of promptness mentioned in the ECHR and ICCPR in terrorism cases. However, 
the UK could learn from Pakistan’s example and produce a terror suspect before a court 
within 24 hours, which is currently 48 hours in the UK. While Pakistan has been hit worse 
by terrorism than the UK, if Pakistan’s law allows for the production of a terror suspect 
within 24 hours then why should the UK not do so? 
The UK is a role model when it comes to the enforcement of the laws related to 
the management of the pre­charge detention. The assessment in Chapter Four in the 
context of the UK did not find much evidence where the country’s practices in this regard 
are in violation of her laws on the management of the total period of the pre­charge 
detention, the period a terror detainee is kept in police custody at a time, and the prompt 
production of a terror detainee for the first time before the court.   
In summary, at present a terror suspect can be detained for a total period of 14­
days, of which a total number of two further warrant of detention maximum of six days 
at a time are allowed and a terror detainee is produced before a court within 48 hours. If 
the UK accepts the suggestions in this part, then it should reduce its total period of pre­
charge detention to seven days there is a possibility that a terror suspect would remain in 
police custody for a total number of two further warrant of detention or police remand 
each for a maximum period of three days at a time after a review officer and court are 
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satisfied that further detention should be authorised and the prompt production of the 
terror suspect should be reduced to 24 hours. Consequently, this research suggests that 
the UK should consider halving its current 14­days total detention to seven days; six days 
detention at a time to three days; and 48 hours to 24 hours.  
 
6.2.2 Police Interrogation and Questioning 
The UK is one of the best examples to learn from when it comes to the treatment 
of terror suspects during police interrogation for the administration of criminal justice. As 
mentioned in Chapter Four, the UK has enacted codes and schedules that provide minute 
details regarding the handling of terror suspects. The treatment is suspect­centred for 
several reasons: the police do not compel a terror suspect to stand up during 
interrogations; their cell is lit and heated, the police conduct interviews during the day 
time; a suspect takes short and long breaks, for which the investigating officer usually 
stops questioning the suspect; and, the duration of interrogations is not more than two 
hours at a time. It has also been noted in Chapter Four that the UK police do not exceed 
their actions. They remain within the bounds of law to carry out their duties. All these are 
true as long as a terror suspect remains on the soil of the UK. The laws and actions of the 
UK police complies with its human rights obligations.  
However, all that changes when the UK’s law enforcement agencies operate 
outside the country. Although this is not the focus of this research, it is necessary to note 
that the UK is not a role model in all sorts of interrogations. Unfortunately, the UK law 
enforcement agencies, as mentioned in Chapter Four, are accused of being complicit in 
the torture and other ill­treatment of the terror detainees interrogated overseas. Various 
NGOs and the UN Human Rights Committee have substantiated strong cases against the 
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UK in this regard.971 The UK has accepted these allegations and it has even publicly 
apologised for the wrongful actions.972 If the UK adheres to conducting its overseas 
interrogations to the same standards as it observes on its soil when interrogating terror 
detainees, then this will surely improve its human rights record of the country. If so, then 
the UK would not have to publicly apologise and pay high reparation costs, as were paid 
in the case of Baha Musa.   
 
6.2.3 Internal Police Review Mechanisms 
The internal police reviews (initial and subsequent) are useful procedural 
safeguards in the UK to protect a terror suspect from abuses and mistreatment from the 
police. As mentioned previously, these safeguards are available to a terror suspect during 
his or her first 48 hours in police custody. The assessment in Chapter Four in the context 
of the UK can provide some guiding principles for the UK in this regard. Another lesson 
the country should learn is to allow the police to review the treatment of terror suspects 
from arrest to the end of the pre­charge detention period. At present, it will be 
administratively more difficult and expensive to cover the entire 14­days detention and 
review handling of the suspect. However, if the country reverts to the seven­day detention 
period, then it would be less difficult to carry out such reviews. Chapter Four on the UK’s 
treatment of terror suspect regards the UK’s internal police review mechanism as a liberal 
ideal and if it is applied throughout the period of the pre­charge detention, then it might 
become exemplary for other countries to follow. 
 
                                                          
971 Turns, D. “The Treatment of Detainees and the “Global War on Terror”: Selected Legal Issues”, 
International Law Studies, Vol 84. See also The Seventh Periodical Report submitted by the United 
Kingdom before the Human Rights Committee in 2013; See also The Amnesty International Report 
(2006) United Kingdom – Human Rights: A Broken Promise, available at 
http://www.statewatch.org/news/2006/feb/ai­uk­report.pdf  p. 66. See also WWW.Bahamousainquiry.org 
972 Ibid. 
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6.2.4 Police Records 
The UK keeps up­to­date records of a terror suspect during police custody. 
According Chapter Four on the treatment of terror detainees in the UK, a custody officer 
is responsible for the accuracy and safety of the record. This chapter also found that an 
investigating officer assumes the duties of a custody officer when interrogating a terror 
suspect.973 Most importantly, there is nothing ‘off the record’ when an investigating 
officer questions a terror suspect. The evaluation did not find a gap between the law and 
police practices when maintaining the police record. Therefore, the UK laws and practices 
are in compliance with human rights law when it comes to its obligations on the police 
record. 
Chapter Four also highlighted the discrepancy in it its overseas interrogation of 
terror suspects and criticised the UK’s law enforcement agencies because they did not 
keep proper accounts of their interviews. Although these were overseas operations and 
were part of an episode of the war paradigm of terrorism. These operations are not the 
focus of this research. It is important here to differentiate between the UK’s police record 
in a legal response to terrorism from the war or executive paradigm of terrorism. The 
evaluation brought to the fore that the UK’s agencies argued that they were not 
responsible for the custody of the detainees and, therefore, did not bother to keep records 
of the interviews in the overseas operations. The UK’s episode of the overseas human 
rights violation in terrorism cases is seemingly due to the lack of keeping interview 
records. If the UK looks at its own maintenance of the police record in its legal response 
                                                          
973 Blakely, R. and Raphael, S. (2016) “British Torture in the ‘War on Terror’” European Journal of 
International Relations 1 – 24. “In other cases, record keeping 
by officers on the ground was so poor that there were no interrogation records or records 
with no or limited details of the welfare of the prisoner concerned.” See also The Report of the Detainee 
Inquiry (2013) available at http://www.detaineeinquiry.org.uk/wp­
content/uploads/2013/12/35100_Trafalgar­Text­accessible.pdf last accessed on 28 October 2016 
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to terrorism, then it can adopt this example in its overseas interviews if it still intends to 
pursue the war on terror abroad.  
 
6.2.5 Rights of a Terror Suspect to Contact the Outside World 
Chapter Four did not find anything in the rights of a terror detainee to contact the 
outside world that is against the human rights law. Instead, it appreciated the UK’s stance, 
which even reminds a terror suspect of his or her right to contact the outside world (i.e., 
relatives, friends, solicitors etc.). The assessment did not find any gap in the law and the 
practice of the police. Here, the UK is very clear in its legal response to terrorism, which 
requires a terror suspect to contact the outside world, including his or her lawyer, to 
prepare her/his defence. 
 
6.2.6 Detention Conditions 
Similarly, Chapter Four also observed that terror detainees in the UK are kept in 
good conditions during their pre­charge detention. As long as they are in police custody, 
they are provided with nutritious food, enough hours to sleep (eight­hour rest), prayer 
time, exercise facilities, and short breaks for tea and personal hygiene, and so on. This 
humane treatment of terror suspects during police custody is welcomed and act as a useful 
comparator for other countries to follow. 
 
Part III 
6.3.0 Further Research and Implications 
If Pakistan follows the proposals for reform in Part I of this chapter in its anti­
terrorism laws governing the treatment of terror suspects, then this will safeguard liberty 
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for all during the pre­charge detention period. However, further research is required to 
protect liberty during all stages of a terrorist trial in Pakistan. How then should liberty be 
protected from intelligence gathering, surveillance and profiling? This research will only 
be able to help to protect terror suspects during pre­charge detention. Therefore, this 
protection is only available for a limited time—30 days, after arrest, but only if Pakistan 
reduces her current 90­days detention. What treatment do terror suspects experience 
during post­charge detention? Bokhari has mentioned that many terrorists have waited 
for years for their trial to commence.974 What about the treatment of the terror suspects 
after conviction? Therefore, there is a need for further research to evaluate all of the anti­
terrorism laws in Pakistan in light of the human rights law and principles. This should 
overhaul the anti­terrorism laws and regimes of Pakistan, fundamentally changing its 
more aggressive and dominant conservative attitudes to more liberal ones. The residual 
liberty of terrorists will be protected throughout. Pakistan has recently promised to reform 
its criminal justice system with a particular focus on the reformation of anti­terrorism 
laws.975 Ideally, experts in Pakistan should bear in mind this case­study on the treatment 
of terror detainees when reforming Pakistan’s legal response to terrorism.  
Chapter Five found that Pakistan tends to prefer to reflect the war or executive 
conception of terrorism in its legal response to terrorism. It is, therefore, recommended 
that Pakistan should clearly differentiate its criminal justice response to terrorism from 
its war or executive responses. The conservative approaches to security that were 
described in Chapter Two might prove useful in the war paradigm of terrorism or an 
executive response to terrorism because these responses are directed to disrupt terrorism 
rather than prosecuting terrorists. However, a legal response to terrorism requires the 
                                                          
974 Bokhari, S.W. (2013) “Pakistan’s Challenges in Anti­terror Legislation”, Centre for Research and 
Security Studies. 
975 Abbasi, A. (2016) “Criminal Justice System to be Overhauled”, The News available at 
https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/155038­Criminal­justice­system­to­be­overhauled last accessed 20 
March 2017 
Page 254 of 272 
 
criminal justice system to act on certain liberal ideals to make that defeat of terrorism 
possible. However, if the country shifts from more conservative to more liberal attitudes 
in its legal fight against terrorism, then this will have implications for countries with 
similar jurisdictions, such as India. All of those states which currently adhere to hard­
nosed security approaches will learn from Pakistan’s change of attitude and will follow 
the same course. For example, India can detain a terror suspect for 180 days.976 India’s 
treatment of terror suspects has been the subject of constant criticism.977 Likewise, in 
Israel a terror suspect can also be detained for 180 days.978 Israel’s counter­terror powers 
often lead to human rights violations.979 Others, such as Iran, allow pre­charge detention 
for 120 days;980 and Afghanistan authorises 75 days detention,981 which often violates the 
detainee’s human rights for the sake of security.982 We can learn from Pakistan’s example 
that these countries’ current dominant conservative attitudes should be changed to more 
liberal attitudes. This will enable the human rights of terror detainees to be protected 
throughout the world. Consequently, there will cease to be discrimination between ‘they’ 
                                                          
976 The Prevention of Terrorism Act of India, 2002 section 49 (2) b available at 
http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/document/actandordinances/POTA.htm last accessed 20 
March 2017; see also Sen, S. (2015) “Anti­terror Law in India: A Study of Statutes and Judgements, 2001 
– 2004” Vidhi Centre for Legal Policy, p. 64 
977 Human Rights Watch, 2016 annual report on India available at https://www.hrw.org/world­
report/2017/country­chapters/india last accessed on 20 March 2017 
978 Blum, S. (2008) “Preventive Detention in the War on Terror: A Comparison of How the United States, 
Britain, and Israel Detain and Incapacitate Terrorist Suspects”, The Journal of the NPS Center for 
Homeland Defense and Security available at https://www.hsaj.org/articles/114 ; see also Lokesson, M. 
(2013) “How the World Treats Terrorist Suspects”, National Geographic available at 
http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2013/13/130423­dzhokhar­tsarnaev­boston­marathon­
bombing­terrorist­rights­detention/ last accessed 20 March 2017 
979 Human Rights Watch, 2016 annual report on Israel available at https://www.hrw.org/world­
report/2017/country­chapters/israel/palestine last accessed 20 March 2017; see also Ma’an News Agency 
(2016) “Israel's Knesset passes 'draconian' anti­terrorism law”, available at 
https://www.maannews.com/Content.aspx?id=771897 last accessed on 20 March 2017 
980 Human Rights Watch (2013) “Iran: Guarantee Rights of Terror Suspects”, available at 
https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/02/22/iran­guarantee­rights­terror­suspects last accessed 20 March 2017 
981 United States Department of State, 2015 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - Afghanistan, 
13 April 2016, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/5711040d4.html accessed on 20 March 
2017; see also https://www.unodc.org/tldb/pdf/Afghanistan_anti-terrorism_law_2008.pdf  and 
https://www.unodc.org/res/cld/document/criminal-procedure-code_html/Criminal_Procedure_Code_-
_Endorsed_by_President_EN_2014_03_14_with_TOC.pdf  
982 Ibid; see also Human Rights Watch (2013) “Iran: Guarantee Rights of Terror Suspects”, available at 
https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/02/22/iran­guarantee­rights­terror­suspects last accessed 20 March 2017 
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and ‘we’, and between the ‘enemy’ and an ordinary criminal. The focus will remain on 
prosecuting terror suspects in accordance with the relevant human rights law and norms.   
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